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Presentation  
Carla Faralli, Jeanne Gaakeer, Marcelo Campos Galuppo, M. Paola Mittica 
and Ana Carolina de Faria Silvestre Rodrigues 
 
it is precisely the act of forgetting that makes it possible  
for law to be applied indiscriminately and therefore unjustly   
[Blumenthal 2007: 36] 
What is so special about the topic of Law and Emotion? Law, at least as traditionally 
understood in some theories of jurisprudence, prefers the realm of reason above that of 
emotion. In order to legitimize their decisions, judges in civil-law jurisdictions refer to 
law in books , while in common-law surroundings to precedents and the rules derived 
from them. But in law in action , as the proponents of Legal Realism already pointed 
out earlier in the twentieth century, emotion is an indisputable factor, to be tested 
empirically as well. According to them, Law by definition leaves room for the 
subjectivity of judges, although not necessarily only of the kind of law-as-what-the-
judge-had-for-breakfast . 
If judicial decision-making were only be a matter of rationally determining the 
relevant legal criteria for the case at hand and then applying them, it would be correct to 
say that judges and legal actors in general depend only on their intellectual faculties to 
solve legal problems in concrete cases. However, if we assume that in the phase of the 
determination of the relevant facts of a legal case, there are more things at work, 
namely, a going to and fro, i.e., from the facts to the legal rule and back, then we can ask 
in what way the relevance of specific facts is determined. 
Judging is choosing, and this not only goes for the applicable rule (statutory or 
otherwise), but also for the relevant facts in concreto. It is here that the idea that judicial 
perception is both professionally trained and character-dependent comes in, and that 
the question of the role of emotion in decision-making comes to the fore. Legality in 
contemporary jurisdictions demands of the judge to stay clear of her subjective 
persuasion so that the rule of law, rather than of men, can be guaranteed. But the judge 
needs both a head and a heart , as Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer claimed, 
because when you are representing human beings or deciding things that affect them, 
you need to understand, as best you can, the workings of human life. [...] Only the most 
difficult cases get to the Supreme Court, those cases where perfectly good judges come 
to different conclusions on the meaning of the same words. In those difficult cases, it is 
very important to imaginatively understand how other people live and how your 
decisions might affect them, so you can take that into account when you write  (Breyer 
2015). To Breyer, in order to meet this criterion, judges need to seek nourishment in 
literature, if they are to develop both the necessary imagination for a good eye on the 
Presentation 
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circumstances of a case as well as the necessary empathy to judge well1, since the under-
determinacy of law draws the attention to judicial emotions as well. How do judges 
perceive themselves, how do they view their societal role and function, and their legal 
personae in daily practice? How do they educate themselves as far as their legal 
imagination is concerned? In which way does their ethos affect their logos (and pathos, 
when it comes to their court personae)? 
Translated into the interdisciplinary field of Law and Literature, or, more broadly, 
Law and Humanities and Law and Culture, this suggests various interesting topics for 
research, such as: 
a) the role of emotions in adjudication as a topic for empirical investigation to 
develop a literary-legal or narrative methodology and/or theory of adjudication that 
challenges traditional normative approaches, which usually focus only on rationality and 
cognition, and disregard, and even deliberately discard, emotion; 
b) the combined development of the heart and the head  through literary works, 
as suggested in legal practice by Stephen Breyer, and in legal theory by Martha 
Nussbaum and others working on the topic of empathy and imagination as elements of 
judicial practical wisdom in Aristotelian studies;  
c) the tension between reason and emotion that judges and other judicial actors 
experience, in themselves and in the people whose fates they are deciding. According to 
Aristotle, the virtuous person is likely to have appropriate emotions in different kinds of 
situations as her emotions flow from a firm character disposition. However, virtue is 
hard to achieve and so we can ask whether most of the judges and the parties in the 
legal process are prudent enough. What is more, judges in their daily practice must 
manage their private lives and feelings in order to create a public face  when they handle 
other people s feelings and their own at the same time. However, this emotional and 
intellectual labor cannot avoid the tragic dilemma  or the tragic legal choice , i.e., when 
the choice to be made cannot avoid suffering and pain, as already depicted in Greek 
tragedy; 
d) the representation of emotion in law in cultural artifacts such as novels (both 
high culture and popular), TV series, tabloids, and televised court dramas in which 
judges have gained popularity and notoriety these past few years. Is such representation 
not often a farcical portrayal of law (and its emotions in its various guises as noted 
above; think, for example, of Judge Judy s display of emotions ), or does such 
representation perhaps serve other ends? And, viewed differently, is not the gist of so 
many products of popular culture that law is the great redeemer (John Grisham s 
template for legal fiction comes to mind here, as does the TV series CSI)? This 
redemptive aspect is often in sharp contrast to everyday legal reality with plea 
bargaining, problems in jury selection in common law legal systems, the law s undue 
delays, or miscarriages of justice as a result of assigning heavy tasks to inexperienced 
(examining) judges.  
The topic Law and Emotion  has prompted a collection of papers previously 
presented in the Special Workshop that the editors co-convened in 2015 in Washington, 
D.C., on the occasion of the XXVII World Congress of the International Association 
for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Presented as articles in this volume, 
they explore (at least one of) the topics suggested above and they do so from a variety 
                                                 
1 Each of those stories involves  ... 
literature very hel  Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, 103rd 
Congress, 2nd session 232-233, 1994, statement of Stephen G. Breyer, Supreme Court Nominee. 
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of theoretical and cultural-disciplinary backgrounds. They find a common ground in the 
task of reflection on the relationship between law and emotion through the privileged 
lens of literature. 
This Special Workshop has met since the Frankfurt edition of this Conference, 
and we have enjoyed organizing it not only due to the intellectual development that it 
provides, but also due the personal relationship that it has assured.  
In particular, the Workshop has made possible a permanent relationship among 
our different experiences in Law and Literature in our countries: the European Network 
for Law and Literature, here represented by Jeanne Gaakeer; the Italian Society for Law 
and Literature, coordinated by Carla Faralli and M. Paola Mittica; and the research 
group rooted in Brazil under the guidance of Marcelo Galuppo. 
The Editors 
Presentation 
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Emotion, Reason and Political-Legal Bond: 
Ideas from Greek Literature  
Giovanni Bombelli  
Abstract: The traditional representation of (the) Hellenic world relies on the close and symmetric relation 
between Greek culture, understood as the origin of the Western model, and reason  (including its legal-
political reflexes). This reading dates back to the German neo-humanistic movement of the XIXth centu-
ry, from Johann Winkelmann to Werner Jaeger and, although its recent (and partial) review by Martha 
Nussbaum, it moves from a peculiar interpretation of some moments of the Hellenic framework as a 
whole (mythology, art, literature and philosophy). This perspective mainly aims to remove the role of 
emotion  and, more widely, allows the equation Western culture=reason  or, in a consequent manner, 
law=reason . On the contrary Greek world presents a more articulated relation reason-emotion. Within 
the Hellenic context emotion , very broadly considered, seems to have a dialectic role: as a fundamental fac-
tor in order to almost rationally build the social-political-legal life and, at the same time, as a potential dis-
ruptive factor of the polis. Within the Homeric world some relevant tracks of this complex model emerge, 
especially in the light of two elements closely related to each other: the political-representative role played 
by the primitive forms of agora and the institution of the duel , which is to be regarded as a crucial legal-
political tool to control the emotive dimension in the archaic world. Anyway only tragedy, through a rein-
terpretation of myth, offers relevant examples of the ambiguous role played by emotion within the polis: 
both as a building factor of the public space, closely related to the public function of tragedy, and as a disruptive 
force (with particular regard to the female dimension: for instance Medea and Electra). According to a 
very significant continuity literature-philosophy, Aristotle synthesizes in a more specifically political-legal 
direction this complex tradition: similarly to the Platonic perspective, within Aristotle s model polis and its 
peculiar political-legal institutions are grounded in emotion. The Stagirite emphasizes both the constructive profile 
of emotion, which is grounded in the notions of philia and thymos as bases of the polis, and, on the oppo-
site, its dialectical and dangerous  aspect (i.e. the doctrine of pathos and chatarsis elaborated in his Rhetoric). 
In a wider perspective this re-interpretation of the Hellenic world elicits a new look over the nature of law 
as well as with regard to the anthropological model underlying the western legal tradition. From the begin-
ning law (generally meant: private  and public ) and politics structurally presented an emotive  profile and, 
then, took shape as a tragic dilemma . Hence the necessity to radically rethink the traditional pair emo-
tion-reason and, especially, its role as the anthropological condition of the political-legal bond.  
 
Key-words: Emotion-Reason-Law-Greek universe-Homer-Tragedy-Aristotle 
 
                                                 
 Giovanni Bombelli is Assistent Professor of Philosophy and Theory of Law at Catholic University of 
the Sacred Heart, Milan. His main research fields are the Western philosophical-legal notion of communi-
ty, the theoretical models of Law and their anthropological reflexes (especially within the area of Law and 
Humanities and including Law and Literature). This article was first presented as a paper at the 2015 
World Congress of the International Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Wash-
a-
 giovanni.bombelli@unicatt.it 
Giovanni Bombelli, Emotion, Reason and Political-Legal Bond: Ideas from Greek Literature 
10 
1. Greek Universe and Emotion 
The traditional representation of the Hellenic world is based on a precise image: the 
close relation (or equation) between Greek culture, understood as the origin of the 
Western model, and reason  (including its legal and political consequences).  
This insufficient reading, which was fundamentally elaborated starting from the 
XIXth century by the neo-humanistic movement which flourished within the German 
culture (up to Jaeger 1936-1947 and Nestle1942 but at least dating back to Winckel-
mann 1934), was based on a peculiar reinterpretation of some moments of the Hellenic 
framework as a whole: mythology, art and literature. It mainly aimed to remove the role 
of the emotion  or, at least, to emphasize the control  of the emotion: only recently this 
simplified view has been partially rethought by Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum 1986). 
Furthermore it allowed another and wider equation based on the close corre-
spondence Western culture = reason  and then, symmetrically, law=reason . On the 
contrary, and on a closer view, the Greek world presents a more complicated relation 
between reason  and emotion  (without necessarily sharing the polarity proposed by 
Nietzsche 1972). In other words from a philosophical-legal perspective within the 
Greek universe the dimension of emotion , broadly meant, seems to have a double role: 
as a fundamental element of the social-political-legal life and, at the same time, as a po-
tentially disruptive factor of the polis.  
With regards to this aspect we can observe the presence of some relevant tracks in 
the Homeric context, especially where Homer puts in evidence the role of the primitive 
forms of agorà or, in a related manner, the institution of the duel . But only the classical 
tragedy, through a complex reinterpretation of myth, offers relevant examples of the 
ambiguous role played by emotion within the polis: emotion as a building of social bindingness 
(i.e. the public function of drama) and, at the same time, emotion as a disruptive shock 
through its representation (i.e. the crucial role of women: for instance Medea and Electra). 
As is well known Aristotle synthesizes and theorizes this tradition. From a politi-
cal and legal point of view the Stagirite emphasizes both the constructive role played by 
emotion, especially with regard to the concepts of philia and thymos as bases of social life, 
and, on the opposite, its possible disruptive role. In other words, and only similarly to 
Plato s theory, according to Aristotle polis and its peculiar legal-political institutions are grounded 
in emotion.  
In a wider perspective, this possible interpretation of the Hellenic world elicits a 
new look over law and the Western identity. That is to say: from the beginning of the West-
ern tradition law (generally meant: private law  and public law ), as well as politics, al-
ways structurally presented an emotive  profile and accordingly represented a tragic di-
lemma . 
2. Homer and emotion 
The entire Homeric society is fundamentally characterized by the dimension of emo-
tion , which should be understood according to a wide acceptance (for a general survey 
about Homeric world and some related questions Fowler 2004; Koziak 2000). 
We may refer, for instance, to the concept of thymos (impulse) in the Iliad (for this 
point see in particular the fundamental Koziak 2000). According to Koziak (2000: 39), 
The Harmonies and Conflicts of Law, Reason and Emotion: A Literary-Legal Approach 
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within a comparison with Plato, Homer s poetic depiction of warrior emotions is chal-
lenged and epic psychology is substantially altered in Plato s Republic. [Plato]confines 
thymos to anger without the Iliad s variety of possible emotional expressions . In particu-
lar, the Authoress underlines that anger often appears as, or with, thymos, but this is be-
cause anger itself is the central emotional subject of the Iliad  (Koziak 2000: 40).  
In fact thymos is a very complex dimension which is not exclusively linked to an-
ger. Achilles is the paradigmatic thumotic man , but anyway thymos is not an emotion 
itself, but a set or organ of emotional feeling, so that it moves with many other emo-
thymos participates in deliberation  (Koziak 2000: 38). Furthermore 
thymos is not entirely or simply anger, but harbors other emotions  (Koziak 2000: 39). In 
fact many emotions are found in thymos  indeed, almost all emotional descriptions in-
volve thymos [which could be called] the neutral bearer of emotion  (Casswell 
-physical part where emotions happen  
(Koziak 2000: 43; see also 44-45 for the debate and the relation with phrenes). On the 
contrary Plato confines thymos to anger without the Iliad s variety of possible emotional 
expressions  (Koziak 2000: 39): in other words, although Plato invents the study of po-
litical psychology, he severely narrows the Homeric conception of thymos  (Koziak 2000: 
40; for the Platonic perspective see also in Koziak 62-80). 
But, in the light of what we will remark later in this contribution, we have also to 
consider the relation women-thymos : s thymos is 
associated 
constitution of mortal women may differ from the male warrior s, they have a thymos  
(Koziak 2000: 46-481). More generally there is a relation thymos-deliberation : starting 
from some passages concerning Odysseus and Achilles the complex nature and role of 
thymos in the decision-making  processes emerges not as a formula or as a intensifier, 
but as a sign of emotional evaluation and choice  (Koziak 2000: 53; see also 53-55 for 
the relation thymos-spiritedness ) also in a precise political-legal direction (Koziak 2000: 
55-58). 
Furthermore after all, and always in a general perspective, we should underline 
that many characters or heroes in Homeric world are dominated by emotive (or physi-
cal-emotive) dimensions: for instance fair cheeks  Briseis, cautious  Ulysses or belli-
cose  Menelaus. 
Beyond these elements within the Homeric poems we can find some relevant 
tracks of the idea of emotion and, especially, with regard to two points: the notion of 
agora and the figure of the duel . 
In fact within the Homeric poems it is possible to observe the emergence of the 
role of some primitive forms of agorà and, according to a close conceptual continuity, 
the institution of the duel . 
2.1 Agorà (Rhetoric and Emotion) 
Notwithstanding a long tradition, according to which Homeric poems are only the ex-
pression of a primitive social model without reference to structured political-legal mod-
                                                 
1 In addition: 
means that as passive observers of male warfare their sorrow and grief will proliferate. In any case, thymos 
is not a thing or quality limited to one sex, or even to human beings  (Koziak 2000: 48). 
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els, some scholars have recently showed the presence of important political and legal in-
stitutions within the Homeric universe. 
More precisely the public  role of agora (assembly) has emerged as a sort of prem-
ise of the next classical institutions. In particular within agorà as a public space the role 
of rhetoric and emotion develops. So, for instance, we can remember some passages 
where the agora develops in the Homeric context. 
For instance in Odissey, at the beginning of the book 2, in a long passage we can 
observe the assembly of the people of Ithaca(but there are further occurrences also in 
the first book): 
Soon as early Down appeared, the rosy-fingered, up from his bed arose the dear 
son of Odysseus and put on his clothing. About his shoulder he slung his sharp 
sword, ad beneath his shining feet bound his fair sandals, and went forth from his 
chamber like a god to look upon. Straightway he bade the clear-voiced heralds to 
summon to the assembly the long-haired Achaeans. And the heralds made the 
summons, and the Achaeans assembled full quickly. Now when they were assem-
bled and met together, holding in his hand a spear of bronze  not alone, for along 
with him two swift hounds followed; and wondrous was the grace that Athene 
shed upon him, and all the people marveled at him as he came. But he sat down in 
his father s seat, and the elders gave place.  
Then among them the lord Aegyptus was the first to speak, a man bowed with age 
and wise with wisdom untold. Now he spoke, because his dear son had gone in the 
hollow ships to Ilius, famed for its horses, in the company of godlike Odysseus, 
even the warrior Antiphus. But him the savage Cyclops had slain in his hollow 
cave, and made of him his latest meal. Three others there were; one, Eurynomus, 
consorted with the wooers, and two ever kept their father s farm. Yet, even so, he 
could not forget that other, mourning and sorrowing; and weeping for him he ad-
dressed the assembly, and spoke among them: 
Hearken now to me, men of Ithaca, to the word I shall say. Never have we held 
assembly or session since the day when goodly Odysseus departed in the hollow 
ships. And now who has called us together? On whom has such need come either 
of the young men or of those who are older? Has he heard some tidings of the ar-
my s return, which he might tell us plainly, seeing that he has first learned of it 
himself? Or is there some other public matter on which he is to speak and address 
us? A good man he sees in my eyes, a blessed man. May Zeus fulfil unto him him-
self some good, even whatsoever he desires in his heart . [Odissey, II, 1-34; Homer 
1976: I, 37-39] 
 In the same way we have to consider also the assembly of Pilian people in the 
third book or further tracks in the sixth book (54-55) and, especially, the reception of 
Ulysses at the palace of Alcinous (book 7, 43-45): 
And Odysseus marveled at the harbours and the stately ships, at the meeting-
places where the heroes themselves gathered, and the walls, long and high and 
crowned with palisades, a wonder to behold. [Odissey, VII, 43-45; Homer 1976: I, 
235; see also Odissey, VII, 148-150, Homer 1976: I, 243] 
Similarly it is interesting to consider the banquet in the house of Alcinous (at the begin-
ning of the book 8): 
As soon as early Dawn appeared, the rosy-fingered, the strong and mighty Alcin-
ous rose from his couch, and up rose also Zeus-born Odysseus, the sacker of cit-
The Harmonies and Conflicts of Law, Reason and Emotion: A Literary-Legal Approach 
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ies. And the strong and mighty Alcinous led the way to the place of assembly of 
the Phaeacians, which was builded for them hard by their ships. Thither they came 
and sat down on the polished stones close by one another; and Pallas Athene went 
throughout the city, in the likeness of the herald of wise Alcinous, devising a return 
for great-hearted Odysseus. To each man s side she came, and spoke: and said: 
Hither now, leaders and counselors of the Phaeacians, come to the place of as-
sembly, that you may learn of the stranger who has newly come to the palace of 
wise Alcinous after his wanderings over the sea, and in form is like unto the im-
mortals . 
So saying she roused the spirit and heart of each man, and speedily the place of as-
sembly and the seats were filled with men that gathered. And many marveled at the 
sight of the wise son of Laertes, for wondrous was the grace that Athene shed up-
on his head and shoulders; and she made him taller and studier to behold, that he 
might be welcomed by all the Phaeacians, and win awe and reverence, and might 
accomplish the many feats wherein the Phaeacians made trial of Odysseus. [Odissey, 
VIII, 1-23; Homer 1976: I, 259] 
On the contrary, as a countercheck, we should notice the existence of some socie-
ties (i.e. Cicons, Lotophagi and Cyclops) which are without assemblies (Odissey, IX, 106-
115, 125-129, 252-255, 273-278, 347-352; among others XV, 468 but we should refer 
also to other places in book 16, 17, 20, 21, 22 and especially 24): that is to say they are 
lacking of public discussion.  
For the Iliad (Mackie 1996: 212) we can refer, for instance, to the following passages:  
So, when they were assembled and met together, among them arose and spake 
Achilles. [Iliad, I, 56-57; Homer 1978: I, 7; but see also the ff.] 
Furthermore:  
So saying, he sate him down, and among them uprose Nestor, that was king of 
sandy Pylos. He with good intent addressed their gathering and spake among 
kings rose up thereat and obeyed the shepherd of the host; and the people the 
while were hastening on. [Iliad, II, 77-79, vv. 85-88; Homer 1978: I, 57; but see also 
XII, 211-214] 
 Beyond these references the point for us is the role of the agora in order to organ-
ize/to structure the public discourse and, hence, the emotion as its peculiar and undeniable dimen-
sion since the Homeric world. In other words: starting from the archaic Greek society, the 
couple public discourse (deliberation)-emotion  is to be considered as a decisive mo-
ment of the Greek historical-conceptual model.  
Following this direction it is not by chance that some scholars talk about the 
Homeric speech and the origins of rhetoric  (Knudsen 2014; but see also Griffin 2014 
                                                 
2 
order. The very first assembly in Book 1 is a prime example of the Achaean type, revolving around a pub-
lic quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon. In all, there are five Achaean assembles and four Trojan 
ones in the Iliad
a u-
tion. At Trojan assemblies, fewer and shorter speeches are made. Fewer characters speak, and they speak 
fewer lines. The Trojan assembly is less extended and does not have the function of alleviating political 
tensions via contest and debate .  
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and Mackie 1996): that is to say, the dimension of rhetoric, and hence its emotive pro-
file, belong to the Greek framework as a whole. 
In particular the Iliad 
rhetoric in Homer  (Knudsen 2014: 6; see also 8-14, for a series of passages from the Ili-
ad concerning the emergence of a structured rhetoric within Homer s world as well as 
the Appendix and chapter 1 for the debate about the Homeric rhetoric). 
The analysis of many passages in the Iliad shows not only the development of 
some precise rhetoric schemes (Knudsen 2014: chapter 2), but also the crucial role  
played by emotion. Hence the possibility to put in evidence the presence of patterns of 
Aristotelian rhetoric  in the Iliad and, then, the role of emotion as a tool of persuasion (Knudsen 
2014: chapter 3, especially 86-87 and the entire Part II with regard to the genealogy of 
rhetoric from Homer to Aristotle).  
The conclusion is very precious for us: The particular methodological approach 
Aristotle takes in the Rhetoric, so different from that of the Poetics, suggests why Aris-
totle fails to note the similarities between Homeric persuasion and his own system, and 
is silent about the possibility that the Homeric epics informed the technê of rhetoric.  In 
fact it seems likely that Archaic poetry had no place in Aristotle s conception of the dis-
cipline of rhetoric  innovative, technical, and philosophical as it was.  The reason is 
that by the fourth century Homer was firmly associated with a religious and mythical 
past, and though Aristotle might cite the Iliad or Odissey for the odd example of a rhetor-
ical trope, these associations would have made it difficult for him to see Homer as a 
contributor to the technê of rhetoric  (Knudsen 2014: 152).  
In other words and more precisely: within the Homeric world, so at the origins of 
the Greek world, emotion draws and marks the connection between public debate  and 
politics (or law)  by developing some structured rhetoric scheme. That is to say that pol-
itics (deliberation) develops not only starting from reason but also through emotion. 
2.2 The Duel: Social Order and Emotion 
As previously suggested within the Homeric world, in continuity with the role of agora, 
emotion emerges also in another direction and, in particular, through the figure of the 
duel : then the decisive couple is represented by emotion  and duel . About this topic 
we have to pay attention in particular to the Iliad.  
Within Homer s Iliad the topic of the duel  is very frequent (i.e. book 3 between 
Paris and Menelaus, book V, book XI and XII until the final duel Achilles vs. Hector) 
and, similarly to what happens within all archaic societies, it is the manifestation of the 
aristia (the excellence ). In some way the idea of duel  dominates the entire poem (in di-
rect connection with emotion: for this aspect Adkins 1982; Mumford 1996): in other 
words we could understand the entire Iliad as a sort of great duel between Greeks and 
Trojans based on emotion. As a matter of fact as is well known Achilles  wrath  marks the 
origins of the epic battle. That is to say: from the beginning it is an emotion which determines the 
entire plot, including its decisive political-legal consequences (war and peace) until the end. 
The final duel between Achilles and Hector (see hereinafter) can be read as the confir-
mation of this model and, hence, the instauration of a new social order. 
We may take a look to the a) scheme and the b) meaning of the duel  in order to 
highlight c) some aspect of its relation with emotion.  
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a) The scheme. The Homeric representation of the duel is characterized by a fixed 
scheme. This is surely related to some narrative necessities but, in another perspective, 
we could say that the adoption of predetermined models aims to guarantee a proce-
dure . In other words there is a procedure of the duel: the point is that the expression of 
emotion (hate, vengeance and so on) cannot depend on the free individual behavior. 
Emotion needs rules. The point becomes clearer in the light of the typologies of the duel 
which characterize the Iliad: on the one hand the so-called ceremonial duels and, on the 
other hand, the final and particular duel Achilles-Hector.  
As regards the two ceremonial (or formal) duels of the Iliad (see for instance Kirk 
1978: 18-40, especially 24 and ff.) it is possible to observe the presence of some struc-
tural elements. In particular within these typologies there is a sort of contractual princi-
ple  and a code , which are to be understood as forms of ritualization of the struggle 
(similarly to the funeral games to Patroclus: Iliad, XXIII). In a paradigmatic manner we 
can shortly take a look to the ceremonial duel between Paris and Menelaus (Iliad, III) 
which is characterized by many interesting elements. Schematically it is necessary to 
highlight the following elements (for this scheme see especially Camerotto 2007). 
Firstly the duel implies the end, or better the stop, of the war. It should be noticed 
that words and gestures seem to refer to a convocation of the agora, in confirmation of 
the suggested relation public discourse-(control of) emotion . Moreover there is a simi-
larity with the modalities and procedures underlying agons (Iliad, III, vv. 77-85: about 
the nexus agons-agorà  see Arend 1933: 120 and ff.; Beck 2005: 233-244, especially 233 
and ff.). 
Secondly there is the isolation of the two competitors (Iliad, III, 91) at the pres-
ence of the public: that is to say the struggle/battle is structurally public. In addition, and 
in confirmation of the procedural character of the duel, an award (athlon) is provided ac-
cording to precise pacts which are guaranteed by a solemn sacrifice in the light of the 
rules approved by Zeus. 
Thirdly some other rules concerning the details of the duel (i.e. with regard to 
draw, arms dressing and so on), and in particular the absence of the killing of the com-
petitor as well as the proclamation of the victory, confirm the ritual character of the 
struggle. Furthermore another important point should be remarked: all duels, raising a 
collective emotion, show their public role and their relation with the dimension of agora (i.e. 
the political dimension or the public debate).  
With a few differences the same elements are present, for instance, in the duel 
Hector-Ajax (Iliad, VII) but we should pay particular attention to the final and decisive 
duel Achilles-Hector (Iliad, XXII, 252-354). It shows a completely different type of 
struggle because it represents the climax of the aristia (the fundamental reason and goal 
of every duel) and, at the same time, the antithesis to the rules: in other words it is a 
very ambiguous duel.  
On the one hand the confrontation Achilles-Hector presents the usual peculiari-
ties of the duel: some elements related to the ceremonial duel and to the agons or, more 
in general, the same architecture. But, on the other hand, it has a specific and funda-
mental character: it is a struggle perì psukès, that is to say a battle for the life. Accordingly 
within this typology of duel, in so far as it is a final conflict, the contractual principles  
of the duel are destroyed (by Achilles  decision). In other words the passage is from the 
control  and ritualization  of the emotion (i.e. violence, vengeance), as a typical trait of 
the ceremonial duel in order to guarantee its public role, to the complete manifestation 
of a ferine (wild) emotion.  
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Achilles  behavior (Mackie 1996: chapter 4 for the relation between strife and the 
language of Achilles) is dominated by two emotions (menos and thymos):  
And Achilles rushed upon him, his heart full of savage wrath [menos
know thee well, and forbode what shall be, neither was it to be that I should per-
suade thee; of a truth the heart (thymos) in thy breast is of iron. [Iliad, XXII, 312, 
356-357; Homer 1978, II, 477, 481] 
Anyway as someone suggested the presence of the emotion in the Iliad, in particu-
lar the thymos, is very ambiguous and dialectical (including Achilles: for Achilles  pity see 
Jinyo 2000, in particular 1813; more generally concerning the topic of pity  Konstan 
2004, especially 128 and ff.) especially in a political and legal perspective. In fact if we look at 
the poem as a whole and interpret it as critique of the heroic ethic, we find that this cri-
tique centers on a crucial change in the thymos of Achilles . More clearly the movement 
of the psyche of the central character of the Iliad reveals both the inherent pugnacity of 
thymos and its potential as a reservoir for other emotions, in Achilles case for grief and 
sympathy . Hence through thymos he shows the potential both for the destruction of 
civilization and for the constitution of kinship between strangers. The destructive, sav-
age force appears in Achilles  Iliad ends with a return 
to the human in a reconciliation of Priam and Achilles  (Koziak 2000: 58-59, but see al-
so 58-62; see also Koziak s remarks quoted in the previous paragraph 2 of this contribu-
tion). 
Menos and thymos become the extreme manifestations of ferocity (wildness). The 
duel is not only a game but it aims at the annihilation of the adversary, with the precise 
mention of the notion of aikia which is proper of animals: we could say the emotion at 
the animal level emerges. Following this direction, and within a project of an evolution-
ary literary criticism , Gottschall (2001) assesses the duels in the Iliad in terms of ritual 
combat  and intra-species sub-lethal animal fighting , by focusing on the tragedy of be-
ing a human animal  in Homer (see also Gottschall & Wilson 2005: vii-xv for a theoreti-
cal discussion). 
 
b) The meaning. Beyond its different typologies, from a cultural and political-legal 
point of view the complex figure of the duel presents a constant meaning. In fact it is 
the expression of the honor  of heroes: more precisely the duel is the way they show 
their aristia. Starting from this perspective we have to evaluate the action of heroes with-
in the particular context underlying the Greek archaic society which, according to a fa-
mous conceptual model, is a shame-based society  (Dodds 1973 chapters 1-2 for the 
theory about transition from the shame cultures  to the guilt cultures ). That is to say: 
unlike contemporary social models, the archaic social contexts are characterized by an 
interwoven relation among many dimensions: ethics, law and so on. This implies that 
the duel is not only a mere social procedure in order to control the emotion, or to pro-
vide the mutual recognition, but at the same time it involves a political-legal aspect 
which is to be understood within the complex and long passage from shame-cultures  
to guilt-cultures . Following this conceptual horizon the duel can be properly under-
stood as a political-legal rule.  
                                                 
3  and his 
, specifically on the level of diction, is 
inseparable from those of the heroic code and human suffering and mortality . 
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In other words: we should consider the duel  as a real legal institution. Through the 
procedure developed by the duel, especially if considered in its various phenomenology, the 
looser is placed in a different social, and hence political-legal, position. After all we 
should remember that, as is well known, the legal profile of the duel is confirmed by its 
long history within the European and Western tradition and, not by chance, in the litera-
ture (Kiernan 1988; Fontinoy 1969): once again a close relation law-literature.  
 
c) Conclusions: relation emotion-duel . The figure of the duel  seems oriented to domain 
the emotion in order to achieve a double goal: the social, political and legal control of 
the emotion and the confirmation of a social order. 
Firstly. Through the duel the archaic society is oriented to avoid the excess  of 
emotion, which entails a fatal consequence: the destruction of society, a point which will 
be re-called by Aristotle when he discusses the complex role of emotions in his Poetics 
and Rhetoric and, especially, an emotion as fear or phobos. Hence the duel could be under-
stood as a form of ritualized, or codified, vengeance or revenge (for instance McHardy 
2008).  
Secondly. The duel is a tool through which it is possible to confirm the social or-
der . More precisely the old social order, as in some way developed within the ceremo-
nial duels, or the new social order established by the duel as in the final struggle Achil-
les-Hector.  
With specific regard to the question of the relation law-emotion we can establish 
at least two important points. 
Emotion has a crucial role within political-social-legal systems. Unlike modern-
contemporary models the emotive dimension, which is to be understood according to 
its wide archaic semantic field (i.e. the Homeric lexicon), integrates the social models. 
Emotion has a double face. Its dynamic force elicits that it should be controlled  
and deeply re-interpreted  (rethought) in a legal and political direction. Only in this 
manner emotion can become a political-legal factor as a whole especially in order to avoid 
the clan revenge , that is to say a sort of public revenge (anyway in the light of the com-
plex problem of the legal meaning of revenge): see, for instance, the reconciliation Pri-
am and Achilles as well as Achilles  pity. Furthermore this aspect should be considered 
in the light of the reception of Greek drama within the polis (see Revermann &Wilson 
2008, in particular the essay of Helen P. Foley concerning Audience and Emotion in the Re-
ception of Greek drama). At the same time emotion is the motor  for social life. It is under-
lying the entire Greek archaic society until the classical age (see hereinafter the para-
graph 4): on a closer view every action, decision and so on of the heroes moves from the 
emotive dimension, perhaps according to a cultural model which connotes all archaic 
societies including the non-Western contexts. 
In conclusion we should say that the ambiguity of emotion could be connected to the ambi-
guity of social order: the fundamental role of emotion as a structural foundation is always 
combined to the possibility to destroy the social architecture.  
3. Polis, Tragedy, Emotion (Medea and Electra) 
This long tradition about emotion, including its ambiguity and political-legal corollaries, 
in some way develops in the classical age. But this development presents an interesting 
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point: in spite of different historical and cultural conditions emotion maintains its double 
identity. 
On the one hand emotion, according to what happens within the Homeric uni-
verse, is a decisive component of political-legal life, in particular for its connection with 
the public dimension of agorà (including the rhetoric profile). From the Homeric litera-
ture the idea concerning the political role of emotion references goes to Aristotle who, 
from this point of view, can be considered the catalyst of the Greek reflection and, 
hence, encompasses the previous long tradition (see hereinafter). On the other hand, 
and once again according to the Homeric universe, emotion is conceived as a possible 
disruptive element of social order. More precisely within the polis the representation of 
emotion as a disruptive force emerges. In other words the classical age synthesizes and 
rethinks the two crucial elements (agorà and duel ) deriving from Homer.  
Let us shortly consider the two points closely related to each other: a) the public 
space  (agora) and b) the duel . 
 
a) As is well known the first one develops as a structured form of political organi-
zation. Here we can only remember as in the classical age the public debate still remains 
a sphere which is based on the emotive dimension: only following this direction we can 
completely appreciate the peculiar role of the rhetoric according to a close continuity with 
the Homeric premises. It will be never enough underlined this particular factor of the 
Greek social life (from Demosthenes to Isocrates): persuasion, as a rational and emotive 
process at the same time, is a pillar of politics (a factor which is completely unknown in 
other cultural models and dating back to the archaic period).  
Anyway it is necessary to combine the well-known importance of emotion in 
rhetoric with the presence of other emotive elements within the polis: that is to say we 
should start to think seriously about the polis as a world strongly based on emotion. Be-
yond Martha Nussbaum s suggestions, some recent works have put in light the emotive 
dimension of the polis as, for instance, the courage  (Balot 2014, especially chapter 3 
about the nexus free speech-democratic deliberation-courage  and the entire Part 2 
concerning the relation equality-emotion-civic education  with the conclusion 333 and 
ff.), in confirmation of the complexity of the Greek social order.  
Furthermore, and following this direction, it is enough to remember the funda-
mental circle politics-tragedy-emotion  (for instance Sommerstein & Halliwell & Hen-
derson & Zimmermann 1993, in particular 11-19). Starting from the crucial role played 
by drama within the polis, with particular regard to tragedy, we can grasp at least a key-
point: the relation between emotion and literature. Beyond the political-representative-rational 
systems, drama involves the other  channel of the Athenian democracy. Through this 
channel the political and legal relevance of emotion emerges and characterizes the entire 
classical age, according to the problematic Aristotelian perspective which is paradigmati-
cally synthesized by his theory of catharsis: is it to be understood as a control or as an 
elimination/repression of the emotion? (for a discussion about this point see at least, 
among many references, Nussbaum 1986: 388-391). At the same time it is very signifi-
cant that this process develops starting from literature and myth. Here we cannot deep-
en the undeniable role of myth and its direct political relevance within the polis but anyway it is 
possible to outline an interesting conceptual sequence emotion-literature-politics : that 
is to say not only the relation emotion-politics but furthermore, and in a more specific 
manner, literature-politics.  
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b) But emotion, once again according to Homer, can have also a disruptive role. 
The figure of the duel , which dates back to Homer, in the classical age takes a new 
shape essentially based on the just mentioned tragedy. In some way we could under-
stand this very particular Greek experience, according to a very significant parallelism 
with the institution of agora, as a form of duel  among different positions which are em-
bodied by heroes . Always along the lines of the Homeric perspective, through a com-
plex reinterpretation of myth drama as a whole, and especially tragedy, offers relevant 
examples of the structurally ambiguous role played by emotion within the polis: that is to 
say on the one hand emotion as a building force of the polis (i.e. the public function of trag-
edy), on the other hand emotion as a disruptive shock.  
It is on this level that, in a very significant manner, the issue concerning emotion-
polis emerges with a close relation with the thorny role of woman  above all if consid-
ered as a complex social-legal figure and role. Among many examples offered by tragedy 
we can paradigmatically focus at least on two figures: Medea and Electra. 
The dramatic story of Medea (for instance Friedrich 1993; Griffiths 2006, espe-
cially chapter 6) directly concerns the previous topics, that is to say the problematic rela-
tion agorà (public debate)-social bond- emotion (including its various manifestations) . 
In other words once again it is an emotion ( revenge ) which triggers the plot and its dy-
namic until the destruction of the social bond. In fact the lacking control of emotion in-
volves the radical crisis of the basement of the koinonia politikè (according to an Aristote-
lian lexicon): the killing of the sons, the interruption of the dynastic lineage (according 
to the fundamental social bases and rules dating back to Homeric period) and, accord-
ingly, the explosion of the stasis (civic conflict) with the implosion of social life. It is 
enough to refer to some passages about the ambiguous role of Medea as described by 
Euripides. 
Medea radically destroys the social order and the social bond because she violates 
a fundamental rule: the prohibition of killing the sons. As is well known the starting 
point is an emotion: Medea kills her sons because at the basis of her behavior there is 
Medea s desire to exact revenge on Jason (who is guilty party of hybris, 1366: Nay, but 
thine insolence and thy new-forged bonds ). 
Furthermore we should notice a sort of comparison, or balance, between two 
contrasting emotions: love for sons and revenge. The point is well clarified from the be-
ginning by the nurse s words:  
[Medea]loathes her babes, joys not beholding them.  
And what she may devise I dread to think.  
Grim is her spirit, one that will not brook  
Mishandling  
[Medea, 36-39; Euripides 1980: IV, 287] 
The homicidal intention becomes clearer. Medea points out:   
Woe! I have suffered, have suffered foul wrongs that  
may waken, may waken  
Mightly lamenting full well! O ye children accursed from the womb,  
Hence to destruction, ye brood of a loathed one forsaken, forsaken!  
Hence with your father, and perish our home in the blackness of doom!  
[Medea, 111-114; Euripides 1980: IV, 293, with a following long passage where 
Medea thinks about the Greek misogyny and mediates revenge and a final allusion 
to the ambiguity of the female world] 
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Throughout the story we can observe the progression, in some way the emotive 
construction , of the homicidal project: threats (623-626; 790-798; 976-977), uncertain-
ties (892 and especially the famous passage 1038- 1080 with the following comment of 
the Chorus at 1081-1115) until the final decision:  
Friends, my resolve is taken, with all speed  
To slay my children, and to flee this land,  
And not to linger and to yield my sons  
To death by other hands more merciless.  
They needs must die: and, since it needs must be,  
Even I will give them death, who gave them life.  
Up, gird thee for the fray, mine heart! [vv. 1236-1242; Euripides 1980: IV, 379] 
Furthermore it is possible to notice as Medea, similarly to other Greek figures and 
according to the complex and double dimension of emotion, puts in evidence the ambi-
guity which structurally connotes the female universe within the polis including its possible 
positive declination (i.e. the rescue of Corinthus by Medea from the famine and also the 
mysterious conclusion in 1317-1322; about the ambiguity of Medea see De Romilly 
1970: chapter 4).  
In a theoretical continuity Electra s plot, according to two possible versions (Eu-
ripides and Sophocles: a comparison between the two versions in Avezzù 2003, espe-
cially 181-188; furthermore Van Nortwick 2012, in particular 149 for the three versions 
of Electra in Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides4) offers another example of the com-
plex relation emotion-politics-female world. In fact the tragedy is characterized by some 
fundamental emotions as hate  (vengeance, revenge), anguish, joy  and desperation  
which are closely related to each other and, in the final analysis, they are connected to a 
political-legal question, that is to say the problem of the dynastic lineage: the insur-
mountable problem of legitimacy of power. 
Only some passages with regard to emotion. 
Firstly, whether Medea moves from the desire of revenge, the entire behavior of 
Electra starts from the mix of emotions (or feelings) composed of hate, revenge and an-
guish. From the beginning these emotions appear and, primarily, the hatred : 
Hail, black-winged Night, nurse of the golden stars,  
Wherein I bear this pitcher on mine head 
Poised, as I fare to river-cradling springs, - 
Not that I do this of pure need constrained, But to show Heaven Aegisthus  tyran-
ny, - 
And wail to the broad welkin for my sire.  
For mine own mother, Tyndareus  baleful child, 
Thrust me from home, to pleasure this her spouse, 
And, having borne Aegisthus other sons, 
Thrusteth aside Orestes  rights and mine. 
[Electra, 54-63; Euripides 1978: II, 11] 
                                                 
4  Electra is important as a part of the family whose history is cloud by past events, but she is 
agent in the revenge plot 
and participates in the murder of tral 
acts of the myth and his devaluing o  
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In the same way Electra s anguish, which is connected and interwoven with the 
idea of revenge, emerges in this long passage:  
Bestir thou, for time presses, thy foot s speed; 
Haste onward weeping bitterly. 
I am his child, am Agamemnon s seed, - 
Alas for me, for me!  
And I the daughter Clytemnestra bore, Tyndareus  child, abhorred of all; 
And me the city-dwellers evermore 
Hapless Electra call. 
Woe and alas for this my lot of sighing, 
My life from consolation banned! 
O father Agamemnon, thou art lying  
In Hades, thou whose wife devised thy dying  
Her heart, Aegisthus  hand. 
On, wake once more the selfsame note of grieving: 
Upraise the dirge of tears that bring relieving. 
Bestir thou, for time presses, thy foot s speed; 
Haste onward weeping bitterly.  
Ah me, what city sees thee in thy need,  
Brother?  alas for thee! 
In what proud house hast thou a bondman s place, 
Leaving thy woeful sister lone 
Here in the halls ancestral of our race 
In sore distress to moan? 
Come, a Redeemer from this anguish, heeding 
My desolation and my pain: 
Come Zeus, come Zeus the champion of a bleeding 
Father most foully killed  to Argos leading 
The wanderer s feet again.  
[Electra, 112-139; Euripides 1978: II, 15] 
Anyway only within Sophocles  version (a general introduction about Sophocles 
in Goldhill 2012 and, with regard to Electra in Sophocles, Dunn 2012) the idea of re-
venge  and its transformation into a sort of madness, that is to say an emotional mad-
ness, completely develops as well as the failure of the control of emotion. For instance: 
Halls of Persephonè and Death, 
Guide of the shades, O Hermes, and O Wraith, 
Ye god-sprung Furies dread 
Who watch when blood is shed, 
Or stained the marriage bed, 
O aid me to avenge my father slain, 
O send my brother back again!  
[Electra, 110-118; Sophocles 1978: II, 135] 
Furthermore about madness:  
Ah, noble friends ye come, I see 
To ease my misery; 
Your kind intent, O trust me, I perceive. 
Yet can I never leave 
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My task, each day, each hour, anew to shed 
Tears o er my father dead. 
O kindly hearts, so ready to repay 
All friendship owes, 
Leave me, O leave me (this one boon I pray) 
To my wild woes.  
[Electra, 129-138; Sophocles 1978: II, 137] 
Along these lines it is not by chance that in comparison, and as a sort of opposi-
tion, we can observe the polarization between Electra and her fearful and resigned sister 
Chrysothemis. In fact this latter invites Electra to control the emotion (i.e. rage): 
Sister, why com st thou once more to declaim 
In public at the outer gate? Has time 
Not schooled thee to desist from idle rage? 
I too, my sister, chafe no less than thou 
At our sad fortunes, and had I the power, 
Would make it plain how I regard our masters. 
But in the storm tis best to reef the sail, 
Nor utter threats we cannot execute.  
I would thou wert likeminded; yet I know  
Justice is on thy side, and I am wrong. 
Yet if I am to keep my liberty, 
I needs must bow before the powers that be.  
[Electra, 329-340; Sophocles 1978: II, 151] 
On a second level, in confirmation of the crucial role of the emotive dimension, it 
should be also underlined the different emotions on the occasion of the false Orestes  
death within Sophocles  version. This passage is very relevant because in some way it 
draws not only the antithesis between the emotional universe of Electra and Clytemnes-
tra but, in a political-legal direction, their different perspectives about the dynastic line-
age. Accordingly this dystonia implies a different development of the plot. Here is the 
long passage: 
CLYTEMNESTRA. 
Strange is the force of motherhood; a mother, 
Whate er her wrongs, can ne er forget her child. 
AGED SERVANT 
So it would seem our coming was in vain. 
CLYTEMNESTRA 
Nay, not in vain. How canst thou say in vain , 
If of his death thou brings convincing proof, 
Who from my life drew life, and yet, estranged, 
Forgat the breasts that suckled him, forgat  
A other  tender nurture, fled his home, 
And since that day has never seen me more, 
Slandered me as the murderer of his sire 
And breathed forth vengeance?  Neither night nor day 
Kind slumber closed these eyes, and immanent dread 
Of death each minute stretched me on the rack. 
But now on this glad day, of terror rid 
From him and her, a deadlier plague than he, 
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That vampire who was housed with me to drain 
My very life blood  now, despite her threats 
Methinks that I shall pass my days in peace. 
ELECTRA 
Ah woe is me! Now verily may I mourn 
Thy fate, Orestes, when thou farest thus, 
Mocked by thy mother in death! Is it not well?  
[Electra, 769-790; Sophocles 1978: II, 183-185] 
In this passage two points are to be noticed with regard to the question of the 
emotion. On the one hand the joy of Clytemnestra which, always according to an emo-
tional level, in the eyes of Orestes becomes the proof of her cruelty. On the contrary 
Electra s desperation is the proof of her fidelity and sincerity: that is to say the possibil-
ity to reconstruct the dynastic lineage through the killing of Clytemnestra and, hence, to 
restore the social bond. 
In conclusion. Medea and Electra, although in a different manner and according 
to various degrees (about the complex polarity of Electra see also Vernant 1965: 162-
165) are representative of the fundamental role of emotion within the polis. But, in a 
wider perspective, we can underline the particular connection between emotion  and 
female world  within the Greek model: is it only by chance that in Greek literature 
many female figures play a disruptive role? This is a point which should be better deep-
ened because it entails the role of woman as a whole. 
On a closer view the latter seems placed between two extremes: on the one hand 
woman as an expression of the social order (i.e. Penelope), on the other hand the rup-
ture  represented by the mentioned figures of Medea and Electra or others as Antigone 
and so on (once again closing related to myth: for instance some mythical female figures 
as Pandora). Following this direction we should take into account not only the relation 
law-emotion but, more widely, the pair politics-emotion starting from the female perspective: 
hence the research range should be extended to the field woman-emotion-law-politics  
(see for instance Various Authors 2002; Craik 1993). 
4. From Literature to Philosophy: Aristotle and the Relation philia-
thymos 
As previously remarked Aristotle, as well as Plato, synthesizes and theorizes the long 
Greek tradition related to emotion. The passage is from literature to philosophy in the 
light of the close continuity between the archaic society and the classical age and, hence, 
between narration (story telling) and theoretical/speculative approach. In other words: 
within the Hellenic world in some way philosophy can be considered as a sort of continu-
ation of literature (for a general framework about Aristotle-literature Konstan 2006). 
In confirmation of the nexus agorà (political debate)-emotion  both philosophers 
understand the crucial relation between social life and emotion and, in the same way, 
political-legal level and emotive dimension. Similarly to Plato s theory, according to Ar-
istotle polis and its peculiar legal-political institutions are structurally grounded in emotion5. But 
                                                 
5 For some ideas discussed in this paragraph see also, in a wider perspective, Bombelli 2013 and especially 
two my papers presented at the 2015 World Congress of the International Association for the Philosophy 
of Law and Social Philosophy, Washington D.C. (26th July 2015-1st August 2015): the first one, entitled 
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from a political and legal point of view there is a substantial difference. According to 
Plato emotion, although its social role, fundamentally represents a dangerous dimension: 
then it is to be controlled within the schematic and rigid order of the Republic grounded 
in the close analogy between the typologies of individual soul, including the different 
levels of emotion, and the social strata (philosophers, guardians/warriors and workers). 
On the contrary the Stagirite, although he is aware of the complexity of the emotive di-
mension (for a general survey Fortenbaugh 2002), emphasizes its constructive role in 
order to build up social life as a sort of diffusive dimension. I focus only on the fundamental 
emotions of philia and thymos. 
The Greek (Aristotelian) notion of philia, and the similar concept of omonoia (here 
not deepened), should not be confused with the modern idea of friendship  (Konstan 
19976). Within the Hellenic-classical universe the former, which is substantially absent in the 
archaic period7, expresses the ontological origin of human relationships, whereas the latter 
indicates only a subjective relation frequently based on an individual choice. 
Within the Aristotelian perspective the relevance of philia can be evaluated at least 
in two directions. On the one hand, and beyond the wide discussion proposed in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, philia can develop only within a communitarian context (household, 
oikos, polis): in other words there is a mutual and circular relation between community 
and philia (there is no community without philia). On the other hand philia immediately 
identifies a political dimension: being a political dimension, philia represents the theoretical as 
well as sociological basis for political obligation (Politics, III, 9, 1280b 30-1281a 11 and, 
more broadly for the nexus best koinonia-philia , Politics, IV, 11, 1295a 25-1296a 19). 
Along these lines we can appreciate the corollaries implied by the conceptual circle phil-
ia (as an emotion)-community  with regard to eudaimonia and paideia.  
The relation koinonia-eudaimonia  (Nicomachean Ethics, I, 4, 1095a 14-20; I, 7, 1097a 
30-1097b 11) marks the conceptual continuity between the two profiles which charac-
terize the Aristotelian argumentation as a whole: the attention to the theoreti-
cal/anthropological dimension of the relation and, at the same time, the importance of 
its underlying contextual-empirical and communitarian reference. In other words eudai-
monia is to be understood as an anthropological, and then ethic and political, flourishing 
including the emotive dimension related to philia as a pillar of social life. 
The nexus koinonia-paideia  (Politics, VIII) synthesizes the Hellenic tradition regard-
ing the political role played by education and represents the logical conclusion of the en-
tire Aristotelian philosophy. Human relations can develop only within the polis-koinonia 
                                                                                                                                          
e second one, entitled Reason, Emotion and Politics. Remarks for a Contem-
porary Theory of Emotion in Political-Legal Debate, in a Working Group. Both papers will soon be published.  
6 According to some authors despite the ostensible continuities between classicla and modern concep-
tions of frienship as mutual, voluntary, loving, and unselfish relationship, there are deep differences be-
tween them that reflect diverse value  (Konstan 1997: 14).  
7 More precisely and with regard to Homer: As the oldest evidence for the history of friendship in the 
classical world, the two epic poems attributed to Homer present a paradox. The relationship between 
Achilles and Patroclus in the Iliad is often cited in antiquity as one of three or four legendary friend-
ships.[...]Nevertheless, many modern scholars suppose that in archaic epic, friendship is conceived as a 
formal and non-emotional bond based on obligation rather than love.[...][T]he substantive philos (as op-
posed to the adjective) is not normally used in the classical period of family members, for example, or fel-
low citizens any more than  is today; rather, philos as a noun refers to people who associate volun-
tarily on the basis of mutual affection. This point is controversial[...]. in the language of Homer, however, 
philos does not apply specifically to friends, and this raises questions about the description of friendship in 
 (Konstan 1997: 24-28).
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(based on philia): hence this latter is philosophically, legally and politically legitimated to 
elaborate and, to some extent, to impose  a public education and, then, to give a precise 
direction to the social emotions (Politics VIII, 1, 1337a 11-22 and 35-36; see Newman 
1950: I, 369-374). 
Following this direction the communitarian model, including its decisive emotive base-
ment, can be dynamically the ideal political-legal framework to enhance personal and col-
lective identity and freedom: through Aristotelian lexicon to achieve the complete eudai-
monia. But, at the same time, koinonia can develop into a totalitarian structure, that is to say 
into a platonic philosophers  republic (which is based, not by chance, on the role played 
by paideia and on the control  of emotion).  
In conclusion. According to Aristotle human relationships and communitarian 
bonds  rely on a sort of superimposition/equation between relation  and community : 
in some way community is the relation. Moreover Aristotle consequently establishes the 
equation polis-koinonia, insomuch that legal/political obligation must be involved and jus-
tified within community. 
In the light of these remarks the point for us is precisely the political and legal 
one. Philia as an emotive dimension, including its communitarian horizon and corollaries 
(i.e. the notions of eudaimonia and paideia), represents the basement of the polis and the 
condition for its political and legal stability: as someone suggested, few canonical political 
philosophers and even fewer contemporary political theorists make use of the possibili-
ties that the Aristotelian treatment of political emotion offered  (Koziak 2000: 3; see also 
chapters 3-4 and hereinafter the remarks concerning thymos in Aristotle). Unlike the 
modern-contemporary tradition based on the idea of rational contract  as a basement of 
the political obligation, within Aristotle s framework politics grounds in a complex se-
mantic area (from the public role of drama to the deep meaning of philia) in many ways 
related to emotion.  
Following this direction the concept of impulse  (thymos) plays a relevant role 
within Aristotle s theory of emotion and has a close relation with desire and appetite 
(orexis). More precisely it could be considered as its (biological) dynamic and hence, in 
some way, the process underlying every form of emotion. In other words im-
pulse(thymos) should be understood as the genetic moment of the movement  underlying 
emotions as epithumia (appetite, which is literally a form of thymos) or orexis.  
Anyway it is a very complex notion. From this point of view Aristotle continues 
the long tradition of thymos dating back to the Greek archaic society (see especially the 
previous paragraph 2 of this contribution; furthermore Fortenbaugh 1983: 303-320, es-
pecially 304-307, about the complex emotive dimension in Medea, including the concept 
of thymos, and the relation with the Aristotelian perspective concerning emotion and 
women). Within the Aristotelian theory the word-category thymos covers a wide semantic 
field (for this point see again Koziak 2000, who severely criticizes the perspective about 
thymos as spiritedness inspired to Leo Strauss: Koziak 2000: 32; see also Berns 1984, 
Charney 1990, Zuckert 1990, Lord 1992) and, in a more specific manner, it presents at 
least a double and interwoven declination: a cognitive-theoretical dimension and a prac-
tical-political reflex. 
 In a cognitive-theoretical perspective thymos, which is the linguistic-etymological 
basis of thaumathein, could be understood as a sort of emotive puzzlement. That is to 
say: emotion, and therefore a physical or in some way genetic factor, seems to be the 
condition for theoretical activity or philosophy. Hence thymos is a form of emotive knowledge 
according to the famous passage of Metaphysics where Aristotle states that [f]or it is ow-
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ing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize  (Metha-
physics, I, 982b, 12-13).  
 On a practical-political level within Aristotle s theory it is possible to distinguish 
three concepts of thymos: thymos as the emotion anger, as an aggressive force or spirited-
ness  (both according to Plato) and, especially, the innovation of thymos as the general 
capacity of emotion (particularly within On the Soul: Koziak 2000: chapter 3 for this dis-
tinction and all the references). Following this direction thymos has also a relevant politi-
cal role (Koziak 2000: 28; Sokolon 2006): more precisely, also in the light of its connec-
tion with friendship (philia), thymos represents the condition for social-political life and its 
institutionalization ( thymos in citizen-rulers requires an institutional 
base : Koziak 2000: 122) and its possible destruction as well,9 starting from the relevance 
conferred by Aristotle to the tensional nature of polis between order-disorder (Bombelli 
2013).  
In other words, polis develops on a tensional balance (a dialectics) grounded at the 
same time in two paramount conditions: on the one hand intelligence/thought, or we 
could call rationality  (logos, dianoia), and, on the other hand, a combination of opposite 
factors (see for instance Politics, VII, 1327b 36-1328a 15). These factors are based on 
emotions as thymos, according to a possible translation of this very complex word, which 
is a condition for social life but, at the same time, could be the reason of the political divi-
sion. 
Nevertheless, and unlike a traditional interpretation of the Greek model (including 
Aristotle s perspective), there is no direct and mutual correspondence between the pair 
rationality (intelligence)-order  and the couple emotion-disorder : on the contrary emo-
tion is also a condition of the social order and represents an unavoidable political factor 
with relations to a specific context.10 Hence the radical difference between the Greek model 
grounded in the particular experience of the polis and other social models as suggested 
by the Stagirite11: the blending (or balance) composed of rationality (dianoia) and emotions 
(philia, thymos) marks the decisive boundary between freedom and slavery and represents the 
condition of social and political life.12 
                                                 
8 thymos  emotion available to contemporary 
challenges to rationalistic expl  
9 thymos in its most complex sense loses its meaning of one 
emotion or of one drive or instinct, becoming instead  (Koziak 2000: 110 
also for many references to Politics and Nicomachean Ethics). 
10As someone has conveniently suggested, for Arist understanding an emotion requires knowledge of 
its typical context  the typical frame of mind, the typical grounds or reasons, and the typical objects, es-
pecially the kind of people toward whom we feel an emotion. And emotional habits can be changed by 
al contribution toward a 
comprehensi  (Koziak 2000: 21-24 with reference to Politics 1253a 29-31).  
11 Having spoken of the number of the citizens, we will proceed to speak of what should be their charac-
ter. This is a subject which can be easily understood by anyone who casts his eye on the more celebrated 
states of Greece, and generally on the distribution of races in the habitable world. Those who live in a 
cold climate and in Europe are full of spirit, but wanting in intelligence and skill; and therefore they retain 
comparative freedom, but have not political organization, and are incapable of ruling over others. Where-
as the natives of Asia are intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit, and therefore they are 
always in a state of subjection and slavery. But the Hellenic race, which is situated between them, is like-
wise intermediate in character, being high-spirited and also intelligent. Hence it continues free, and is the 
best-governed of any nation, and, if could be formed into one state, w  (Poli-
tics, VII, 7, 1327b 16-33: all Aristotelian quotations from Barnes 1984).  
12In fact, according to Aristotle the well- -
the immediate and disordered (chaotic) relations to the legal- And clearly those whom 
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In conclusion.  
Aristotle draws a very delicate conceptual architecture which encompasses at the 
same time reason and emotion in order to guarantee the just  balance order-disorder  ac-
cording to the entire tradition dating back to the archaic world (for this point we should 
also remember, in a negative perspective, the crucial role of fear-phobos in tragedy as it is 
theorized in Aristotle s Rhetoric). This dialectical dynamic makes polis possible in order to 
avoid the stasis: that is to say the civic, political and legal chaos . Similarly to the concept 
of philia, thymos takes shape as a sort of pretheoric (in some way emotive ?) disposition 
underlying the political and legal structure: passion is the quality of the soul which be-
gets friendship and enables us to love  (Politics, VII, 1327b 40-1328a 1).  
On this level we can better appreciate the complex relation between philia and 
thymos: the former should be placed within the horizon of a basic and common friendship, 
which implies the decisive question concerning the understanding of the other  outside 
the polis. Anyway this relation gives the confirmation of the emotive nature of philia as 
the basis of the political-legal structure of polis. Aristotle reaffirms this point also in Rhet-
oric13 and especially in another synthetic passage with regard to the structural and dialec-
tic role of thymos:  
notably the spirit { } within us is more stirred against our friends and ac-
quaintances than against those who are unknown to us, when we think we are des-
based upon this quality, for passion is commanding and invincible. [Politics, VII, 7, 
1328a 1-8] 
5. Some Conclusions 
The interpretation of some passages of the Hellenic world suggested in the previous 
pages elicits a new look over the relation between the Western cultural identity, law  and 
emotion and, to some extent, anthropological models. In conclusion, and in a very syn-
thetic manner, we can try to fix at least the following points related to each other. 
 
a) Western identity and law. Unlike a certain critical interpretation, from the beginning of 
Western culture (i.e. Greek world) law , generally meant as private  and public  law as 
well as politics, always presented a structural emotive  profile. More precisely all these 
notions took shape as a tragic dilemma  between two poles: on the one hand emotion , 
widely understood as a complex dimension (menos, phobos, philia, thymos and so on), and, 
on the other hand, reason  in turn to be interpreted according to multiple levels. This 
problematic horizon influenced the following legal tradition and civilization including its 
peculiar institutions. From this point of view it is possible to conceive some legal figures 
                                                                                                                                          
the legislator will most easily lead to excellence may be expected to be both intelligent and coura  
(Politics, VII, 7, 1327b 36-38). 
13 He points out: We may describe friendly feeling towards anyone as wishing for him what you believe 
to be good things not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these 
things about  (Rhetoric, II, 4, 1308b 35-1381a 1). 
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as systems to control emotion through rules: for instance the idea of Court  could be un-
derstood as a sort of ritualized duel14.  
 
b)The relation emotion-reason. In a wider perspective the historical-conceptual conti-
nuity between Greek literature and philosophy (from Homer to Aristotle) suggests a 
close and problematic relation between the two dimensions. In particular an ambiguous 
model of emotion , and in a symmetric manner of reason , emerges: emotion as an un-
deniable element of the social bond and, at the same time, emotion as a potentially dis-
ruptive force (with the consequent problem of its control and the central dialectics 
male-female  which marks the entire Greek world). 
 
c) Anthropology. In some way this entire conceptual framework entails a different 
understanding of the anthropological model underlying the Western theorization of po-
litical and legal models. The archaic man  as well as the classical man  seems to be char-
acterized by a double nature which is based on a delicate balance of reason  and emo-
tion . Is it time to deeply rethink the theoretical and anthropological conditions of law and 
politics?   
                                                 
14 I thank Prof. Jeanne Gaakeer for this suggestion and the discussion about this point in occasion of the 
 
The Harmonies and Conflicts of Law, Reason and Emotion: A Literary-Legal Approach 
29 
 
References 
Adkins, W. H., 1982. Values, Goals, and Emotions in the Iliad. Classical Philology, 77, 4, 
292-326. 
Arend, W., 1933. Die Typischen Schenen bei Homer. Berlin: Weidmann. 
Avezzù, G., 2003. Il mito sulla scena. La tragedia ad Atene. Venezia: Marsilio. 
Balot, R. K., 2014. Courage in the Democratic Polis: Ideology and Critique in Classical Athens. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Barnes, J., (ed.) 1984. The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Beck, D., 2005. Homeric Conversation. Cambridge Ma.-London: Harvard University Press. 
Berns, L., 1984. Spiritedness in Ethics and Politics: a Study in Aristotelian Psychology. 
Interpretation, 12, 335-348. 
Bombelli, G., 2013. Occidente e figure  comunitarie. I Un ordine inquieto: koinonia e comunità ra-
dicata . Profili filosofico-giuridici. Napoli: Jovene. 
Camerotto, A., 2007. Il duello e l agone. Le regole della violenza nell epica eroica. Ni-
kephoros, 20, 9-32. 
Casswell, C., 1990. A Study of Thymos in Early Greek Epic. Leiden: Brill. 
Charney, A., 1990. Spiritedness and Pity in Aristotle. In C. Zuckert, Understanding the Political 
Spirit. New Haven: Yale University Press, 67-87. 
Craik, E., 1993. Tragic Love, Comic Sex? In Sommerstein A. H. & Halliwell S. & Hender-
son J. & Zimmermann B. (eds.).Tragedy, Comedy and the Polis. Bari: Levante, 253-
262. 
De Romilly, J., 1970. La Tragédie grecque. Paris: Puf. 
Dodds, E. R., 1973. The Greeks and the Irrational. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Dunn, F., 2012. Electra. In K. Ormand (ed.), A Companion to Sophocles. Chichester: 
Blackwell, 98-110.  
Euripides, 1978. Electra. Cambridge Ma: Harvard University Press. 
----, 1980. Medea. Cambridge Ma: Harvard University Press.  
Fontinoy, C., 1969. Le duel dans les languages sémitiques. Paris: Édition Les belles lettres . 
Fortenbaugh, W. W., 1983. On the Antecedents of Aristotle s Bipartite Psychology. In J. P. An-
ton-A. Preus (eds.), Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy. Albany: State University of 
New York Press, II, 303-320. 
----, [1975] 2002. Aristotle on Emotion. A Contribution to Philosophical Psychology, Rhetoric, Poet-
ics, Politics and Ethics. London: Duckworth.  
Giovanni Bombelli, Emotion, Reason and Political-Legal Bond: Ideas from Greek Literature 
30 
Fowler, R., (ed.) 2004. The Cambridge Companion to Homer. Cambridge, Uk-New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Friedrich, R., 1993. Medea apolis: on Euripides  Dramatization of the Crisis of the Polis. In 
Sommerstein A. H. & Halliwell S. & Henderson J. & Zimmermann B. 
(eds.).Tragedy, Comedy and the Polis. Bari: Levante, 219-239. 
Goldhill, S., 2012. Sophocles and the Language of Tragedy. Oxford et al.: Oxford University 
Press. 
Gottschall, J., 2001. Homer s Human Animal: Ritual Combat in the Iliad . Philosophy and 
Literature, 25, 278-294. 
Gottschall, J. & D. S. Wilson, (eds.) 2005. The Literary Animal: Evolution and the Nature of 
Narrative. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
Griffin, J., 2014. The Speeches. In R. Fowler, The Cambridge Companion to Homer: Cam-
bridge, Uk-New York: Cambridge University Press, 156-168. 
Griffiths, E., 2006. Medea. Gods and Heroes of the Ancient World. Oxon New York: 
Routledge. 
Homer, 1976. Odissey. Cambridge Ma: Harvard University Press. 
----, 1978. Iliad. Cambridge Ma: Harvard University Press. 
Jaeger, W., 1936-1947. Paideia. Die Formung des Griechischen Menschen. Berlin-Leipzig: W. 
De Gruyter. 
Jinyo, K., 2000. The Pity of Achilles: Oral Style and the Unity of the Iliad. Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield. 
Kiernan, V. G., 1988. The Duel in European History: Honor and the Reign of Aristocracy. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press. 
Kirk, G.S., 1978. The Formal Duels in Book 3 and 7 of the Iliad. In B.C. Fenik (ed.), Homer: 
Tradition and Invention. Leiden: Brill, 18-40. 
Knudsen, R., A. 2014. Homeric Speech and the Origins of Rhetoric. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University. 
Konstan, D., 1997. Friendship in the Classical World. New York-Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press.  
----, [2001] 2004. Pity Transformed. London: Duckworth. 
----, 2006. The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks. Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature. To-
ronto-Buffalo-London: University of Toronto Press.  
Koziak, B., 2000. Retrieving Political Emotion. University Park, Pa: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press. 
Lord, C., 1992. Aristotle s Anthropology. In C. Lord & D. K. O Connor (eds.), Essays on 
Aristotelian Political Science. Berkeley Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
49-73.  
McHardy, F., 2008. Revenge in Athenian Culture. London: Duckworth. 
The Harmonies and Conflicts of Law, Reason and Emotion: A Literary-Legal Approach 
31 
Mackie, H. S., 1996. Talking Trojan: Speech and Community in the Iliad. Lanham et al.: Row-
man & Littlefield. 
Mumford, D. B., 1996. Somatic Symptoms and Psychological Distress in the Iliad of 
Homer . Journal Psychosom Res, 41, 2, 139-148. 
Nestle, W., 1942. Von Mythos zum Logos. Die Selbstentfaltung des Griechischen Denkers von 
Homer bis auf die Sophistik und Sokrates. Stuttgart: Verlag. 
Newman, W. L., [1887]1950. The Politics of Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Nietzsche, F., [1872]1972. Die Geburt der Tragödie. Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen (1872-1874). 
Berlin-New York: W. De Gruyter.  
Nussbaum, M. C., 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Phi-
losophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Revermann, M. & P. Wilson, (eds.) 2008. Performance, Iconography, Reception. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press. 
Sokolon, M. K., 2006. Political Emotion: Aristotle and the Symphony of Reason and Emotion. 
Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 
Sommerstein, A. H. & S. Halliwell & J. Henderson & B. Zimmermann, (eds.) 1993. 
Tragedy, Comedy and the Polis. Bari: Levante. 
Sophocles, 1978. Electra. Cambridge Ma: Harvard University Press. 
Van Nortwick, T., 2012. Last Things: Oedipus at Colonus and the End of Tragedy. In K. 
Ormand (ed.), A Companion to Sophocles. Chichester: Blackwell, 141-154. 
Various Authors, 2002. Eros and Polis: Desire and Community in Greek Political Theory. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Vernant, J. P., 1965. Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs. Études de psychologie hostorique. Paris: 
Maspero.  
Winckelmann, J. J., [1764] 1934.Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums. Leipzig: Allen & Unwin. 
Zuckert, C H., 1990. On the Role of Spiritedness in Politics. In Id. (ed.), Understanding the Polit-
ical Spirit. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1-29.  
 
 
  
 
  
   
 
ISLL Papers 
The Online Collection 
© ISLL - ITALIAN SOCIETY FOR LAW AND LITERATURE 
ISSN 2035-553X - 2016 (Vol. 9) 
 
 
33 
End-of life care and dignity of dying 
(Literary flashes of inspiration) 
Patrizia Borsellino* 
Abstract: In the last decades, end-of life has become a crucial topic in philosophical-legal and bioethical 
research, which has focused and still does on questions regarding meaning of dying with dignity and con-
ditions, to be granted to all individuals, for ending life in a dignified way. The debate has however high-
lighted relevant disagreements with regard to the notion of dignity of dying . In order to overcome these 
different opinions, the best way is to propose a clear redefinition with the intent to initiate the discussion 
and possibly reach agreement on choices and courses of action useful to offer the best care to terminally 
ill patients. But how can we identify the conditions needed to properly discuss about dignity at the end-of 
life and dignified dying? Famous literary works may help to enlighten the search for the key-words  in 
ending life with dignity. The paper proposes a methodological analysis based on a passage of Francis Ba-
con s On the dignity and Advancement of Learning, where the author stigmatizes the habit of contemporary 
physicians of abandoning the cures of patients in their nature incurable and vigorously recognizes, for the 
first time, the binding duty of physicians to mitigate pain and suffering. The analysis includes three pas-
sages respectively extracted from The Death of Ivan Il ic (1886) by Leo Tolstoj, Buddenbrooks (1901) by 
Thomas Mann, and In the face of death (1985) by Peter Noll. The analysis of these passages will be useful to 
argue in favor of the thesis that dying with dignity requires first of all that the suffering patient is never 
subject to others  interests, including family, who often wants to prolong life at any cost. In the second 
place, it requires that we really understand how devastating is the impact of lies on the patient s overall 
condition. Finally, it requires that efforts be made to overcome prejudices in order to preserve the patient 
from mortification caused by not been considered any longer a person with full rights: This occurs any-
time the patient is denied the right to choose and possibly adopt nonconformist lifestyles. Conclusions of 
the paper focus on some considerations concerning values at stake and foreseeable impacts on health pol-
icies regarding the vision of dying with dignity in the shape of the examined literary inspirations. 
 
Key-words: Bioethics, End-of Life, Literature, Law 
In the last decades, the philosophical-legal and bioethical debate has increasingly 
focused on the end-of life. The primary reason for this is that modern technological 
medicine has brought deep changes in the scenarios of dying, and these transformations 
have played a major role in the attention paid to this key issue. 
Over time, modern medicine has refined its abilities of controlling death. Indeed, 
medicine can now modulate times and modes of dying, and consequently the end-of life 
has become a field where choices are possible, and as such, it constitutes a privileged 
issue at the core of the ethical, critical discussion. In this context, the question 
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concerning the meaning of dying with dignity and of the adequate protection of all 
individuals  right to end their life in a dignified way has cropped up repeatedly both in 
the philosophical reflection and in the ethical-legal debate. And the interest shown in 
this topic has been primarily associated with the echo that the concept of dignity has 
played in arguing in favor of the desirable modes of ending life. Arguments based on 
dignity have indeed represented the main strategy used to persuade of the goodness  of 
choices and lines for action to be adopted in the end-of life. 
Although very different ethical positions have appealed and do appeal to the 
notion of dignity, relevant disagreements over the conditions of dying with dignity still 
persist. This may lead to consider dignity at the end of life  as a kind of empty box , as 
a rhetorical useless  artifice (as Ruth Macklin [2003] wrote in a challenging paper 
entitled Dignity is a Useless Concept), or even as a dangerous one, and for these reasons it 
should -as it is sometimes suggested- be avoided in order not to ferment the 
mystification of an agreement which seems to be, always and in any case, not only 
possible but even taken for granted. However, dignity  is a term that has an intense and 
emotively positive connoted power , as Uberto Scarpelli, my master of philosophical-
legal studies, would have qualified it (Scarpelli 1992: 40). And the term, which is used in 
relevant international documents like the European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(Nizza, 2000), deserves, in my opinion, to continue to be part of the theoretical, ethical-
legal lexicon concerning the end-of life. This proposal is subject to the condition of 
framing the meaning of the concept by means of a re-definition in which the debate 
could be grounded. And according to this definition, we could achieve the desired goal 
of obtaining consensus of opinion on choices and lines for action that could provide the 
best assistance to incurable patients. 
But how can we identify the conditions needed to properly discuss dignity at the 
end-of life and dignified dying? Famous literary works may help to enlighten the search 
for key-words  in ending life with dignity. By following some famous authors  line of 
reasoning, I think it is possible to frame a definition of dignity at the end-of life  
deserving attention and positive evaluation with regard to the values it puts into play 
and to the practical impacts it may have. 
The first key word  of dying with dignity is suggested by a passage excerpted 
from On the Dignity and Advancement of Learning by Francis Bacon, who was one of the 
major seventeenth-century pioneers of modern thought. In this passage, the author 
stigmatizes the habit of contemporary physicians of abandoning the cures of patients in 
their nature incurable ( the patient after the disease is thought past cure  in Bacon s 
words) and vigorously recognizes, for the first time, the mandatory duty of physicians to 
mitigate pain and suffering. He writes: 
And further, we esteem it the office of a physician to mitigate the pains and 
tortures of diseases, as well as to restore health; and this not only when such a 
mitigation, as of a dangerous symptom, may conduce to recovery; but also, when 
there being no further hopes of recovery, it can only serve to make the passage out 
attending the patient after the disease is thought past cure, though, in my 
judgment, if they were not wanting to their own profession and to humanity itself, 
they should here give their attendance to improve their skill, and make the dying 
person depart with greater ease and tranquility. [Bacon 2013: 190] 
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With the help of the anticipatory ability characterizing important masters and 
directed by the expressive effectiveness of remarkable writers, Francis Bacon prefigured 
the model of medicine committed to curing even when healing is no longer possible 
three centuries ago. This model of medicine inspired palliative care during the early 
1950s onwards, initially in Great Britain, and later in further countries. Bacon also 
identified, in this way, the first essential condition of dying with dignity, which consists 
in offering cares that are adequate for the specific situation of each patient till the end of 
her life. To preserve from abandon  by providing specific assistance is therefore the 
first and essential condition to be fulfilled in order to properly discuss the question of a 
dignified death. This is not however a sufficient condition. A suffering individual near to 
death may be indeed preserved from abandon and assisted, but with the intent to 
prolong his/her survival at any cost, and not with the intention of meeting his/her 
specific needs for mitigating suffering. This would be the response of a medicine that, in 
order to avoid patients  death, ends up in overlooking the patient who has his/her life at 
stake along with his/her needs, his/her feelings, and also his/her specific demands. This 
model of medicine is successfully portrayed in Thomas Mann s romans. Consider, for 
instance, the passage excerpted from the Buddenbrook (1901) where the author sketches 
out the dramatic scene of a terrible agony that the physicians refuse to mitigate by 
means of a sleeping pill, despite the fact that the patient implores them. In order to 
justify their refusal, physicians appeal to the conviction that mandatory duty of any 
physician is to preserve patients  life as longer as possible and to do so in favor of the 
patient s relatives and not for the benefit of the patient himself/herself. 
In Thomas Mann s words: 
Have mercy gentlemen, let me sleep! ... But the physicians knew their duty: they 
were obliged, under all circumstances, to preserve life just as long as 
were not made to bring death into the world, but to preserve 
life at any cost.  There was a religious and moral basis for this law, which they had 
known once, though they did not have it in mind at the moment. So they 
strengthened the heart action by various devices and even improved the breathing 
by causing the patient to retch. . [Mann 1924 : 480] 
The reading of this passage helps us to grasp how high is the price, not only in 
terms of mortification and humiliation, but also of increase in suffering, that the patient 
has to pay whenever physicians decide and act without taking into account his/her point 
of view, and their decision and act is directed by the presumptuous conviction that they 
are the only ones able to evaluate quantity, quality, and tolerable degree of suffering as 
well as to decide what is good  for the patient. 
Some years before Thomas Mann work, and more precisely in 1886, Lev Tolstoj, 
in his work entitled The Death of Ivan Il ic, had already denounced the devastating impacts 
of a medicine, and more in general of a culture of life, that justifies, or rather demands 
for the exclusion of the patient from the decision making process concerning 
treatments, and that pursues this intent by denying the patient any access to information 
concerning diagnosis and, above all, prognosis of his/her illness. In this way, this model 
of medicine includes the patient in a conspiracy of silence  - a common and recurring 
expression in literature dealing with the end-of life - that is doomed to cause further 
suffering beyond the one caused by the illness itself. Tolstoj represents a first and 
effective image when he writes: 
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What tormented Ivan Ilych most was the deception, the lie, which for some reason 
they all accepted, that he was not dying but simply ill, and that he only need keep 
quiet and undergo a treatment and then something very good would result. He 
however knew that do what they would nothing would come of it, only still more 
agonizing suffering and death. This deception tortured him their not wishing to 
admit what they all knew and what he knew, but wanting to lie to him concerning 
his terri
strangely enough, many times when they were going through their antics over him 
he had been within a hairbreadth of calling out to them: Stop lying! You know and 
I know that I am dying. Then at least stop lying about it!  But he had never had the 
spirit to do it. [Tolstoj 1993: 48-49] 
Both the passages excerpted from the works of Thomas Mann and Lev Tolstoj 
help us to understand that in order to achieve the goal, relevant for any human being, 
that is, a death that can be qualified as good , assistance ought not to be associated with 
mortification, of which the victim is the individual whose demands for help are 
systematically overlooked, and in particular the individual who, because of his/her 
illness and the fact that he/she is near to death, is no longer taken into account as a 
person . 
I think that we have reached a point where we can identify good reasons for 
proposing inclusion within the conditions for a good use of the expression dying with 
dignity  of two further aspects that we can sum up as following: impede any kind of 
mortification  and acknowledge that the individual who is dying has the right do be 
treated as a person until the end of his/her life . 
But what does it mean to recognize that an individual is a person? Person  like 
dignity is a controversial concept, as there are no commonly shared views either of the 
requirements that constitute the status of person or of the individuals who deserve to be 
qualified as person . However, it is not in doubt the relevance of the contribution made 
by the theoretical approach that argued critically against the qualification of the notion 
as a concept describing  ontological or empirical properties presumptively possessed by 
individuals. This critical approach has underlined the main normative nature of the 
concept, which recalls the legal and moral rights and duties attributed to individuals, in a 
concise expression (that is, person ) as Hans Kelsen (2005: 172) observed in his 
analysis. 
 If we agree with this perspective, which highlights the fact that the qualification 
of specific individuals as person depends on normative choices made in the light of 
specific axiological options (Hart 1951; Scarpelli 1985), we will conclude that to qualify a 
dying individual as a person means to acknowledge his/her moral relevance, to 
legitimate the attribution of rights and duties, to confirm his/her role of active agent 
and not only of recipient of relevant decisions concerning his/her life. 
It could be observed that current legal acts and documents relating to health care 
available in many Western countries like Italy, which is the country I come from, are 
absolutely clear about the fact that ill individuals and dying individuals ought to be 
considered as person  according to the meaning referred to earlier. The Italian 
Constitution confirms this view, for instance, in Article 31, which states equality of 
                                                 
1 Art. 3: All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without distinction of sex, 
race, language, religion, political opinion, personal and social conditions .  
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citizens irrespective of their personal conditions , or in Article 322, which states that no 
one may be forcefully submitted to medical treatment  without introducing any 
distinction with regard to patients with poor prognosis or in the terminal phase. 
Do we then really need to claim the right of all individuals to be considered a 
person  till the end of life and to identify the protection of such a right as the third 
unavoidable condition of dying with dignity? In my opinion, the positive answer to the 
questions derives from the remark that, despite all the legal provisions ruling this right, 
the patient is denied the status of person , and his/her dignity is compromised 
whenever the seriousness of his/her illness is an excuse for not observing rules and 
principles, which, in the society we live in, are considered inalienable; whenever we 
deprive, more or less consciously, a patient of the opportunity of shaping the last part of 
his/her life according to his/her lifestyles, convictions, and values; eventually, whenever 
we justify and contribute to his/her social detachment, and thus we proclaim his/her 
civil death before the biological one occurs. This is a quite realistic scenario that we 
should not erroneously refer to the years when Tolstoj and Mann wrote their romans, 
and hence undervalue its persistence in the contemporary age, as it clearly emerges from 
the last passage I am going to quote in my discussion. I refer to the work of Peter Noll, 
In the face of death, posthumous publication, two years after the author s death, in 1985. 
This work bears testimony to the experience of illness, specifically bladder cancer, 
which would have caused the death of the Swiss jurist. He lives this experience in full 
compliance with his ideal of life and death, and by fully implementing the right to self-
determination with regard to health care, a right that ought to be considered an 
inalienable prerogative of any person - in the specific case, he denies consent to a 
surgical intervention proposed by physicians. 
I had been knowing that I had cancer for three years. I had refused the advised 
operation, not because of heroism, rather because it did not coincide with my ideal 
Christians, and especially non Christians like Seneca, Montaigne, and Heidegger 
were of the opinion that life has more sense when we think of death, instead of 
to be exposed to radiations, and despite all this I would have had only 35% of 
3 . [Noll 1985: 97] 
This powerful and clear image of an ill individual, who has made aware choices 
and has never ceased to be a person , is counterbalanced by the representation, well 
reported in a reflection of Noll s wife and published in the book, of the distance 
between the ill person Peter Noll embodied and the one commonly perceived as 
normal , that is, a patient who does what everybody expects him to do, specifically by 
completely entrusting physicians with the task of curing him and refraining from 
nonconformist decisions, even by not choosing at all. 
                                                 
2 Art. 32: The Republic safeguards health as a fundamental right of the individual and as a collective in-
terest, and guarantees free medical care to the indigent. No one may be obliged to undergo any given 
health treatment except under the provisions of the law. The law cannot under any circumstances violate 
the limits imposed . 
3 Peter Noll 1984, Diktate über Sterben und Tod, Pend Verlag, Zürich. English title In the face of death. The 
quotation has been translated by the author from the Italian version Sul morire e la morte, Mondadori, Mila-
no, 1985. 
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See, you bother people with your decision. When a person has cancer, she goes to 
the hospital and accepts operation. But if somebody has cancer and goes happily 
around as you do, the phenomenon is disturbing. People are suddenly urged to 
face death, and this is precisely what people do not want until they are in your 
condition. If you went to hospital, everything would be in the right way, they could 
visit you and take you out, and after some time it could be said: God blesses you, 
he has been dismissed, and after some time it could be said: now he went back, 
and it could be possible again to bring you out, but for shorter periods. You are a 
scandal for people, you are the living representation that death is among us.4 [Noll 
1985: 97] 
In the investigation aimed to find a re-definition able to fill with contents a notion 
like death with dignity , which is exposed to the risk of remaining an empty box , the 
passages excerpted from four famous works, despite difference in chronology and 
literary genre, have represented metaphorical step-overs, where the one who decides to 
pause will be, in my opinion, persuaded that to die with dignity is not possible if the 
social context, where an individual lives, is characterized, especially with regard to 
individuals suffering from incurable illnesses, by an indifferent attitude which hides a 
generalized removal of finitude and death. And if we are not able to understand the 
devastating impacts of lies on the condition of the patient because we are anchored in 
rooted prejudices. If, eventually, the patient is not protected against mortification 
deriving from the fact that he/she is no longer considered fully a person , and he/she is 
denied, because he/she is ill, the right to choose and adopt, if he/she wants to, 
nonconformist lifestyles, as Peter Noll did in the last part of his life. 
At this point of my discussion, it could be opposed that the representation of the 
situations with a negative impact on the condition of the involved characters, which 
clearly emerges from the quoted passages, is the result of the wise use, of which only 
masters are able, of the expressive language that moves feelings and stimulates 
emotions. 
Why then refer to and focus on that representation and the contents that can be 
extrapolated from it in order to fill the notion dying with dignity  by the point of view 
of a conceptual approach based on a conception of the philosophy of law as a critical 
reflection, that is, that refers to a set of reasons used to show that something is true or 
correct? 
I think that we can answer this question by observing that from the passages of 
Bacon, Mann, Tolstoj, and Noll, I referred to in my discussion, the philosopher of law, 
who is loyal to his/her critical approach, can obtain something that goes far beyond the 
strong, emotive inputs.  
I refer to the more or less explicit identification of values at stake and 
consequently of reasons based on principles that support the definition of dignity of 
dying , a definition grounded in two essential and sufficient conditions for properly 
using the notion, that is, the fight against abandon and mortification along with the 
assurance of being treated as a person till the end of life. 
What values? Solidarity and beneficence, but with an essential role attributed to 
the value of autonomy in the clarification of the adequate conditions of implementation 
of solidarity and beneficence, or, as perhaps it is better to say, the value of the respect of 
                                                 
4 Ibidem. 
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individuals  convictions and will. These values have not reached full implementation yet, 
despite the fact that they have been ethically and legally recognized (consider, for 
instance, the Italian Constitution I referred to earlier), values that play a key role not 
only in the way human beings can end their lives, but also in the way they can actually 
live their lives. Our authors can help anyone to understand this point.  
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On the Borders, In Trial: Sabahattin Ali and His 
Documents 
Gökçe Çataloluk* 
Abstact: This paper attempts at analyzing the image of an author (Sabahattin Ali, 1907-1948) that stands 
in the intersection point of law and literature. Unlike a literary critique, the paper does not elaborate much 
on Ali s fiction but rather on a recent book collecting the legal documents of his life as an ordinary 
suspect. Petitions, letters, bills of indictments and court verdicts by or about him constitute a rich source 
for the literary interpretation of his work and recent history of Turkish law - but not necessarily in this 
order. They are fictions of law in the literary sense and valuable proofs of the construction of a legal 
subject, out of a well known writer. Through these documents, the pathos ( My whole life is but a 
disturbing dream to me ) is derived out of the writer s logos ( I do not beg mercy or tolerance from your 
court, I demand justice ) to understand his very ethos. Albeit highly challenged by law and humanities, the 
systems theory as developed by Niklas Luhmann is employed as the theoretical framework of the article. 
Focusing on the metaphor of border to dissect the structural coupling, I consider my motive as a problem 
of legal imagination and a re-reading of literary memory. 
 
Key-words: Systems theory in literature, border, structural coupling, Sabahattin Ali, legal imagination. 
1. Introduction 
A letter written in 1945 to the Minister of Education of Turkey, as a response to an in-
quiry, ended with the Latin phrase:  
Dixi et salvavi animam meam. 
It was written by a German teacher suspected of socialist propaganda. The teach-
er s name was Sabahattin Ali (1907-1948) and he held many more titles apart from being 
a full time teacher: a well known novelist and poet of his time; a publisher, columnist 
and a symbolic name for the struggle for emancipation. 
As it is a very hard task to evaluate and comment on an author s work in a lan-
guage that it is not translated into1, the limits of the attempt must be clearly defined and 
                                                 
* Gökçe Çataloluk works as an assistant professor in Istanbul Bilgi University, Faculty of Law. Her 
research is focused on systems theory, critical legal education and literature. This paper was presented in 
2015 World Congress of the International Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 
. gokce.cataloluk@bilgi.edu.tr 
1 Actually, the work of Ali was translated during the cold war years in Eastern Europe, Russia and Greece 
due to geo-political reasons but it has recently been published in German and French and finally the Eng-
lish translations will be available in 2016, from Penguin Classics. 
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a wider discussion must be left aside until the translations are in daylight. Therefore this 
article is focused on a the legal documents of Sabahattin Ali which include his petitions, 
letters, notes he made in prison and bills of indictments and court verdicts about him 
which are gathered together in a book named Mahkemelerde [At the Courts]. The aim of 
this article is to limite to discussing about the subjection  of Sabahattin Ali by the legal 
system to argue that he is in a position which makes his literary work a piece of legal his-
tory and legal documents concerning him that of modern Turkish literature. 
To pursue this attempt, I will introduce Ali s fiction first, then discuss about the 
law s fiction of Ali and finally try to comment on the ethos of this modern writer and the 
symbolical aspect of his existence. 
2. An Intellectual on the Borders- Ali and His Fiction 
The author s role and its limits on his/her work (even to determine whether it is a text  
or a work ) is equally important in law and literature studies as it is in literary theory. 
Quite a number of literary theorists such as Roland Barthes to Terry Eagleton have 
claimed that for analysis, the author is dead  and that it is the text that is open to inter-
pretation of the reader. Although this seems to be quite a liberating approach, I agree 
with Ian Ward that in context of law and literature, textual analysis can t be thought 
apart from the author as this field basically has educative aims and it is meant to create a 
historical and social consciousness of critique2 which is impossible to create without ref-
erence to the author. But the author here is not taken as an actor but as the producer of 
the communications, which leads us to the borders of another theory. To get to that 
point, we must start with introducing Sabahattin Ali as an author. 
2.1 The Author 
Sabahattin Ali belongs to the first wave intellectuals of the newly founded Republic of 
Turkey (1923) after the War of Independence3 (1919-1922). Using both the old (Arabic) 
and the new alphabets (Latin)4 he was also one of the pioneer youth to build the new 
Republic that were sent abroad to get western education. After the two years he spent in 
Berlin (1928-1930), he returned to Turkey and was appointed as a German teacher. He 
travelled in Anatolia and witnessing the social and economic panorama, he adopted 
firstly a quasi-nationalistic and later a socialist world view. 
Although he is widely known as a socialist writer, his fiction cannot be framed 
boldly with his ideological affiliation. As almost all of his short stories fit in the genre, 
one can observe that two out of his three major novels do not fit in particularities of the 
dominant social realism at his time. He was even subjected to serious critique about his 
individualistic approach after the publication of the last two novels. Ali s poems, written 
                                                 
2 Ward, I., Law and Literature. Possibilities and Perspectives. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p.38 
3 The War took place right after the WWI, against the allied forces of Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece 
and Armenia. As a consequence, the Ottoman Empire fell and was replaced with the Republic of Turkey 
and the Caliphate and Sultanate were abolished. 
4 As the Arabic letters were used to write Ottoman language which was under heavy influence of Arabic 
and Persian, the Republic of Turkey made a reform to adopt Latin alphabet in 1928 which was more suit-
able to write Turkish. 
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in a folk spirit, sometimes up to the point of naiveté, were composed into very popular 
songs long after his death. 
Just to take a quick glance at his first novels can provide us a basic opinion about 
his narrative. The first published novel,  [Yusuf from Kuyucak] is per-
haps his most realistic work and a good modern example for brigandage narratives in 
Turkish folk culture. Writing about an orphan adopted by a bureaucrat who struggles 
against the local gentry, Ali challenges the moral values and customs of a small town. 
 [The Devil Within], his second novel, reveals the modernist pro-
gress of Ali and combines the social with a Dostoyevskian individualistic existentialism. 
Influenced perhaps too much by the Notes from Underground, The novel is based on a 
love story and focuses on the intimate evil potential of man. Having direct references to 
social and economic corruption, the novel stays in the border of the realism and roman-
ticism. 
And finally Kürk Mantolu Madonna [Madonna in Furs] is a partly autobiographical 
story of a young Turk in Berlin falling in love with a German Jew and his angst which 
turns into a catatonic sense after having to leave her and settle down back home in Is-
tanbul. Although it has connotations about the rising fascism in Germany, this novel is 
the most individualistic piece of his work and it exhibits the writer s talent of portrayal. 
The influence of the German romantic writers; especially Goethe, whose work and 
Heinrich von Kleist, whose life and death fascinated Ali is also obvious in this latest 
work. 
It must be noted that Ali was not only a fiction writer and that he also the owned 
nd a couple of left-wing intellec-
tuals wrote political satire. Although it was read by masses, the magazine was closed and 
was re-opened under different names5 and could only survive two years under the op-
pression.  
In the beginning of 1948, after a series of legal cases I will elaborate on later, the 
exhausted and offended Sabahattin Ali disappeared. Some months later, his bones were 
found in a forest on the westernmost spot of Turkey and a highly suspicious man, Ali 
Ertekin admitted that he murdered Sabahattin Ali who had paid him to help him to 
cross the border of Bulgaria. In his testimony, the suspect said that the well known un-
patriotic attitude of the writer provoked him and he committed the murder under the 
pressure of his nationalistic feelings. This incident was one of the very first unsolved 
murders of Turkish intellectuals, which would later grow in number6. Today it is almost 
certain that Sabahattin Ali was first interrogated and then murdered by the deep  state, 
not as a particular act of homicide but as a threat to the leftist movement.  
2.2 Law s Subjecting Fiction  
                                                 
5 In September 1947 [Certain Pasha] , after 1947  [Deceased Pasha] 
6 The impact of this murder at time it was committed can be traced in the memoir of Sabiha Sertel, a lead-
ing woman figure of leftist movement and a journalist:  their own predictions about the 
incident. We all knew that Sabahattin wanted to flee but could not believe in the story the newspapers 
told. Ali Ertekin, the papers claimed, had killed Sabahattin for money. But there was so little money found 
on him. It was written that he had books of Karl Marx and Lenin in his bag. Why would someone need to 
take those books to Bulgaria? The incident was obviously served to the papers from one source and the 
truth was hidden  (Sertel 1978: 372).  
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The author s figure, then, is a very political  one. And his work is also political  not be-
cause it speaks about political matters, because writing an sich is a political action. And as 
what is legal cannot be clearly separated from what is political (as these systems are co-
evolved and therefore interpenetrate), it is also a legal figure. But there is more to say, 
from a systems theoretical perspective.  
Niklas Luhmann describes law in a way that resembles the tale of King Midas, 
who turned everything he touched into gold: Law is what law says that is law. To be 
clearer, where a communication that can be declared as legal or illegal takes place, there 
functions the system of law, which is one of the social subsystems (Luhmann 1987: 
221). I won t go in the details of the theory but it should be noted that the system of so-
ciety is the totality of the communications of these sub-systems and nothing else. There-
fore, the theory employed here for the analysis is not an actor theory but a functional-
istic structuralist one, in which not the individuals but the communications constitute 
the parts of a society.  
On the other hand, a system only accepts communications that can be translated 
into its own language. Therefore, for Sabahattin Ali s communications to fall into the 
legal sphere they must be eligible for taking any value of the binary code of law. And 
this could only be possible if the producer, as a psychic system can be reconstructed by 
the legal (social sub-) system as it is the result of these communications7. This process of 
reconstruction, is legal subjection as we know it. Against the illusion that people are 
naturally subjects, regarding law as one of the ideological apparatuses of the state (also a 
repressive apparatus) Louis Althusser points at the construction process:  
I shall then suggest that ideology acts  or functions  in such a way that it recruits  
subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or transforms  the individuals 
into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have 
called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the 
most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: Hey, you there!  Assuming 
that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed indi-
vidual will turn round. By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical con-
version, he becomes a subject. Why? Because he has recognized that the hail was 
really  addressed to him, and that it was really him who was hailed  (and not some-
one else). Experience shows that the practical telecommunication of hailings is 
such that they hardly ever miss their man: verbal call or whistle, the one hailed al-
ways recognizes that it is really him who is being hailed. [Althusser 1970] 
It is not only Althusser who supports the relational point of view in this context. 
James Boyd White, in his classical work The Legal Imagination, claims that the whole 
point of judicial process8 [which, according to Luhmann is the center of legal system G.C.] is to 
call a person or event a name, affix a label  (White 1985: 238). However complex this 
analysis might seem, the case in the life-world is easy to distinguish. It might even re-
semble a Leonard Cohen song. The legal life of Sabahattin Ali started when law called 
him by his name .  
Now, let us take a brief look at the cornerstones of this construction. 
                                                 
7 This, is the autopoietical process of any social system which is the constant process of self-structuring of 
the system by its own parts. 
8 The courts, according to Luhmann constitute the center of the legal system fort hey produce the pure 
legal communication (Luhmann 1993: 299-306). 
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In 1932 acting upon the testimony of an informer, the state prosecutor claimed 
that Sabahattin Ali had recited the following poem in public:  
O those who haven t left the motherland 
Have the blurry rivers become lucid? 
Have the streams of blood stopped? 
Have the high ambitions been reached? 
Do they still hang the worshippers of rights? 
Do they make an MP out of each clown? 
Do the peasants have their plows? 
Have their skinny oxes been resurrected? 
Those who will all confirm if he says he s God, 
Do they still worship the old pimp?? 
Haven t they imprisoned Ismet9 yet? 
Hasn t Ali the Bald, been beheaded? 
Once the old pimp drinks it up. 
 
Once he sneered even Alexander the Great 
Hasn t the earth blushed with shame? [Ali 2004: 11] 
 
The poem obviously blames Mustafa Kemal of being a drunkard dictator sur-
rounded with clowns. But the lines are so naïve that it would certainly have been pro-
tected under the regulations concerning freedom of speech, if it wasn t the earliest years 
of the Republic, the revolutionary phase. Although Ali never openly admitted to have 
written the poem, a short analysis on the folk rhyme, syntax and the apparent cynicism 
implies that it is probable. In any case, Ali s first petition of defense provides us a rhe-
torical piece of communication: 
 
I am a man who bows his head and keeps silent when he is wrong, but shouts out 
loud when he is right and struggles against those who deny his being right. It is my 
duty as a free citizen not to stay silent as long as I am subjected to injustice and 
that is not corrected. I consider the possible negative consequences but yet I do 
not refrain from claiming my right because it is more honorable to be in prison 
where injustice is prevalent than to walk freely. [Ivi: 37] 
Despite all his efforts, the author was found guilty and had to spend five months 
in prison: And this incident paved the way for a series of trials. 
In 1937, he was sued for being a threat to both the family and military life of the citizens 
and propagating against the system in his novel , depicting Turkish sol-
diers as lazy and corrupt and an honest man reuniting with his wife even though he 
knows about her being into prostitution (Ali 2015a). But this case dropped after three 
expert reports in defense of Ali, one of which was written by another well-known novel-
ist, Resat Nuri Güntekin. Mahkemelerde, includes this report as well: 
a society. To exonerate family, woman, school, police, municipality from this cri-
tique would lead to the elimination of the moral genre and replace it with a hypo-
critical, artificial and cheap literature. As in any state, there are rules that restrict 
daily political press in the Turkish Republic, too. But abstract ideas and art are giv-
en absolute freedom. I think that as Turkish writers do deal with even communism 
                                                 
9 Comrade of Kemal Atatürk in the War of Independence, the -  of the Republic. 
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as an idea, there is no harm in writing a critical novel about any of our institutions. 
[Ali 2004: 66]  
It was in the year of 1945 when a reactionary crowd destroyed the progressive 
a threat to public morality, Sabahattin Ali was put on the shelf as a German teacher by 
the Ministry of Education. Perhaps it was at this point, in a momentum between hekon 
and akon (Goodrick 1991: 56) , he made his tragic choice. In other words, as his destiny 
was already fixed by the gods above, he decided to take his life in his hands and walk to 
his own end. The letter he wrote the letter he wrote to the Minister of Education, men-
tioned above, reflects this moment of illumination: 
I spent many sleepless nights and I examined over and over again these days, 
whether I am or my ideas are wrong. But only a quick look at the methods of 
struggle my enemies use, I concluded that they have no chance of being right. The 
right ones never take such a road; no right would never abandon the side of words 
and ideas and support the kicks and sledges. [Ali 2004: 99] 
And taking this moment as an opportunity, he openly marked his standpoint and 
described his analysis about his homeland in detail:  
Only socialism could resurrect a nation like ours, the production level of which is 
very low and raise it to the state of art. But as many regions of our land is living in 
a primitive social and economic state and culturally, the understanding of people is 
not suitable for grasping socialism, in my opinion the urgent task is to serve to 
change the circumstances. [Ivi: 96] 
But in contrast to the Latin phrase aforesaid, dixi et salvavi animam meam, this very 
act couldn t save his soul. Actually, this tragic choice determined the climax of his life as 
a legal subject: He stepped right in the soul of the legal trap as an ordinary suspect . 
From a systems theoretical perspective, this soul  is where law speaks only its own lan-
guage. According to Luhmann, by 18th century, when law completed its ausdifferenzierung 
and developed the prohibition of the denial of justice principal, the courts gained their 
unique place in autopoiesis: the center of the legal system.  
After this turn, Ali maintained his place in the pink files of Turkish legal system 
and his work became a part of legal history, entering into petitions, verdicts and police 
information sheets. And things became so superficial that he had to return to his origi-
nal profession: teaching. 
based on jokes. To take offense at jokes and touchiness are signs of low self confi-
dence for the people who have reached a high civil and cultural level. [Ivi: 128] 
In 1947 he was tried four times: first for defaming a Minister in 1947 and second 
for addressing the members of the government as Forty Thieves . The excerpt above is 
from his defence in the first one. He was acquitted from both, thanks to the expert re-
ports.  
In the third trial, Ali was sentenced to three months in prison for defaming an MP 
and finally in the fourth, having tried him for defaming two Turkish racists (Ali called 
one of them Hitler s apprentice  and the other, Albanian s Son  in one of his articles) 
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the court decided in favor of the writer but by the time verdict was given, he had been 
held in custody for two months. The expert reports and defenses trying to point out 
that calling an Albanian Albanian  is not an insult, hold their unique places in the legal 
document of this tragicomedy. Here is an excerpt from a petition by Ali s lawyer: 
 10 is from 
Prezne might make you think he is an Albanian. Page 725 of Hayat Encyclopedia, 
printed in Istanbul in the year [1]932 might state that the grandfather of Cenap Sa-
habettin and the baker of the palace of Sultan Mahmut , Osman Aga of Preznen  
is Albanian. But, yes, he might as well be the son of conquerors that rode their 
horses from Konya and therefore of pure Turkish race. But being the son of an 
Albanian or the son of a Turk does not have any significance for this case. Because 
being a Turk is only constitutionally meaningful and there is no sign of defaming 
here neither legally nor rationally. [Ivi: 152] 
As it was the case in the trials of Oscar Wilde (Wan 2011: 710), Ali s subjection by 
law obviously turned his fictional work into legal communications through excerpts in 
petitions and verdicts and citations in many legal documents. But the process fed also a 
reverse movement. As an ordinary suspect , going deep in the sewage of the legal sys-
tem, Ali tried to objectify legal communications for his fictional work. In the book that 
gathers all the above quoted legal documents, Mahkemelerde, there are also a few peti-
tions by other prisoners including a demand from Greek and Armenian prisoners to be 
allowed to write their letters in their native language, a very striking description of the 
maltreatment and torture of young political prisoners, personal notes on being in prison 
and a detailed description of an execution night. As for the latter one, on a postscript, 
he notes that he got this information from the wardens and he will use it in his stories. 
Although he never wrote a totally corresponding story, other pieces can easily be traced 
in his short stories: 
Isolating a prisoner from the world is the best thing you can do for him. Because 
what would knock him down is to know that freedom is so close. Listening to the 
waves of the sea that is ten steps away, which leads to the greatest freedom but 
having to watch the walls of a t it a pain 
so deep? One would choose to be kept at some place that has nothing to remind 
freedom rather than meeting a bird that eats bread crumbles in the yard, at one s 
feet and then watching her leave these walls by a strike of her wings to meet her 
liberty, after sharing imprisoned steps inside. [Ali 2003: 40]  
3. The  of Ali and His Work in Intersection 
Recreation of the author in legal system has its consequences in literature. But 
this, as psychic systems do not produce communications but mere perturbations 
for social systems to transfer, is not a linear process from the systems theoretical 
perspective. Therefore what follows is an attempt to dissect this complex relation-
ship and point at the opportunities the theory offers.  
                                                 
10 As the law on appointing surnames had only recently passed, the people in concern in this case had the 
chance to pick up their own surnames. The surname of  complainants, literally 
. The lawyer of Sabahattin Ali is implicitly making fun of the complainant. 
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3.1 A Metaphor to Define It All 
The very existence  of Ali was surrounded by crowds but at the same time, a stark lone-
liness oozed from his works.  
I knew that there was an empty space in me and it oppressed me morally. Some-
thing was obviously lacking but what was it? I was so sad like the men who sud-
denly realize that they forgot something right after they leave home but cannot 
find what it is and desperately search their pockets. Just like them, I was taking fur-
ther steps, unwilling to walk. [Ali 2015b: 117] 
s just the need for loneliness. There are 
days I can t put up with any word or even a small sound around me. I feel that I 
fully feed my own self and even overflow. Irreplaceable perfect dreams that seem 
stronger than everything, race in my mind. [Ali 2015c: 88] 
He suddenly thought that he had slits on his chest like the slits on the bark of this 
he was in this huge night that spread from the stars in the sky down to the pebbles 
in the water, from the clouds that came from the east to the sea that lay on the 
west. [Ali 2015a: 15]  
As a realist writer with an acute romantic tendency, Ali was criticized for his con-
fusion  (Bezirci 1974: 195-6)11. Not only this, his existentialist approach was considered 
as an individualistic weakness by many critics12.  
Starting from this point and following a line of thought, I think border  is the 
metaphor that could fully surround his Ali s image. Not only is he in the border of ro-
manticism and social realism, but also he is in the border of his political ideas. The cri-
tique of Nazim Hikmet soon after Ali s death, about his being an independent socialist 
and staying just on the border of the party, shows this direction: 
If he was a Party member, maybe this would not prevent his being jailed and killed. 
But he wouldn t be the victim of that fascist provocation this easily, he wouldn t be 
slaughtered in that forest, that way. [Ali 2004: 2]  
Ali wrote his best known poem Never mind my Heart  in a prison castle on the 
northernmost spot of Turkey right by the sea13 but to crown the metaphor, died on the 
border between Bulgaria and Turkey, just like Walter Benjamin who now sleeps in Port-
Bou.  
                                                 
11  
12 Nowadays, under the rule of the  Islamism in Turkey, Ali is hailed as an anti- Kemalist writer and 
his work has become popular again, which I think is another unhealthy approach making it harder to 
analyze his work in depth. 
13 The poem has been composed and became a very cathy popular song, jus
poems. Just to give a quick impression, here is an excerpt: 
Outside, wild waves 
Rush the walls 
Their sound entertain you 
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The metaphor of border also corresponds to the concept of boundary in systems 
theory. It finds its roots in the Laws of Form of Spencer-Brown that is one of the pillars 
of the theory stands on. To start with, a distinction must be made to produce any kind 
of form. Once a distinction is made, there is a marked (system) and an unmarked (envi-
ronment) space that are subject to crossings or any kind of alterations. But the crucial 
point is that a marked space can only gain its meaning with the boundary that creates 
the distinction and leaves the unmarked space out. This is called the the unity of a dis-
tinction  and when transferred to social systems, it means that a system can only be to-
tally grasped with reference its environment. More specifically, to say that there is a 
boundary of law that separates it from the other systems does not simply mean that is 
isolates the system. It merely defines  the system but without the examination of the 
ways of a system to relate to its environment, a system cannot be understood complete-
ly. 
It is illustrated above, how the legal documents of Ali constitute a source for liter-
ature. But again, the literary work of Ali is frequently used to accuse or defend the au-
thor in the legal documents. If Ali s legal documents lay on the boundary of the system 
of law and the system of art, the boundary here, must be understood not only as distinc-
tion of the marked (law or literature) and the unmarked space (law or literature and the 
rest of the environment) but also the unity of this distinction (Spencer-Brown 1994:3-4), 
therefore a reference must be made to both of the systems. 
3.2 Art and Law- Interconnection of Two Social Systems 
But how then, are these systems interrelated? How can one grasp the unity of this dis-
tinction? If the systems are not structures trapped in their own boundaries, then there 
must be an adaptation process that does not lead to the disorganization of the systemic 
properties. The term autopoiesis not only refers to the reproduction of one system but 
also this boundary issue . From a systems theoretical perspective, autopoietic systems 
only take cognitive impulses from their environment and code them in them meaning 
producing mechanisms (Witteween 1999: 645-648). 
Since the boundaries of the systems are only determined by communications and 
what is social is always defined by a set of complex relationships, it is generally the case 
that two or more systems produce communications and coexist in life. In this case, the 
overlapping systems interact continuously. In systems theory, there is a specific term to 
define this case: Structural coupling (Maturana & Varela 2010: 98). Just to give a quick 
example; in a Constitution, it is easy to observe the structural coupling of politics and 
law. The document belongs to the legal system, determined by law s dual code and it be-
longs at the same time to the political system, determined by its dual code. But the legal 
and political communications preserve their systemic characteristics and do not replace 
or merge in each other. 
The system of art however, has a peculiarity among all other social systems ac-
cording to Luhmann: 
Artistic communication distinguishes itself both from communication that relies 
exclusively on language and from indirect communications that are either analo-
gous to language or unable to secure the autopoiesis of communication, because 
the communicative intent of conveying information can always be denied. Artistic 
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communication, by contrast, employs perceptions that it prepares exclusively for 
its own use. In so doing, artistic communication realizes specific forms of structur-
al coupling between consciousness and society. It communicates by means of dis-
tinctions located within the work or by means of forms, for the concept of form, 
in the sense we use it here, implies a two-sided form, a distinction that can be dis-
tinguished. The work of art, then, is anything but an end in itself  [Luhmann 2000: 
52] 
But this does not restrain it from coupling with other systems. In his Art as a So-
cial System, Luhmann comments on art and economy as two distinct systems and refers 
to patronage as their area of structural coupling (Luhmann 2000: 161-167). Following 
the same line of thought, I think that the trials of a writer due to his work of art may be 
considered as another area of structural coupling, this time between art and law. Both 
systems observe these documents from their own perspective and to analyze the cou-
pling, there is a need for a second order  observation.  
Law, as a normatively closed system , is actually cognitively open (Luhmann 1993: 
65) which means that there are environmental reasons for its normative operations. The 
system takes these irritations  and codes them in its own language as it is the case with 
Sabahattin Ali. But when it comes to art, it is worth noting that as he determined the 
meaning producing dual code of legal system quite easily (lawful/unlawful), Luhmann 
himself had a great difficulty in determining the dual code of the art system and came 
out with the very loose couple: art/ non-art that is determined by fitting by the form. 
The problem then, is whether the legal documents gathered in Mahkemelerde fit (or don t 
fit) the form of art. 
Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, in his Beauty and the Beast: Art and Law in 
the Hall of Mirrors, comments on the dual coding of art: 
The value of non-art in the determining binarism art/non art  of the art system in-
cludes not only what is not considered art aesthetically, but also what is not con-
sidered art by the art system itself. To compare it to the lawful/unlawful schema-
tism, while both non-art and unlawful belong to their respective systems, non-art 
includes also the environment of the art system ( anything can be art these days! ) 
The unlawful as opposed to non-art , does not constitute a gate for the environ-
ment of the system to enter the system. [Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2003: 17] 
Following this comment and the paradoxical fact that social systems are closed in 
an open way , structural coupling of the two systems can easily be observed in Ali s trials 
and the documents thereof. 
4. Conclusion 
The fact that systems theory is met with hesitation if not with refusal within the law and 
literature studies, I think, has a few basic and good reasons, some arising from the theo-
ry itself. Firstly, when he examines the society, Luhmann briefly sees a complex network 
on the move. Therefore he fears oversimplification and accuses the and  disciplines of 
missing the whole. A second reason also has to do with reductionism but from the op-
posite side. Talking about boundaries and this way or other closed  systems does not 
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seem fitting for interdisciplinary approaches like law and literature14. And finally there is 
the chronic humanities  issue fearing the grand theory to oversee the very human story. 
But on the other hand, these hesitations feeding each other, miss the great opportunity 
of Aufhebung. 
Leaving this issue aside for a detailed analysis , I would like to stay within the bor-
ders of systems theoretical perspective to claim that in the case of Sabahattin Ali, the au-
thor subjected by law and his work re-coded in law s own language constitute a coupling 
area for both systems of law and art, more specifically the subsystem of literature which 
have been co-evolved in context of metaphors, analogies and authorial points of view 
(Amsterdam & Bruner 2010: 110). And to conclude, this observation (keeping in mind 
that each observation is another construction) comes out with the claim that in context 
of memory, Sabahattin Ali is in a position where his legal heritage not only belongs to 
legal history but also to the literary history of Turkish Republic, and vice versa.  
 
  
                                                 
14 See for example Berbee (2010: 245). Berbee recognizes the paradoxical relationship between autonomy 
and interdependence (2010: 250) yet is critical against the  rhetoric. 
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Emotions and Sentiments in Judicial 
Deliberation: The Role of Literature 
Ana Carolina de Faria Silvestre Rodrigues  
Abstract: The traditional perspective on emotions assumes a structural dualism between emotions and 
reason. Emotions are assumed as forces which can blind a person´s view and conduct her to do terrible 
things. For the common sense and including the legal common sense, emotions are dangerous and have 
nothing to do with the rational decision-making. However it´s absolutely interesting and fruitful the 
Aristotelian´s perspective about the relation between emotions and cognition. Emotions are not blind 
forces completely dissociated from reason but they are sustained by thoughts, opinions or impressions 
about an object. Aristotle did not elaborate a complete theory of emotions but he recognized that they are 
strongly connected with thoughts. 
The relation between emotions and law has been studied for a large range of scholars from 
different legal movements and with diverse objectives. We intend to explore it from Aristotle´s 
perspective about the relation between reason and emotions drawn on Nicomachean Ethics; the 
jurisprudencialism  a jusphilosophical approach elaborated by António Castanheira Neves - and the 
power of literary work to the development of phrònesis and other judicial virtues to the practical realization 
of law. 
 
Key-words: Aristotle on emotions, jurisprudencialism and the power of literary work.  
Occasion by occasion, one knows what to do, if one does, not by 
applying universal principles, but by being a certain kind of person: 
one who sees situations in a certain distinctive way . 
(Van Domselaar 2014: 226) 
1. Introduction 
In the Western world, reason and emotion are traditionally assumed to be distinct 
universes that nothing, or very little, has to do with each other. This vision of emotions 
as completely dissociated of reason goes back to classical Greek antiquity, exemplary, to 
Plato. Although Aristotle was Plato s student and member of the academy for twenty 
years, he rethought the relation between emotions and reason in practical life and in 
other fields as rhetoric etc. 
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In this paper, we will explore the relation between emotions and reason in ethics 
according to Aristotle´s point of view. Our main point is to rethink the practical 
realization of law challenges and the role of literary pieces to the development of the 
excellence of phrònesis and the judicial virtues of the non-rational part of the soul. The 
used methodology was the descriptive-analytical. 
2. Aristotle on emotions in Rhetoric 
In Rhetoric, Aristotle realized that facts are perceived differently under the influence of 
different emotions (Retórica: 1378a). The good speaker knows that. The reality itself in 
practical matters does not exist (in a pure objective way); what is true for me is what I 
perceive as true and emotions are an important part of my experience of life, my 
perception of correctness and to the judgment in a particular case.  
Aristotle realized that emotions are not an auxiliary element of persuasion as the 
ancient tradition used to assume, but they are important because they affect the 
judgment of the audience or, in other words, emotions change the way one perceive and 
evaluate the facts of life. The emotional arguments are much more complex than we 
normally see them. According to Aristotle in Rhetoric, emotions are the causes that 
make humans amend and introduce changes in their judgments, insofar as they involve 
pain and pleasure (Ivi: 1378a)1. 
Plato, in effect, studied the emotions and realized that the emotional responses 
are different from the bodily sensations and bodily drives. In Philebus, Socrates 
distinguishes between three kinds of mixed pleasures and pains. There are mixtures 
which concern the body and are found in the body, those that belong to the soul itself 
and are found in the soul, and those that belong to the soul and to the body. Emotions 
as anger, fear, lament, love, longing, emulation and envy are understood as mixed 
pleasures and pains belonging only to the soul. According to Fortenbaugh: 
The importance of this classification is to be seen in the union of emotional 
responses into a single class marked off from other kinds of mixed pleasures and 
pains that depend upon certain bodily conditions. Socrates is clear when say that 
anger and fear are fundamentally different from itches and tickles and hungers and 
thirsts, that emotional responses are neither bodily sensations nor bodily drives 
and therefore are to be grouped separately as pleasures and pains of the soul itself 
(Fortenbaugh 1975: 10). 
However, Socrates is not clear about the cognitive nature of emotional response. 
The Philebus certainly makes clear that Plato saw an intimate relation between emotion 
and cognition. But it fails to make this relation clear  (Ivi: 11). In Philebus, Socrates and 
Protarchus discuss about the relation between emotions (and other kinds of pains and 
pleasures) and cognition. Protarchus understands that an opinion can be true or false 
but he is not ready to concede that pleasure and pain can be classified as true or false. 
                                                 
1 There are many different definitions of emotions in Aristotle´s Works. In Nicomachean Ethics, emo-
tions are defined as appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emula-
tion, pity, and in general the feelings that are ac  (Nichomachean Ethics). 
These definitions do not present a full account of emotions on Aristotle´s thought. According to Zingano 
(2009), thoughts, opinions or evaluative judgements are the decisive element of emotions. 
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Facing the provocative theme, Socrates points out the similarities between opinion and 
pleasure and pain. In order to establish that pleasures and pains can be true or false as 
opinion, he affirms that pleasure often occurs together with false opinion. According to 
Fortenbaugh, the use of with  reflects a simple concurrence between opinion and 
pleasure. Opinion accompanies pleasure but is external to pleasure. It´s clear that Plato 
understood that emotions and pleasures are close related but it is not clear what kind of 
relation exists between emotion and cognition, stated Fortenbaugh (Ivi: 11).  
In Rhetoric, the relation between emotion and cognition is much clearer than 
Aristotle´s answer to this debate presented in Topics. There we can find an explicit 
relation between the thought of outrage (as an efficient cause) and the emotion of anger, 
for example. 
 
(Ivi: 12). 
The efficient cause of anger is the thought of outrage which means that someone 
cannot be angry when she thinks herself as treated justly. If I did something wrong and 
I know it, I will not feel angry. In that case I can fell shame, fear, sadness or another 
emotion but never anger. There is a logic distinction between similar emotions. Let´s 
analyze the logic distinction between hate and anger.  
Anger, as we stated under Aristotle´s perspective, is an emotion motivated by the 
thought of outrage. Someone said or did something outrageous, without any reason, to 
me or to someone who I care about. Anger is directed to one individual who I perceive 
as an outrageous one. Hate is distinct from anger because for its occurrence it´s not 
necessary to believe in personal outrage but to think of someone as a certain kind of 
person (Retórica: 1382a). 
The efficient cause became a powerful tool for distinguishing the logical 
boundaries between related emotions. Both fear and shame involve disturbance 
and both can be labeled as phobos. But they are essentially different because fear 
necessarily involves the thought of impending harm, while shame necessarily 
involves the thought of disgrace (Fortenbaugh 1975: 15).  
Notwithstanding the importance of efficient cause to definition and distinction of 
one emotion from another, Aristotle is not concerned exclusively upon one kind of 
cause. His scientific purposes move him toward the identification of other causes as the 
material and final cause (Ivi: 15).  
In regard to emotions, this means that he will prefer definitions which mention 
more than the thought which moves a man to respond emotionally. Anger is not 
to be defined by the efficient cause alone. Mention must be made of material and 
final causes, that is to say of blood boiling around the heart and a desire for 
returning pain (Ivi: 15). 
Aristotle realized that emotions are based on impressions, thoughts or opinions 
that can be altered by arguments. The good speaker can´t ignore the emotions because 
they are crucial lens through which we see the facts of the world. However, the 
importance of the emotions, inside Aristotle´s thought, is not restricted to rhetoric. The 
study of emotions also reflected in the need of rethinking the role of tragedy and music 
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in the development of a theory of benefits through purgation (katharsis)2 and with 
regards to our main concern in this text, it culminated in a challenging approach to 
ethics. 
3. The education of the desire through reason and the practical 
deliberation 
In Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is dedicated to reflect on the fair 
means between excess and lack in practical deliberation. What does it mean that human 
action must be oriented by indication of the guiding sense?  
Aristotle begins his reflection stating that there are two dimensions of the human 
soul: one that engages in reasoning and one that cannot itself reason but is nonetheless 
capable of following reason. The first one may be split into two: a) a contemplative part, 
which studies the invariable truths of science and mathematics (scientific faculty); b) one 
that deals with the practical matters of human life (calculative faculty) (Ética a Nicómaco: 
VI, 1139a 5-10 ).  
Ethics is on the dimension of what can be otherwise . It is not governed by well-
defined accessible principles, but is a practical search for the best decision under a 
specific situation. 
To make progress in this sphere we must already have come to enjoy doing what is 
just, courageous, generous and the like. We must experience these activities not as 
burdensome constraints, but as noble, worthwhile, and enjoyable in themselves 
based on habit and experience (Kraut 2014). 
The calculative faculty and desire are the basis of the choice which is the efficient 
cause of the action. The man constituted by thought and desire is the origin and the 
efficient cause of the action: good actions if you have true thought and right desire and 
bad actions if you have false thought and wrong desire.  
Emotions are desires which can be educated by habituation and, above all, 
through the action guided by deliberation. The goal of the moral education is to educate 
the desire in order to make it pursue what is good  and the good in practical issues, in 
general, is the fair means between excess and lack. 
The whole problem lies exactly in the relation between the desired and the 
thinking in the concrete moment of decision. Moral virtue is a disposition on the 
choice/election (...) so the thought has to be right and the desire straight so that 
the proairesis is good. There has to be a coincidence between what reason says and 
the desire pursue so that the proairesis is serious (free translation)3.  
Professor Nuno Coelho goes on to say that:  
                                                 
2 For the contributions of the analysis of emotions to Aristotle's poetics, politics and ethics. See for all 
Fortenbaugh 1975. 
3 Todo o problema radica exatamente na relação entre o desejar e o pensar no momento concreto da 
correto e o desejo reto para que a proairesis seja boa. Tem que haver coincidência entre o que a razão diz e 
o desejo persegue para que a proairesis  (Coelho 2012: 97). 
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On the act gives the mobilization of the whole soul. The different dimensions of 
the soul (the rational and the irrational ones) are mobilized on the act of serious 
man even because only then he, while serious, constitutes its own character (free 
translation)4.  
Habituation precedes the rational deliberation of the wise man. We start to do 
what is right since childhood  if we have wise parents, are influenced by wise people 
and live in a place ruled by good rules etc - before the very understanding and the 
reflection on what is good and bad. First the alogical half is habituated correctly and 
then this habituation is confirmed by the reflections on the logical half  (Fortenbaugh 
1975: 49). Between habituation and practical deliberation a dialectical relation is 
established, i. e, since childhood we are used to act according to what is right. As we are 
growing and facing alone the practical situations - the concrete problems of the practical 
life which demand a solution - we need to evaluate what is the right thing to do in 
practice (Ética a Nicómaco: 1106b 5).  
The habituation and the previous deliberation will not solve the real problem of 
doing the right thing in a practical situation. Notwithstanding, the more I act according 
to the true thought and the right desire, the more habituated I am in acting that way. 
Action on what is, but it could be otherwise  constitutes the dispositions of character of 
the non-rational part of the soul and the excellence of phrònesis.  
This understanding of the challenges of practical life is very realistic because it is 
not focus on the avoidance or the rejection of emotions in practice but on the education 
of the desire by reason in practice. The excellence of phrònesis and practical virtues 
predisposes the phronimos person to act in one direction and not in the other (Ivi: 
1106a 1-5). 
Affirming that desire is persuaded by reason is different than affirming that desire 
is chosen by reason. If it could be chosen rationally in a deliberate way, then there 
would be no need of the habit as a formative practice of the desire. Desire can not 
be immediately and directly determined by reason. It must be prepared, cultivated 
and used to obey reason. If we could choose what to desire, there would be no 
need of educating desire and even less to keep the education of the desire as a 
to choose the desire in a deliberative way. It would not make sense if it happened 
this way (free translation)5.  
The good deliberation in practical life includes emotions and the wise man rather 
than suffocating/avoiding the emotional experience should feel emotion in the right 
way. Aristotle states that the following advise must guide the emotional experience of 
                                                 
4 No agir, dá-se a mobilização de toda a alma. As diferentes dimensões da alma (seja a racional, seja a 
irracional, cada qual também com suas diferentes dimensões) mobilizam-se no agir do homem sério até 
porque apenas assim é que ele, enquanto sério, constitui o seu próprio caráter  (Coelho 2012: 97-98). 
5 Dizer que o desejo é persuadido pela razão é bem diferente de dizer que ele é escolhido por ela. Se pu-
desse ser escolhido racionalmente, i.e., deliberadamente, então não haveria necessidade do hábito como 
uma prática formativa do desejo. Ora, o desejo não pode ser imediata e diretamente determinado pela 
razão, pelo o que ela dita como certo. Ele deve ser preparado, cultivado, habituado a obedecê-la. Se pu-
déssemos escolher o que desejamos, não haveria necessidade alguma de se educar o desejo e menos ainda 
s-
colher deliberadamente o desejo, como não faria sentindo algum para ética aristotélica se assim fosse 
 (Aggio, 2010: 6-7). 
Ana Carolina de Faria Silvestre Rodrigues, Emotions and Sentiments in Judicial Deliberation: The Role of Litera-
ture 
58 
the wise man in practical situation: feel [emotions] at the right times, with reference to 
the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is 
what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue  (Nichomachean 
Ethics. 1106b 20).  
However, not every action nor every passion admits of a relative mean between 
two extremes. Adultery, theft, murder, envy are examples of actions and passions that 
are themselves bad (Ética a Nicómaco: 1107a 9). Once they are done it can´t be right. It´s 
not possible to admit a mean intentional murder toward a right person, at the right time, 
and in the right way but simply to do it is to go wrong (Ivi: 1107a 15).  
4. The excellence of  in Law 
The law is not a strictly theoretical science. It is a science that is called to solve problems 
arising in praxis, in the world of life always in motion which does not follow a logical or 
natural order or are ruled by fixed principles and norms. The ethical thought in Aristotle 
is both political and legal, clarifies Coelho: If wisdom is not an excellence (a way of 
thinking) specifically legal, it is, however, central to the law as it is mobilized around act 
in any and all circumstances in the practical sphere where the law is inscribed  (free 
translation)6.  
The wise man is the one who, in every situation of life, is invested with the task of 
figuring out what is good; the best thing to do in a concrete problem. On the dimension 
of what is, but it could be otherwise , there will always be a decision. The judgment is 
the core of practical life and also the core of adjudication. What characterizes the 
judgment is the resolution of a practical controversy (...) by an argumentative weighting 
rationally guided which leads, therefore, to a communicatively founded solution  (free 
translation) 7.  
According to Castanheira Neves law is an uncomplete task because between the 
legal system and the legal case a dialectical relation is established. What does the human 
dignity principle mean in a concrete case?  
We can read about this subject matter and this scientific knowledge can help in 
clarifying the general concept of human dignity but it will not solve the practical legal 
problem of finding the best legal answer for the concrete legal case.  
The judge cannot excuse herself to provide a reasoned response to the cases. 
However, the legal answer is not previous defined in the legal system but the result of a 
dialectical process in which the judge has a crucial role.  
In judgment there is decision, even though it is desired to reverse the dimension 
of the voluntas into ratio. The methodological dimension of the practical realization of 
law aim to establish the conditions, the assumptions and the requirements of this 
exercise. Notwithstanding, it does not solve the practical realization of law challenges by 
itself.  
                                                 
6 Se a sensatez não é uma excelência (uma forma de pensar) especificamente jurídica é, no entanto, cen-
tral para o direito à medida que é mobilizada em todo agir, em toda e qualquer circunstância no horizonte 
prático  (Coelho 2012: XVI). 
7 r-
gumentativa racionalmente orientada que conduz, por isso mesmo, a solução comunicativamente fun-
 (Castanheira Neves 1993: 31). 
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4.1. The dialectical relation between the legal system and the legal case and 
the role of phrònesis  
According to Professor Castanheira Neves, as stated above, the realization of law is 
composed by two dialectically intricate dimensions: the legal system and the legal 
problem. 
The meaning of the legal system is not static. Despite of a previous juridical 
knowledge available on positive norms, precedents, doctrine etc, the legal problem is 
always the expression of an obstacle, a perplexity or a doubt raised in the middle of the 
intentional assumption [of the legal system] and the real situation 8. The normativity of 
the legal system9 is an open constituens due to the aim to overcome the legal problems in 
a practical-normativity manner10 (which the result could be the resignification of the 
legal system) and due to its other constitutive dimension; the axiological-normative 
validity. 
If we assume the concrete case as the methodological prius of the practical 
realization of law11 and the axiological dimension of law as a validity to assume and to 
problematize in the very realization of law 1213, than we are able to conclude that the 
practical realization of law demands the Aristotle´s phrònesis excellence. 
In judgment there is decision, even though it is desired to reverse the dimension 
of the voluntas into ratio14. However, are the judges prepared for the practical realization 
of law challenges under the jurisprudencialism approach and the Aristotle´s theory of 
practical reason?  
                                                 
8 According to Castanheira Neves, um problema é sempre a expressão de um obstáculo, de uma perplex-
idade, de uma dúvida nascida na relação entre uma intencional pressuposição, com as suas exigências es-
pecíficas de cumprimento, e uma situação real que resist . (Ivi: 159-160). 
9 When we talk about , we are not talking about a closed system of normativity, but in an 
open one which is being constituted greatly through the questioning of the legal case. Certainly the legal 
system begins by enclosing and predetermining the field and the type of problems. Nevertheless, this 
statement does not necessarily lead us to the conclusion that the  are just the problems and 
facts previously assumed by the legal system as legal problems. The stabilized normativity reflects the in-
tentional assimilation of a given concrete, unique and unrepeatable legal experience, being in the same 
measure, limited by that. (Ivi: 158).  
10 The meaning of the legal system is not constituted in advance. The normative dimension of the legal 
system is immediately imbricated to another one, i. e, the dimension of the concrete legal problem. Be-
tween the legal system and legal problem establishes a dialectical relation. You could say that normativity 
is provisionally stabilized due to the questions or queries addressed by the concrete problem to the legal 
system. However, new problems that have arisen in the world of life, can put new questions or reveal the 
inadequacy of old ones. New problems can bring new intentions (valuations, principles) that may require 
relativisation of previously established intentions in a congruent whole (Ibidem). 
11 The core problem of the practical realization of law, i. e., the capital and problematic objective of the 
legal thinking. 
12 O direito (...) é uma validade a assumir e a problematizar na sua  
396). 
13 A human-cultural binding validity which the very existence is beyond the values and the fundamental 
normative principles available in law. 
14 When the legal problem interrogates the legal system unanswered, the relation between the legal system 
and the legal case turns an aporetic one. The legal system ceases to be the expression of an available hypo-
thetical solution to reveal yourself as an uncomplete task. By the questioning of a situated legal case, as an 
aporetic experience - because the practical queries and problems posed by the concrete legal case has not 
yet been a bsorbed by a fundamental systematic-dogmatic exercise (Castanheira Neves 1993: 158). 
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We understand that the judges would be more realistically prepared to judge if, 
among other things: a) the decision dimension of the judicial deliberation process were 
assumed rather than (artificially) eliminated by judicial methods and judicial procedures 
 jurisprudencialism proposes a methodological approach which does not aim to 
eliminate (because it is impossible) the decision dimension of the judicial deliberative 
process; b) they were allowed to recognize the presence of the emotions in judicial 
decision process and that the best way of dealing with emotions is educating them in 
practice. The education of the desire is an important part of the judicial virtuous process 
(which is developed in practice 
development of judicial virtues requires a set of practices that adequately engage 
dispositions, affections, emotions and demands for concrete virtuous behavior  (Van 
Domselaar 2014: 244). 
The only way of being a virtuous person is acting as a virtuous one, states 
Aristotle. When we read literary pieces, specially the realistic ones15, we are called to 
reflect about other forms of thoughts and different ways of dealing with practical 
challenges of life. Reading (and imagining through) a literary piece we can learn from the 
bad and good actions of the characters and their impacts in the other characters lives; 
we can reflect about our own previous actions and decisions; we can also decide to 
change the way we were used to dealing with a kind of situation because now we are 
able to see some unnoticed impacts of that etc. The imaginative experience of reading 
literary works can change the way we act in practical life and can also be an opportunity 
to experience tragic choices and tragic dilemmas.  
Law, as we have seen before, is an open human task. It´s constituted by a 
dialectical relation between the legal system and the legal case and it has a decision 
dimension that can´t be converted into ratio. There are not available correct legal 
answers in the legal system to be applied on the legal case. Every practical realization of 
law implies the judge herself (in different degrees). The judge must be committed to 
educate her desires and emotions and to be aware of the challenges of the practical 
realization of law16. In order to accomplish the first task, literature can be very helpful 
due to literary works can present examples of virtue acts and virtuous persons whose 
examples can be followed by us. For the second task, literature can illustrates the 
challenges of the practical decisions in Western constitutional democracies in which a 
variety of heterogeneous basic liberties and social goods enjoy legal protection. The 
judicial decisions as a special kind of practical decision can´t overcome the tragic 
dimension of the practical realization of law in a pluralistic constitutional democracy 
experience17. [The] acknoledgments that the losing claim has not been sufficiently 
                                                 
15 According to Nussbaum, reading a literary piece is an interesting emotional experience because we can 
feel emotions as a concerned reader who does not feel the emotions in the way the main character does 
but it´s not completely out of the situation. It allows us to create bonds of identification and sympathy 
with the characters, to share with them certain hopes, fears and general human concerns. This way, the 
reading literature, specially the realistic ones, is much more than an intellectual activity. It is an emotional 
exercise experienced in a vividly way by the reader (Nussbaum 1995). 
16 Emphasizing the importance of rules does not exclude that in some legal cases there is no adequate 
rule or principle available, nor does it exclude the possibility of conflict between relevant legal norms. In 
such cases the choice for a decision might be tragic, a  (Van Doomselaar 
2010: 2). 
17 A legal tragic choice is that the underlying practical conflict is one between fundamental legal values, 
goods or interests. Choosing between granting a permit to build a shed and protecting the neighbor 
against the nuisance resulting from the building of the shed is not a tragic choice. Although these interests 
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honoured by the legal choice and that this very fact is morally disturbing  (Van 
Domselaar 2014: 295). The literary experience (as a vivid and imaginative human 
experience) can contribute to the recognition of the tragic choices in law. 
5. Final notes 
The realization of the law is a practical task. If we assume the Castanheira Neves´s 
jurisprudentialism, we will be urged to look to the law as a task that is performed in 
practice. Ending a legal problem means much more than offering a legal answer for the 
legal case. It demands judges and legal professionals in general who are really committed 
to the practical deliberation under the legal case questioning, which involves emotions.  
The core of the realization of law is the legal case (assumed as a methodological 
prius) and the adequate answer for it is not available in the legal system but it is a human 
task. By exercising this task which encloses at its core judgment and choice, the judge 
can develop and improve the excellence of phrònesis which is fundamental for the law as 
a practical-normative issue.  
The only way of being a virtuous person is acting as a virtuous one. When we read 
literary pieces, we are called to reflect about other forms of thoughts and different ways 
of dealing with practical challenges of life. Reading a literary piece we can learn from the 
bad and good actions of the characters and their impacts in the other characters lives; 
we can reflect about our own previous actions and decisions; we can also decide to 
change the way we were used to dealing with a kind of situation because now we are 
able to see some unnoticed impacts of that etc.  
The imaginative experience of reading literary works can change the way we act in 
practical life. Law is not a strictly theoretical science but a practical science of 
establishing the adequate legal decision for a concrete legal case in a specific situation. 
The judge more than being a cultivated person, she must be a virtuous one  committed 
to the practical realization of law task. Literary works can present examples of virtue 
acts and virtuous persons whose examples can be followed by us. Literature can 
illustrate the challenges of the practical decisions in Western constitutional democracies 
in which a variety of heterogeneous basic liberties and social goods enjoy legal 
protection. It can prepare us as moral agents for the practical realization of law 
challenges in a plural and heterogeneous world.   
                                                                                                                                          
may enjoy legal protection, they are not the stuff of tragedy , i.e. they are not fundamental constitutive 
elements of the human good. Which legally protected values and goods are fundamental enough to con-
stitute a tragic choice in the legal domain, cannot be inferred from the concept itself. Tragic choice as a 
legal concept is open-ended qua moral substance. But, it does imply a group of heterogeneous values and 
goods that are necessary elements of the human good. The concept, therefore, only makes sense in a legal 
order providing legal protectio
Western constitutional democracies in which a variety of heterogeneous basic liberties and social goods 
enjoy legal protection  (Ivi: 9).  
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The rational emotions by Martha Nussbaum: 
importance in legal framework 
Laura Helena de Souza Fagundes  
Abstract: From the study of Martha Nussbaum about the role of emotions in the process of judicial deci-
sion-making in his book Poetic Justice , we seek to understand what the emotions and what the differ-
ences between them and the rational one are. We intend to analyze the influence of Aristotle in Poetic 
Justice. Although western philosophy sustains the bivalence between reason and emotions, this paper tries 
to analyze if the total split of them is possible. We also question what the limits of the emotions are, espe-
cially in the legal system, so that the logic and the body of laws are not lost. Can we judge a real case 
without the presence of emotions? Are the judges able to achieve full impartiality in their deci-
sions? Judicial decisions directly affects the lives of those who seek the State in order to get a solution to 
their problems. Is it correct to disregard of emotions in something so important? 
 
Key-words: rational emotions, judgment, Martha Nussbaum 
1. Introduction 
The emotions, as well as many other peculiarities, are part of a complex mixture 
resulting in humankind. If we look at history up to now, we can see that, long ago, 
thinkers analyses the importance and the weight we give to what we feel. 
According to Plato, the body and the mind are forces in constant tension: the 
body, with their limitations and needs, is the responsible for the deviations from what 
really matters: the reason. [...] Access to truth was conditional upon the rationalization 
of emotions  (Silvestre 2011: 285.). 
Just as in science in which rationality is too valued in detriment to other forces, 
law, so far, made no effort to further the study in the field of the influence of the 
emotions in the legal system. Since emotions are inherent to all human beings, how can 
the science that seeks the solution of societal conflicts close the eyes to this reality? 
This paper proposes a descriptive analysis of the relation between law and 
emotions, especially the important relevance of rational emotions in the judicial decision 
making process; together with a critical reflection on the subject. As a theoretical 
framework and guidance, this work focuses on the book Poetic Justice . 
2. Emotions and rational emotions
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We understand that good decisions don t need to be necessarily devoid of 
emotions. For law, the importance of emotions is so big that we consider them in 
brazilian legal system. The Suspicion and the Court Desqualification are good exemples, 
presented in the Civil Procedure Code, articles 189 to 211(Saraiva 2012).  
According to Maria Helena Diniz, in her legal dictionary, Suspicion (Diniz 2010: 
544) is the suspicion about judicial impartiality; the fact that magistrate is unable to act, 
in a particular case, to exercise its function; exception that can be held against the judge 
presiding the case, the authority in public prosecution, the witnesses, the technical 
assistants, the expert and the interpreter. Court Desqualification (Diniz 2010: 315) is the 
suspicion of the judge that prevents and invalidates their acts, even without the 
opposition. In this sense, by impartiality, we can understand the lack of personal interest 
in a case. 
If there are personal, relatives, friends or enemies interests, for example, the judge 
is unable to take legal decision because it is known that there is no possibility of 
complete separation of professional and personal life of the judge. Of course this 
magistrate will not be able to be impartial with the person with whom he already relates 
in some way, and this possibly results in tendencious jurisdiction. 
In the field of law, Martha Nussbaum argues about the importance of fair 
conduct, especially when she makes us realize that the legal professionals deal with 
human beings in their full complexity and the future of their lives. Precisely because of 
this complexity, and contrary to the paradigm reason versus emotion, it is necessary that 
decisions don t be only determined by rational motivations. So, to the author, there is an 
impoverishment of human conduct towards others when one takes only theories into 
account (Nussbaum 1995: 88). The author believes that intellect and emotions act 
simultaneously. For her, the emotions are the central of moral judgments. In other 
words, emotions are not irrational forces; they are intelligent responses to the 
perception of values and importance of objects. Intellect without emotion is blind to the 
values, and the trigger of that blindness is precisely the denial of emotions and the 
undeniable influence they bring to our daily decisions. 
It is worth to differentiate between emotions and bodily impulses: the emotions 
are always related to an object, a person. They derive from a specific perspective - the 
individual who experiences it, to an object or person, which results in a certain emotion, 
such as love, compassion, fear. Anger is not impulsive; it is felt by someone regarding 
any subject that, for some specific reason, made him feel like that. On the other way, 
bodily impulses are merely the result of a biological process, they don t need external 
stimulus to come out, such as sleep and hunger. 
Beliefs are fundamental elements for the identification and individualization of an 
emotion - these are closely related to beliefs about the object. Compassion requires the 
belief that someone else is suffering significantly (Ivi: 95), for instance. 
Nussbaum argues that we should consider the reason and emotions  specially the 
rational ones - in order to make the right decision
1. Emotions are ways of perceiving (Ivi: 94); besides, the way we notice the object 
is essential for the qualification of the emotion. An anonymous and indifferent mass 
does not arouse emotions. 
                                                 
1 The rational emotion is the rationalization of emotion. What makes it rational or irrational is the intensi-
ty we feel it. If it comes from weighting between extreme rationality and pure emotion, then we will have 
a rational emotion  that is the one used by judicious spectator. 
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Emotions are valid for the judge to clearly imagine what each person in supposed 
to be in a given situation, for instance. We emphasize the extreme importance of this 
imaginative capacity for pondering in the interest of getting a fair consideration of 
certain decision about a person s life. Deleting the emotions from the decision process 
leaves aside important and necessary information for the neutrality of the judge and 
consequently justice. Instead of hiding the emotions, we must assume them once they 
are inevitably part of us. 
Nussbaum believes that compassion is the basis of social rationality. In the 
conception of the author, this emotion consists in put yourself in another s place and 
realize that the drama experienced by the other can be lived by anybody in some point 
of life. When we imagine ourselves passing throw a negative situation in which another 
person has been living we can measure the adversities of other people. When there is no 
contact with emotions, we are not able to recognize the compassion. Furthermore, 
Martha argues that, by reading realistic literature, we can feel empathy with the 
characters. We can, therefore, identify ourselves with the story presented. However, 
even when we do not feel empathy, even when we see the horror of a terrible crime, for 
example, because it is a human drama, we cannot say that we, or a person that we care 
about will never pass throw it. 
In Justicia Poetica (Nussbaum 1995), when analyzing the realistic work Hard Times, 
she argues that emotions, particularly empathy and the compassion for the characters 
through the imagination, is essential for ethics and coherent argument of judges. For 
Nussbaum, compassion happens as an identification result (Ivi: 1995: 99). 
3. The disgust 
The rational emotion is the rationalization of the emotion, it is not the excess or the lack 
of it, but the half-term. However, Nussbaum thinks there are essentially dangerous 
emotions, such as disgust. What makes the emotion rational or irrational is not the 
emotion itself - fear can be good or bad; a person who doesn t feel fear is fearless, on 
the other hand, who feels too much fear is fearful. The half-term of fear is the prudence: 
when it is possible to rationalize and make a decision based on reason without ignoring 
the emotions. 
In human evolution process, the disgust was an important emotion for the 
maintenance of the kind. It distinguished good food from bad food, for 
example. However, to Martha Nussbaum, in the public sphere, disgust is always a 
potentially dangerous emotion, given the desire to repel its cause. The action of this 
emotion in judicial decision-making process can affect negatively one of the parts and 
impartiality will not be concretized. The disgust, in this context, cannot be the strongest 
emotion. 
The disgust is connected to prejudice - we are shaped by the social conception of 
what is grouse. That is why it is so important not to let ourselves to be carried away by 
this particular emotion: even though it is an inherent part of human nature, it repels us 
from people and situations that are considered disgusting when analyzed by the cultural 
and social dimension. The impartiality and neutrality of the actions of the democratic 
state actions and their representatives are not only restricted only to the situations that 
please them. 
According to brazilian Constitution, in its fifth article, caput: 
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Art. 5. All persons are equal before the law, without distinction of any kind, 
guaranteeing to Brazilians and foreigners residing in the country the inviolable 
right to life, liberty, equality, security and property, as follows. [Saraiva, 2012: 7] 
When talking about judicial neutrality in Justicia Poetica, Martha Nussbaum argues 
that the judge does not grant any special favor to groups or individuals motivated by the 
relationship he has with them. The judicious spectator does not consider irrelevant 
feelings, the neutrality that he seeks does not require an arrogant distance from social 
reality (Ivi: 1995: 123). 
The reality must be questioned with imagination and emotional responses 
obtained through the judicious spectator perspective. Imagination, through the judicious 
viewer filter, allows the compassion, the key to emotional responses. 
4. The judicious spectator rol and the trial of the poet judge 
The judicious viewer is not personally committed to the interests of the parties, his 
judgment is free from the influence of feelings such as his confidence or his 
happiness, it would allow us to affirm that his judgment is impartial. He is not 
devoid of emotions and his analyses do not focus on suppressing them. A 
compassionate relationship is established between the viewer and the 
part. [Silvestre 2011: 302] 
The books have the power of transporting us to the universe created by the 
author. Along the reading, we identify with the characters and, from there, empathy 
arises. Then, we are able to recognize emotions arising from this empathy - if the 
character goes through suffering, injustice or any unpleasant situation, we feel pity. On 
the other hand, if something good happens, we feel happy for the characters. 
There is an empathetic relationship between the reader and the characters from 
the books. Nussbaum argues that this reader is the judicious spectator: attentive to 
narrative details, able to be moved by the events that occurred with the characters, but 
still able to use the reason for a good value judgment as a whole; the emotion that the 
judicious spectator feels do not blind him so he cannot clearly perceive the details of the 
situations. Because of this, Nussbaum believes that the judicious spectator is a juror 
model: being the third person that observes and still sympathizes with the story of the 
protagonists. Judicious spectator has the capacity, while perceives the general situation, 
of not being carried away by the disproportionate emotions that take the parts. 
At the end of this process, the judicious spectator has his emotions filtered, once 
he received the influence of reason and, therefore, his emotions are not the result of the 
passions of who lives the story. Reading realistic books allows us to experience rational 
emotions because we are in a privileged position in face of the scenario, making us 
judicious spectators. 
The poet judge has the judicious spectator vision, which makes use of the literary 
imagination; translated as a search for fair judgment through the sense of compassion. 
This is the arbiter of difference, which realizes the drama of the parties in a rational 
manner. In other words, compassion passes through the filter of the judicious viewer, 
which focus on the justice. The judgment of the poet judge asks for judicial materials 
and literary imaginations, which allows experience of compassion. 
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Nevertheless, the literary imagination acts with boundaries; it works within a 
possible juridical framework that cannot be exceeded, given that we live in a democratic 
state. Imagination involving the poet judge and his judgment have well-defined borders 
for the implementation of the law; the body of existing laws, central aspect that should 
be taken into account by legal professionals, is the frame of its use. Despite the 
compassion, the judge cannot forget that signed a commitment to the rule of being the 
representative of the judiciary. 
The poet judge is the realization of emotions in law. It is one who comprises 
empathetic and emotionally parties of the situations that appears to him, being able to 
answer the particulars and details of each case. 
5. The influence of aristotle and his theory of emotions 
Martha Nussbaum has been influenced by Aristotle. According to him, the emotions are 
not irrational answers to events. In Retorica, the author realizes the importance of the 
speech about passions and report the power of persuasion witch emotions cause on 
those who feel them.  
The passion witch Aristotle refers to demands ponderation of values and beliefs 
about the object or the person. It is necessary to have clear opinion, which will be sur-
rounded by everything our personal experience, our culture and our education tell us 
about that. The emotions tell a lot about the nature of the one who feels it. Aristotle be-
lieves in cognitive emotions  they are the result of ponderations, beliefs and, obviously, 
body reactions, once the human being is also an animal. 
What tell us apart from other animals is the fact that we are rational. We perceive 
the world the same way other animals, but we are not slaves of passion and impulses as 
the others. We, provided with rationality, constantly have a dialogue between desire and 
reason related to a given situation. Deciding is dealing with passion. 
Being a rational animal for Aristotle means the ability to see beyond the current 
moment. Inevitably, we often deal with the resignation of pleasure in order to have a fu-
ture pleasure; the human being is capable of renouncing the immediate pleasure due to 
reason. As a result, we are able to distinguish the useful and the harmful, the good and 
the bad, the fair and the unfair. 
The perception that we make decisions under the pressure of emotions is very 
important for deliberation; it is extremely important to know the value of emotions re-
lated to an object or a person in order to make a wise decision. The emotional charge is 
required to act well. We are the result of what we live; the soul, the intelligence and the 
character are the result of our history and our daily actions. We are the result of the de-
cision we make, our mental experience; the way we think and act is built along the time.  
According to Aristotle, the influence of emotions in the decision making process 
doesn t imply in a bad decision. As human beings, it is impossible to separate emotions 
and reasons like western philosophy is used to doing. Based on the fact that it is impos-
sible not to have emotions in our lives, we must deal with them the best way we can, in 
order to make good decisions.  
In keeping with Aristotle, there are four powers of the soul witch influence along 
the decision making process: perception, emotion, desire and reason. Every single deci-
sion depends on the sensitive perception of the five senses; deciding always requires a 
certain context. The perception of a situation automatically produces an emotion. 
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By the moment we realize that something is real, a passion emerges. The desire 
comes connected to emotions  if we feel fear, right after we will have the desire of step 
back from what causes the fear. The same thing happens when we are happy, we wish 
to be close to what makes us feel that way. This phenomenon happens immediately af-
ter the perception. 
According to Aristotle, the pleasure and the pain are signs of who we are  the 
feeling of pleasure is what we do related to what we are. That is why we show who we 
are based on what we feel about the world we live. 
6. Final considerations 
The relation between law and emotion is close connected. Unfortunately, due to much 
more complex motives, the reason pointed out in the western dichotomy reason and 
emotion . The law sets out the specific courses to people s life throw the judge, who is 
the voice of the law. 
Therefore, we can not forget that the body of law is the way to reach the end: the 
best solutions to the case. That is why we can not ignore the human complexity in every 
level; including the ones from those who make the law. Our investigation suggests that 
when we do not take the emotions into consideration in law, either the emotions of the 
parts or the judge s, it can result in bad decisions. Thereby, the reflections about the im-
portance of rational emotions need to be developed. We can find in brazilian literature a 
good example of it in Dom Casmurro. A literary piece of Machado de Assis. Where the 
author makes us to think about the possibility of the betrayal between his best friend 
and his wife.  
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Is Atticus Finch still with us? - the iconic lawyer 
in modern pop-culture 
Marta Dubowska   
Abstract: The influence of Harper Lee s iconic novel To Kill a Mockingbird  is indisputable. It has 
become widely popular among the common readers as well as the ones who practice and study law, and 
provoked a much heated debate about the issues raised in the book. The debate revolved- and still does- 
around the emotion and empathy portrayed in the novel, focusing on the somewhat main character, 
Atticus Finch. The portrayal of this particular lawyer has left a huge imprint on the society s imagination, 
becoming one of the most recognizable literary characters of the second half of the 20th century. But has 
this iconic lawyer stayed in the last century? Has he ever escaped the frames of literature? As far as I m 
concerned, we will never be able to escape Atticus Finch, as he is- maybe even subconsciously - the main 
inspiration behind the new wave of popularity of all kinds of legal TV series (mostly Suits , Damages ). 
What links those artifacts is the focus put on the emotion in the work of the lawyer- how his personal 
feelings and life situation inflict upon his professional work and why so commonly the deprivation of 
emotion is considered the lawyer s best quality. The emotional complexity of Harper Lee s character is so 
wide that it s visibly split into two main characters of previously mentioned TV series. The issue here is, 
how is the heritage of this hero-lawyer treated? Is it simply modernized to fit the present-day realities, or 
transformed in some other way, maybe a common pattern? All these questions and the answers they 
eventually lead to, form an interesting comparison between the portrayal of a lawyer in high-profile 
literature and products of modern pop-culture, raising a question how the needs of the society influence 
the image of the lawyers presented to them. 
 
Key-words: Atticus Finch, Emotion, Empathy, Iconic lawyer, Pop-culture , Lawyer s portrayals 
1. Introduction  how do we perceive lawyers these days? 
The concept of perfect lawyer  has been long a subject of the public debate. Whether in 
the professional environment, soon-to-be-lawyers academic groups, or even at a simple 
family dinner - I would have to say lawyers are getting a pretty disgusting rep. The 
professionals - don t seem to have a shred of belief left that a lawyer can possess a heart 
of gold , the students  some of them naive, but mostly centered for the wealth part of 
pursuing this career path, while in the plain social gatherings - lawyers are simply the 
worst of the worst. All of those deliberations are obviously highly general, but it really 
does seem that lawyers are often associated with the worst traits that a person dealing 
with people s troubles on a daily basis could possibly posses. Calculating, cunning, lack 
of soul, and mostly  no empathy. But then again, when one begins to observe the 
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cultural  portrayals of lawyers, the cinematic ones or the heroes of many TV series (it 
appears the legal environment is the most captivating to portray) they are all linked by 
the same approach  empathy is not a trait that a good - successful - lawyer should 
posses. And that kept me wondering - what is the basis for that kind of approach? How 
did we get to a place where empathy  one should think the trait that actually makes us 
human  - is considered not only unwanted, but basically a burden?  
That problem has begun to niggle me even more when I started analysing the 
most famous pop-cultural lawyer  Atticus Finch of To Kill A Mockingbird  by Harper 
Lee. The winner of the Pulitzer Prize, the book behind a very successful movie which 
went on to obtain an Oscar for Gregory Peck s incredible portrayal (along with ones for 
screenplay and scenography)  has made a great social impact. It would seem that the 
most characteristic and yet obvious trait that made Atticus so beloved is his incredible 
empathy for every single person that crossed his path. But again - the careful analysis of 
that character reveals a much complicated emotional background.  
2. The Wonder That Is Atticus Finch 
When I have started working on the person of Atticus Finch, I don t think I have 
realized how much there is to discover. And I m not only speaking about the character 
complexity, but also - or even mainly - about the amount of essays, articles and different 
work developed on this particular subject. With each paper I read on Atticus Finch, I 
was amazed with how many approaches there were - it seemed every author had a 
different take on the character, saw different qualities or different flaws, sometimes put 
an emphasis on an aspect I would never have thought to analyze. I can safely say each 
take on the matter had a different approach. But what was common for all of them, was 
the fact that each and every one of those people had a strong opinion on the matter. 
These were not cases of mere analysis, or simple collation  if a person made a 
statement about Atticus Finch, it was always unhesitating. What I think is  nobody can 
walk past Atticus and not be biased. It s a simple love/hate thing. He s either your god 
or your biggest enemy- in each case you feel compelled to defend your position. So how 
is Atticus Finch recognized in those works, and also globally?  
Mostly when talked about, the synonym for Atticus Finch is hero-lawyer  for how 
he opposed to his prejudiced society and stood by the truth, and gentleman-lawyer- for 
how despite hateful approach towards him, he still respected every single person in his 
community. But I have come across also much detailed descriptions, such as ones 
stating him to be perhaps the most revered lawyer in modern literature ( Menkel-
Meadow 1999), an ethical role model , or even the ultimate idealized attorney  (Huston 
2004: 161, 162). 
But what struck me the most, was how personal everybody s approach was. 
Personal to a point when we don t regard Atticus as a literary character anymore, but as 
a real-life human lawyer, who actually lived in Alabama in the 1930 s, who took on the 
Tom Robinson case, who defended those who could not be defended. Helping to create 
that illusion was the fact that the Atticus s character was supposedly largely based upon 
the person of Harper Lee s father, and the fact that such trials were a common thing in 
the 1930 s, which makes the illusion of actually once existing a lawyer named Atticus 
Finch a lot easier.  
To quote:  
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Atticus has become so embedded in the collective consciousness as the 
quintessential good lawyer that even widely-adopted law school textbook treats his 
as if he were real. [Phelps 2002: 925] 
3. The Kenneth Star Case 
The perfect example of such approach is a case of Kenneth Starr- a prosecutor, the 
author of the famous Starr Report , which was a 455 page analysis on the sexual 
relations between Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky, containing numerous accusations, 
but none of which were actually provided with arguments to back his claims, having 
been later denounced as without any basis or logic, which eventually led to a public 
opinion of this report being some kind of a political vendetta. This caused many public 
mockeries of said prosecutor, but the jokes ended when Ken Starr compared himself in 
one of his speeches to whom? No one else, but Atticus Finch.  
That, for the American lawyers, was a drop too much. Shook to his very core, 
Clinton s personal lawyer, David E. Kendall, issued a public letter in The New York 
Times. 
To quote: 
(..) the attempt to make Atticus Finch into a docile figure who bows to the 
prosecutor s will simply won t do. Atticus, a white lawyer in an Alabama town 
during the Depression, represented Tom Robinson, a black man falsely accused of 
raping a white woman. He defended his client despite community hostility. 
Atticus knew ``truth  is not the sole possession of the district attorney s office, 
that Bill of Rights procedural protections belong to even the most unpopular of 
defendants, and it was his duty to defend his client against a hostile world.  
(..) No, this appropriation of Finch won t do. If Atticus were brought to life today, 
what would he be doing? He d be championing some unpopular citizen hauled 
before a legislative committee or representing some witness harassed by an 
overzealous prosecutor. [Kendall 1998] 
Another of many responses to that incident and the person of Ken Starr in 
general, was a book by James Carville And the Horse He Rode In On , in which he 
writes:  
Those of you who read my last book, We re Right, They re Wrong , know of the 
tremendous influence To Kill A Mockingbird had on my life. So you can probably 
guess how hopping mad I became when I heard Ken Starr compare himself to 
Atticus Finch in a recent speech. How horrific it must be for Harper Lee to hear 
the esteemed Inspector, an unabashed trampler of constitutional rights, try to 
evoke a comparison between himself and Atticus Finch. [Carville 1999: 148] 
4. Why So Serious? 
So why this enormous debacle about just a literary character? 
Here s what. The first and most important thing we notice about Finch is his 
enormous for the times he lived in empathy towards absolutely everyone. We praise him 
for his admirable solution of how Renee Knake puts it the fundamental disconnect 
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between the rule of law (or one s role in the law) and individual morality  (Knake 2008: 
37). To quote the book itself, Atticus is the same in the courtroom as he is on the public streets
By that he has achieved a rarely met integrity that embraces all of his social as well as the 
professional encounters. He presents empathy as the key tribute of true professionalism. 
But what he excels in is the way in which he omits the part we usually associate with 
empathetical lawyers  presented in pop-culture  the grand gestures, the riveting 
speeches, the thrilling plot twists. There s no high words or blows with Atticus Finch. 
He delivers his moves in a dry, but not cold way, with reasoned professionalism. So 
what he does actually is combining empathy with detachement. As put by Harvard Law 
Review,  
(..) this takes a form of a ritual  where empathy and detachment intersect. Empathy is 
less likely to overwhelm the individual to the point of obstructing the fulfillment of 
his or her duties. It becomes instead a source of inner strength that supports and 
gives meaning to the outward form of restraint and detachment, while guarding 
against degeneration into the hollowness of indifference. [Being Atticus Finch: 1690] 
But more importantly, this detachment is not indicative of any lack of feeling. In 
fact, much of Atticus s speech and conduct in fact suggests great reserves of feeling. 
So we have been presented with a pretty amazing profile of a lawyer. Getting to 
the point of my paper- in our times, would it be possible for a profile like that to even 
be believable? Analyzing the most common law-related artifact in modern pop-culture, 
which is the law based TV series, at first glance I would have to say- not at all. 
Nowadays a character with such strong morals and a very deep emotional complexity 
and nearly courageous integrity simply would not be believable, or more importantly- it 
would be dull for a viewer.  
5. Have We Actually Thrown Atticus s Heritage Away? 
For the last couple of years there have emerged the type of master-apprentice  kind of 
TV series, lots of them concerning lawyers. The highest popularity of them all gained 
Damages , starring Glenn Close and Rose Byrne, and the series I am going to discuss 
further - Suits . The dynamics of this particular series is based on the relationship 
between the older lawyer, Harvey Specter (portrayed by Gabriel Macht), and his 
younger assistant, Mike Ross (played by Patrick J. Adams). From the very beginning of 
the series, there was drawn a clear distinction between the two of them. Seniority 
combines with success, cool, wittiness and respect. Youth is emotions which lead to 
failures. Throughout the whole series we are faced with multiple examples of how 
detachment is basically a recipe for legal fame, and whenever you stray from that path, 
punishment awaits you (numerous situations when Harvey lost his cool or felt 
empathetical towards his client, in which case his punishment for such behaviour has 
become a major plot-point).  
All these observations come to one conclusion  in modern pop-culture, we have 
grown accustomed to the exclusive division between empathy and detachment. They no 
longer intersect, they no longer form a successful union - they need to be separated and 
any effort of combining them together needs to be explicitly punished. So what is the 
reason behind these kind of portrayals? 
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I claim the producers and pitchers of those TV shows are not oblivious to what is 
going on in society altogether. They simply are aware of the fact that a character who 
keeps his integrity on both professional and personal level, manages to combine 
empathy and detachment and basically is as crystal as a chandelier - would simply not be 
believable, or more importantly  lucrative. Nowadays we are not attracted to the 
characters we can measure up to, but rather we want to be reassured that other people 
also make mistakes, have problems, moral dilemmas and so on. We do not want a 
perfect lawyer staring us at our face. Even if Harvey Specter manages to be successful 
most of the time, don t we enjoy his mistakes when they finally happen? Don t we 
rationalize well his professional life is perfect, but isn t he lonely? Wouldn t he rather be 
loved? Doesn t he feel worse when he blocks out his personal feelings? ? A perfect role 
model is not what we want. But isn t it something we need? We twist and turn, we 
divide, but when analyzed closer, one can see that the problems and dilemmas that 
stood in front of Atticus in To Kill A Mockingbird , are nearly the same that Harvey 
and Mike have to deal with (especially the on-going moral debate about Mike not 
actually being a licensed lawyer). 
So when it comes to answering the question posed in the title of my paper, I think 
Atticus Finch IS still with us. We are just not capable of carrying him with us the way he 
was born. 
6. (not) The End 
When I have started my research, I have been blessed with a wonderful turn of events 
(or so have I thought at the beginning) - a new novel by Harper Lee was announced. 
The story behind the book is that it was in fact the manuscript that H.L. gave to her 
editor, who was the one to advise her to re-write it from a childhood perspective of the 
narrator - Scout. The original, entitled Go Set A Watchman , takes place 20 years later, 
when older Scout comes back home and faces her much changed previously-heroic 
father. Not to spoil much of the plot, the admirers of the book and the believers (how 
else should we call them) of Atticus Finch were left shocked after learning what 
happened to their role model.  
For example: 
One was U.S. District Judge Richard Story, who told the Daily Report in 2007 that 
Finch is a superhero in the world of law  after the judge portrayed Finch in a 
theater production of Mockingbird . Story declined to be interviewed about the 
Finch revelations, saying through his secretary that he was in mourning . [Monyak 
2015] 
But not all of the reactions were this negative. Professor Abbe Smith of 
Georgetown University Law Center, while recognizing that maybe it s a good thing that 
the white male Atticus Finch bites the dust maybe he s not the right hero for this 
period in time  (which actually gets perfectly in line with my perceptions on the matter 
presented in this paper), she also makes a point that beats all those ha see he wasn t that 
perfect, all you Atticus believers are wrong  kind of approaches.  
To quote :  
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Atticus Finch is now a much more complicated literary hero. It doesn t render his 
lawyering of Tom Robinson any less heroic. [Ibidem] 
That, in my opinion, is all that matters. One s heroic actions are not diminished by 
latter behaviour. 
And I think I am not alone in my stand of defending Atticus forever. 
7. Conclusions 
Even if we deem Atticus unrealistic or agree that he possesses the bad traits that some 
critics attach to him, we should be aware of the fact how much debate and self-checking 
he has influenced, and how by his creation, his life  and his choices, he has become a 
mirror, not only for lawyers, but for people of all backgrounds, to reinvent our ethical 
and moral choices and rules. And that I think is why we should always be grateful to 
Harper Lee. 
As pointed out by R. K. Knake :  
Martha Nussbaum powerfully argues that the study of law and literature 
particularly is suited for understanding ethical behaviour. She suggests that 
thinking about narrative literature allows for a humanistic conception of the world 
around us. [Knake 2008: 43] 
I couldn t agree more. I have always felt that getting to know Atticus Finch and 
reliving his life choices in my head made me much aware of a person, not only in my 
private life, but also as a studying lawyer. It indeed gives a different perspective and 
makes one reinvent his attitude towards the chosen profession.  
As Robin L. West wrote : 
The good lawyering to which we should aspire, on this view, and the aspiration for 
which we should instill in students, is importantly informed not by economics, but 
by literary and humanistic industry. [West 1996: 1187, 1188] 
There has always been and I hope always will be a debate going on about Atticus 
Finch. We will forever point out his rights and wrongs, analyze his emotions, his 
behaviour, his approaches to different matters. But what I deem to be the most 
important, is to remain humble while discussing this eternally famous literary lawyer. 
Using the words of Monroe H. Freedman to conclude: 
In short - Atticus Finch is both more and less than the mythical figure that has 
been made of him. He is human - sometimes right and sometimes wrong. And one 
critcizes Atticus Finch not from a position of superiority, but with respect, like a 
sports columnist reporting the imperfection in an athlete whose prowess he 
himself could never match. [Freedman 1994: 482]   
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Practical Wisdom and Judicial Practice:  
Who s in Narrative Control?  
Jeanne Gaakeer  
Abstract: In this article I focus on the Aristotelian requirements for the art of good judging in connection 
to the suggestions made for the role of emotion in adjudication as developed in the interdisciplinary fields 
of Law and Literature/ Law and the Humanities: how to combine the heart and the head in legal practice by 
finding inspiration and guidance in literary works, and in the suggestions more recently made in cognitive 
narratology. Or, in other, words, how to incorporate empathy and literary-legal imagination into a judicial 
methodology in such a way that the requirements of the rule of law (rather than of men, i.e. the subjective 
persuasion of the judge) are fulfilled. 
 
Key-words: practical wisdom/phronèsis, judicial practice, empathy, narratology  
Give therefore thy servant an understanding heart to judge thy 
people, that I may discern between good and bad  [1 Kings 3:9, AV] 
 
This, Fiona decided as her taxi halted in heavy traffic on Waterloo 
Bridge, was either about a woman on the edge of a crack-up making 
a sentimental error of professional judgement, or it was about a boy 
delivered from or into the beliefs of his sect by the intimate 
intervention of the secular court. She didn t think it could be both.  
[McEwan 2014b: 91] 
1. Introduction  
In 1 Kings 3:9 (AV) we read that Solomon when asked by his God what he would like 
most begs to be furnished with an understanding heart in order to be a good judge. 
Aristotle in his Poetics suggests that an essential quality of a good tragedy, the site of 
difficult decisions par excellence, is that it arouses fellow-feeling, or philantropia, a contested 
term that refers both to an empathetic stance with respect to the fate of the protagonist, 
and to a form of justice (Aristotle 1999: 68-69, 1453a, footnote 105; on pity in relation 
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to justice cfr. Aristotle 2006: Book II, vii.6ff). Taken together these sources not only 
suggest that the topic of the 2015 IVR Conference, Law and Emotion, has a rich literary 
history, but also that the concept of empathy, discussed in the fields of Law and 
Literature and Law and the Humanities since the late 1980s (E.g. Henderson 1987; Massaro 
1989), and proliferated since the publication of Martha Nussbaum s Poetic Justice, merits 
our further attention. I say so for the simple reason that what James Boyd White wrote 
in 1985 obviously still goes for our legal culture of argument, Law and literature are 
alike in that they both give voice to the voice
sym (White 1985: 104)1, but that so far, given the Anglo-American roots of the 
literary-legal approach(es), both the legal-theoretical and the judicial implementation of 
this proposition has predominantly been geared toward a common law judicial setting 
with a focus on the competing narratives of judicial opinions (McArdle 2012; see also 
on emotion and judging, Belleau 2007). What is more, the paradigm shift in common 
law adjudication toward Holmesian favourites such as economics and statistics, or, as 
Robin West calls it, scientific judging , has lead to, 
a piece of the collateral damage in the movement from traditional, moralistic, and 
particularistic reasoning, to forward-looking scientific adjudication. Empathy is as 
irrelevant to the new paradigm of judging as it was central to the old  (West 2012: 288)2.  
This calls, I suggest, for a search for shared elements of judging, i.e. irrespective of 
common law or civil law orientation. Obviously conceptual clarity as far as the use of 
emotion in a legal setting is concerned is of great importance. As Terry Maroney s 
pathbreaking research on law and emotion has already outlined, we need to be crystal-
clear about what we focus on when we do  law and emotion, or law and empathy. For 
purposes of this article I find inspiration in what Maroney calls the legal-actor approach , 
one that, 
emotion influences and informs, or should influence or inform, those persons  
performance of the assigned legal function  (See, for an extensive overview of 
approaches, Maroney 2006: esp. 125ff.). Given my own field of expertise in Law and 
Literature and the fact that I am a sitting judge, I will restrict my attention to the judge as 
a legal actor, not least because most common law oriented research usually takes the 
jury as object of inquiry. 
Now emotion may seem to be a strange bedfellow3 if we consider that the 
demands of legality in contemporary jurisdictions order the judge to stay clear of her 
subjective persuasion so that the rule of law rather than of men can be guaranteed. In 
other words, is the emotion of empathy to be accepted as an essential and/or normative 
component of the art of judging, more specifically so in hard cases when the law, if not 
silent, is not particularly outspoken? That is to say, with Thomas Hobbes  Leviathan in 
mind4, can the judge then give her discretion, coloured by private emotion, free reign? 
                                                 
1 The phrase is derived from George Eliot. 
2 
as well as emotions in legal interpretation. On the political level, it is interesting to note that presidential 
candidate Hilary Clinton spoke of the necessity to promote empathy (she used the word literally), also as 
 
Urban League meeting held at Ford Lauderdale, Florida, 31 July 2015, CNN Newsreel 31 July 2015). 
3 
(Cfr. Maroney 2006: 120). 
4 I am thinking here of c Leviathan, where Hobbes discusses the situation in 
which the legislator is silent, i.e. there is nor specific rule, and the subject therefore at liberty to use his 
own discretion. 
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The threat to the logocentric reasoning that we have cherished since the Enlightenment 
looms large for those of legal-positivist denomination. So the question would be 
whether empathy and a literary-legal imagination can be incorporated into a judicial 
methodology such that the requirements of the rule of law are fulfilled. 
In the first part of what follows I will return to, and build on my recent arguments 
about the Aristotelian requirements for the art of judging well, in connection to the 
suggestions made for the role of emotion in adjudication as developed in the 
interdisciplinary fields of Law and Literature/ Law and the Humanities: how to combine the 
heart and the head in judicial practice by finding inspiration and guidance in literary 
works, and for what reasons. I do so also on the view put forward by William J. 
Brennan jr., that already in the early twentieth century, Cardozo drew our attention to a 
complex interplay of forces  rational and emotional, conscious and unconscious  by 
dialogue of reason and passion, does not taint the judicial process, but is in fact central 
to its vitality  (Brennan 1988: 3). Thus my perspective in this part is geared toward 
empathy as a second-order emotion, i.e. as a, mode of being in touch with the 
emotions, feelings, expectations, and vulnerabilities of others,  and as the capacity to 
make morally significant decisions in the light of empathy with the first-order emotions 
of others  (Morawetz 1996: 523). In other words, on what from a literary-theoretical 
point of view is delineated as the combination of aesthetic empathy, i.e. empathy felt for 
a person whom we know to be fictional, say Effi Briest or Anna Karenina, and the 
empathy that we ourselves develop as a character trait (Hogan 2011: 276). The latter s 
success, also in view of Benjamin Cardozo s famous thesis about the unity of form and 
content of legal texts, and more specifically judicial decisions (Cardozo 1925), can be 
deduced from the reaction of those affected by such a decision. When the judicial text is 
logocentric and cold, this can evoke violent emotion.  
Recently in the Netherlands, a father who heard the decision of a lower court with 
respect to the defendant-car driver who ran over and killed his two-year-old daughter 
and both her grandparents while they were cycling on a bicycle track, threw a chair to 
the judge reading the decision out of sheer disappointment and frustration. The decision 
itself was correct in terms of traffic law and criminal law, also as far as the sentencing 
was concerned, but did not at all, or rather not explicitly, recognize the enormous 
suffering of the parents of the little girl (See ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2014:10041). In other 
words, the judicial decision performed its legal function of decision-making and criminal 
law dispute resolution in the abstract sense only, and failed in its communicative and 
societal function because it did not show an empathetic stance towards the bereft 
parents who had understandably hoped for a severe punishment of the offender by way 
of retribution. As a concomitant result, the general audience felt with the parents; it did 
not accept the decision as fair. Thus the performativity of the (text of the) judicial 
decision is intimately connected to the narrative identity of the judge taking the decision, 
whether this identity is consciously chosen or not. An interesting fictional example can 
be found in Ian McEwan s novel The Children Act to which I turn in more detail below 
in paragraph 3. Judge Fiona Maye s opening remark in the hard case of the Siamese 
Twins is this: This court is a court of law, not of morals, and our task has been to find, 
and our duty is then to apply, the relevant principles of law to the situation before us  a 
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situation which is unique  (McEwan 2014b: 26-27)5. This suggests the need for legal 
practice to at least consider the suggestions made by Law and Literature. 
Then, in paragraph 4, I turn to the suggestions made in contemporary cognitive 
narratology in order to highlight the consequences for judicial practice of findings with 
respect to narrative conventions at work in all of us, such as script and schema. Then 
the first-order emotion of the judge, e.g. her fear, anger or distress, comes central stage 
as the objective of other people s narrative goals6. The topic is acute not least because 
contemporary neuroscience suggests that the mechanisms at work in the development 
of empathy are neural, and, ow suggests that, even in law, it is emotion or 
 (Bruner Murrow G. & R. W. Murrow 2013: 
282, 284, my italics). 
2. Narrative empathy in literature and law 
It is my firm conviction, based on some seventeen years of experience on the bench, 
that in every case that comes before a judge emotions are involved in at least two related 
ways. To start with, the first-order emotion of the parties usually triggers the legal 
conflict, even though in corporate and commercial disputes this is mostly couched as a 
rights discourse involving money. In criminal law, the emotion of victim and perpetrator 
rather than the other party in the case, the state, are central stage. The judge has to be 
aware of these emotions and act upon that awareness. But, more importantly, the judge 
has to be aware of the subtext of a case , the stories of the litigants that matter to them 
personally but that are all too often filtered away in the course of the proceedings, 
geared as they are toward the finding of legally relevant facts in light of possibly 
applicable legal rules and norms. This requires of the judge a legal imagination that 
includes a concrete reflection both on what is and what is not actually argued, in either 
oral or written form, and what the emotional aspect really  is (Cfr. Meyer 2003: 1314-
315). And since judges too, ffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune  
(Shakespeare 1997, act 3.1, ll.59-60), such imagination would include professional and 
personal self-reflection on what she recognizes and accepts as valid, and on what 
remains unacknowledged given her own blind spot(s). For the stories in law as much as 
the stories in literature the claims about the necessary capacity of second-order empathy, 
made by scholars and legal professionals alike, are to be considered in connection to 
existing character traits in the reader, and these include her first-order emotions.  
What Stephen Breyer claimed about the need for judges to seek nourishment in 
literature7 in order to correctly fulfill law s requirement of professionals to have both a 
head and a heart 8, is intimately connected to who judges are and how they view their 
                                                 
5 Cfr. McEwan (2014b: 13)  
x-
ample also Watt (2011: 93-107). 
6 For empirical research conducted in Australian courts, see Roach Anleu and Mack 2005. 
7  a-
Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, 103rd Con-
gress, 2nd session 232-233, 1994, statement of Stephen G. Breyer, Supreme Court Nominee. 
8 The reason for the combined heart and head being that 
deciding things that affect them, you need to understand, as best you can, t
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societal role and function, and their legal persona in daily practice. It also calls for 
continued attention in legal theory to the relation between law and morality in its 
connection to theories of adjudication9. Or, as Steven Winter suggests, A literary turn 
of mind is vital to morality because it is through narrative enactment that we imagine 
how various situations might be carried forward and, thus, are able to assess their ethical 
implications  (Winter 2010: 115). 
Both aesthetic and practical empathy thrive on emotion. To me, the claim put 
forward by Patrick Colm Hogan that, Our emotional response to stories is inseparable 
from our empathic response to the characters, their situations, actions, capacities, and so 
forth  (Hogan 2011: 276), is relevant in both literature and law, especially since 
different forms of aesthetic empathy can help feed the legal imagination10. One cannot 
be a good judge without that, and I wholeheartedly agree with Gary Watt when he 
writes that, Too much respect for law and a lack of humane imagination is a terrible 
thing in a judge  (Watt 2009: 20). The 2009 confirmation hearing of Supreme Court 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, however, show that this is not a universally accepted truth. Or 
rather, that a nominee for the bench risks vilification if she deviates from the 
enlightened path of rationality as the predominant factor in adjudication. When her 
views on the importance of her personal identity in its connection to empathy as 
criterion for judging were challenged, Sotomayor was quick to join the traditional ranks, 
i.e. while she acknowledged judicial emotion, she dismissed it as harmful in actual 
decision-making11. And neither did president Obama s warm plea for the empathy 
criterion survive the public debate. Such vilification is not new. One only has to think of 
the empathetic interpretive stance employed by Supreme Court Justice Blackmun who 
joined Justice Brennan s dissenting opinion in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of 
Social Services (489 U.S. 189; 1989)12, and added a voice of his own when he wrote, 
                                                                                                                                          
different conclusions on the meaning of the same words. In those difficult cases, it is very important to 
imaginatively understand how other people live and how your decisions might affect them, so you can 
take that into account when you write  (Breyer 2013). Cfr. Henderson (1988). 
9 Cfr. Brennan (1988: 9, footnote 20) Dialogue between my Head and my 
Heart
-century Langdellian formalism that 
Benjamin Cardozo reacted against, one that not incidentally in the early days of Law and Literature was tak-
en up by Brook Thomas and Robert Ferguson when they drew our attention to the period in which law in 
the U.S. was still part and parcel of the humanities, in Cross-Examinations of Law and Literature (Thomas 
1987) and Law and Letters in American Culture (Ferguson 1984), a period that in Europe, roughly put, can be 
situated before the great codifications of national legal systems of the late eighteenth and the nineteenth 
century (cfr. Gaakeer 2012b). 
10 
oneself in his or her situation (projective empathy), or imagining some relevantly standard person in that sit-
uation (normative empathy)  (Hogan 2011: 284). 
11 Confirming 
u-
preme Court before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Congress, 1st Session, July 14, 2009. 
Cfr. Maroney (2011b: 1485); Sotomayor first brought forward the identity argument in a 2002 speech at 
Berkeley, see Martín Alcoff 2010. See also McArdle 2012. 
12 489 U.S. 189 (1989). In 1984, Joshua DeShaney was subjected by his father, with whom he lived after his 
parents had divorced, to a battering so severe that he suffered permanent brain damage. He was profoundly 
retarded for the rest of his life. The evidence showed that the Winnebago Department of Social Services 
(DSS) knew what happened in the DeShaney home. After the final beating, Joshua and his mother brought 
suit against the county, the DSS, and several of its workers. They complained that Joshua had been deprived 
of his liberty in the sense of bodily integrity without due process of law, in violation of his rights under the 
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Today, the Court purports to be the dispassionate oracle of the law, unmoved by 
se, the Court itself retreats into a sterile 
formalism which prevents it from recognizing either the facts of the case before it or 
the legal norms that should apply to those facts. ... the Court today claims that its 
decision, however harsh, is compelled by existing legal doctrine. ... I would adopt a 
mental justice and 
recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging. ... Poor 
Joshua, ... It is a sad commentary upon American life, and institutional principles that 
this child, Joshua DeShaney, is now assigned to live out the remainder of his life pro-
foundly retarded ...  (Ivi: 212-213). Blackmun was widely taken to task for his first-order 
emotional exclamation Poor Joshua , and his so-called jurisprudence of sentiment  
(Rosen 1994: 13). 
And yet I would agree with Martha Nussbaum when she claims as her 
epistemological position, sable to a 
philosophical inquiry in the ethical sphere; not by any means sufficient, but sources of 
insight without which the enquiry cannot be complete , and that we need literature, that 
talks of human lives and choices as if they matter to us all  (See Nussbaum 1990: 23-24 
and 171; )13. This position originates in Nussbaum s earlier work in which she combines 
ethical philosophy along Aristotelian lines (e.g. Nussbaum 1986, e.g. pp.378-421 on 
Sophocles  Antigone and Euripides  Hecuba) with the suggestion to study the narrative 
and emotional structures of novels, and ties up with Nussbaums s construction of the 
truly moral judge founded in the good aristotelian judge, whose virtue lies correctly 
applying the equity of the flexible ruler. He is, ... a judge of practical wisdom, rather 
than being unreflectively subservient to law, [who] will apply it in accordance with his 
very own ethical judgment ....  (Nussbaum 1990: 99). 
The combined argument about the literary-legal construction of a good judge is 
that real judges should read fiction because the lessons it teaches can directly be applied 
to decision making14. The argument runs like this. Literary works with legal themes, 
however remote perhaps from the traditional jurisprudential themes, can give us insight 
into the struggles and tensions that are created by law by the very way in which it regula-
tes society and the lives of individuals. This is because literature differs from the abstract 
propositions of doctrine and jurisprudence. Literature is always an experience of the 
imagination, never a string of propositions. Literature s capacity  to contribute to the 
professional lives of lawyers makes it also an indispensable medium to learn about law. 
The experience of viewing the world of the text and its inhabitants empathetically can 
be transformed into a norm for judging human relations in general, or, as Nussbaum 
puts it, for our social existence and the totality of our connections  (Nussbaum 1990: 
                                                                                                                                          
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the DSS et al. had failed to intervene to protect 
The majority opinion of the Court held that failure to protect an 
individual against private violence does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause, because no 
affirmative obligation is imposed on the State to provide this type of protection. The Court also held that the 
give rise to such an affirmative obligation either, since the State did not hold Joshua in its custody during the 
final beating, which incidentally was not by a State official but by his father.  
13 See also Cunningham (2001: 5), ly help us to read for life . 
14 See also Heald 1998; Heald 2009. Given the scope of this article I refrain from addressing questions of 
r. the critical note in Morawetz 
(1996: 520-521)  Nussbaum], the relevant moral community is Western culture as it has 
evolved over recent millenia rather than the Balkanized subcultures of contemporary cultural discourse . 
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171). Thus, reading literature can make us aware of the complexity of the human condi-
tion and can help promote an empathic ability, i.e.,  ne the concrete ways in 
which people different from oneself grapple with disadvantage...  (Nussbaum 1995: xvi). 
At the heart of her approach, therefore, is the emphasis on the particularity of human 
experience rather than an abstraction formulated on the basis of presuppositions that 
are hard to test. Nussbaum s term to denote, the ability to see one thing as another, to 
see one thing in another , is fancy  (Nussbaum 1995: 36). This requires from the reader 
as the most important characteristic,  ... the power of imagining vividly what it is like to 
be each of the persons whose situations he imagines  (Nussbaum 1995: 73. Cfr. on 
empathy as moral sentiment Ward 2002).  
What, then, does this mean for the judge in actual legal practice? This narrative 
imagination  as Nussbaum also calls it (Nussbaum 2010: 95-120, Chapter VI Cultivating 
Imagination: literature and the arts ), obviously has to be translated to the language of 
judging, for literature and law are alike in that they need ... a language that is expressive 
of the kind of imagination that s capable of perceiving the individual humanity of the 
people involved and their circumstances; recognizing that each has a complicated story 
with factors that make it not the same as anyone else s  (Nussbaum 1996: 24). This 
argument returns in Nussbaum s defense of the arts and humanities against the 
instrumental profit motive pervasive in contemporary science and technology where she 
includes,  
(Nussbaum 2010: 7, endnote omitted), as a salient characteristic to be able to voice 
other values (including those of citizenship and democracy). Not only is the very idea of 
narrative imagination  applicable in a concrete manner in any act of judgment since to 
Nussbaum emotions are rational, so that in common law and civil law jurisdictions alike 
it makes sense for juries and judges to try and imagine as best as they can the other s 
situation before doing justice  (Cfr. White 2006: 90) by means of a final judgment, it is 
also essential when reading, as is mostly the case in civil law jurisdictions, the paper files, 
since words can never fully describe the emotions at work in, for example, the story of 
what happened by a witness of a terrrible crime. 
In the sense that the working of narrative imagination is based on the metaphoric 
process, its resulting empathy can be fruitfully connected to the legal-philosophical 
concept of phronèsis from Aristotle to Paul Ricoeur. In the spectrum of the intellectual 
and moral virtues Aristotle places phronèsis in the category of intellectual virtues 
(distinguished from épistèmè, i.e. theoretical, conceptual knowledge aimed at knowing 
that , and from knowledge of how to make things, technè)15. Perceptual and dispositional 
                                                 
15 Aristotle starts his analysis with a definition of the prudent man, the phronimos i-
nition of Prudence by considering who are the persons we call prudent. Now it is held to be the mark of a 
(The Nicomachean Ethics, VI.iv.1, 1140a24-29, p.337) e-
liberates about things that cannot vary, nor about things not within his power to do. Hence inasmuch as 
scientific knowledge involves demonstration, whereas things whose fundamental principles are variable 
are not capable of demonstration, because everything about them is variable, and inasmuch as one cannot 
deliberate about things that are of necessity, it follows that Prudence is not the same as Science. Nor can 
it be the same as Art. It is not Science, because matters of conduct admit of variation; and not Art, be-
cause doing and making are generically different, since making aims at an end distinct from the act of 
making, whereas in doing the end cannot be other than the act itself: doing well is in itself the end. It re-
mains therefore that it is a truth-attaining rational quality, concerned with action in relation to things that 
The Nicomachean Ethics, VI. v. 3-4, 1140a32-1140b7, p.337). For an 
extensive treatment of phronèsis in Aristotle and Ricoeur, see Gaakeer 2012a; 2015a. 
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in nature, phronèsis is the capacity to see what the situation demands and act upon it, i.e. 
it includes the application of good judgment to human conduct, knowing how 16. It is 
characterised by deliberation (or bouleusis), primarily with oneself but when transposed to 
the realm of the juridical, especially in legislation and equitable judging, also with others. 
Phronèsis is also a matter of ethos, character, in the sense it is the ability to apply 
understanding and insight gained in specific situations to new contexts. Understanding 
and phronèsis are about the same objects17. Since a judge has to reflect on what works and 
what doesn t in legal interpretation and application, the professional quality of phronèsis 
is crucial (The Nicomachean Ethics, VI.iv.1, 1140a24-29 and VI.v.3-4, 1140a32-1140b7, 
p.337). Phronèsis as knowing and being at the same time, enables the judge to bridge the 
gap between the generality of the rule and the particularity of the situation. As an actual 
form of reflective human judgment, it is a form of self-reflection that ideally leads to 
self-knowledge: why do I think that this rather than that is what is required under the 
circumstances?18 
In Paul Ricoeur s work a connection between phronèsis and metaphor can also be 
discerned and it can be fruitfully connected to Nussbaum s arguments. The first step in 
Ricoeur s argument is to understand imagination as the insight into likeness  that is 
both perceptual and cognitive, a seeing and a thinking19. Here we recognize the 
combination of thinking (including theoretical knowledge of doctrinal law in the case of 
judicial phronèsis) and seeing the particularity of the new situation as comprised in the 
quality of phronèsis. Both phronèsis and metaphor depend on our imaginative capability to 
see  what connects that which we already know (or, see below paragraph 4, think we 
know) to a new meaning of the particular. It is here that the empathetic emotion as 
delineated by Nussbaum works. In short, Ricoeur connects the input from the 
humanities with the development of the judge s narrative imagination and intelligence 
by pointing out its interrelation with justice in terms of phronèsis. Literature offers us 
exemplary performances and thus helps us understand the importance of insight in what 
it means to write a story, or any other text for that matter, in a specific way (Ricoeur 
1980: 178). Phronèsis also teaches us not to arrive at final decisions too quickly, i.e. the 
metaphoric aspect demands what Ricoeur calls suspension of judgment, and as Ammon 
Reichman suggest, that is literature s more important contribution to the act of 
judging20.  
On Ricoeur s view that there is a, 
phronèsis and phronimos, a tie that becomes meaningful only if the man of wise judgment 
determines at the same time the rule and the case, by grasping the situation in its 
singularity  (Ricoeur 1992: 175), I turn to the relation of the deliberative aspect of 
phronèsis and the idea of narrative transfer: in what way, then, do specific types of 
                                                 
16 
Knowledge, but only by perception. (The Nicomachean Ethics, VI.viii.9, 1152a27, p.351). 
17 (The Nicomachean Ethics, VI.x.2, 
1143a8, p.359). 
18 Cfr. Morawetz (1996: 526) -knowledge, a precondition for empathy, is often painful to achieve and 
often achieved in a struggle with  Cfr. Ricoeur (2007: 7). 
19 ability to produce new kinds by assimilation and to produce them not 
above  (1978: 148) 
(italics in the original).  
20 Reichman (2006: 297)
readers judge empathetically; rather literature teaches one to withhold judgment so that when judgment is 
ultimately rendered it is more profound and meaningful . 
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narrative transfer their stories in law and literature, for this too depends on making 
explicit the similarities and dissimilarities in a particular situation? And how do 
narratives influence our (empathatic) emotion? In doing so I keep in mind Ricoeur s 
view about, 
own psycho-sociological conditions of production and thereby opens itself to an 
unlimited series of readings, themselves situated in different socio-cultural conditions. 
In short, the text must be able, from the sociological as well as the psychological point 
new situation  as accomplished, precisely, by the act of reading  (Ricoeur 1981: 139). 
Why? Because what judges do in their act of reading and giving meaning to what they 
read in the form of a decision, is precisely that type of dealing with the texts of others. 
With this in mind I return to McEwan s fictional judge Fiona Maye whose emotional 
trials and tribulations are, or so I would suggest, both an exemplary performance of the 
arguments made so far, and a warning.  
3. Empathy unbound or unbounded empathy? 
The opening scene of the novel portrays our fictional legal actor, High Court judge 
Fiona Maye, professionally the paragon of legal rationality21, recuperating from the 
shock of her husband Jack s declaration that at fifty-nine he wants to have a love affair 
with a young woman named Melanie as a last shot because he longs for the physical 
intimacy he no longer has with Fiona22. Even now Fiona prioritises her professional 
duty for she starts to work on the decision that has to be ready the next day. This case is 
exemplary for the novel s main storyline: the choice between religion and life. It is a 
divorce case in the Jewish Chareidi commmunity in which contrary to religious custom 
the mother Judith Bernstein wants an education for both herself and her children, so 
that Fiona writes, The court must choose, on behalf of the children, between total 
religion and something a little less. Between cultures, identities, states of mind, sets of 
family relations, fundamental definitions, basic loyalties, unknowable futures  (at 13). 
When writing about the moral differences between the litigants, Fiona, 
centre of one s life one or a small number of significant relations defined above all by 
love,  and becomes painfully aware of the fact that, Yes, by this last essential she herself 
was failing  (at 15). But the work comes first, Her judgment must be ready for printing 
by tomorrow s deadline, she must work. Her personal life was nothing  (at 16). The 
topic of religion versus life returns in Fiona s musings about a high-profile case she 
decided some weeks earlier, that of the conjoined twins Mark and Matthew that the 
hospital needed judicial permission to separate in order to save Mark whose chances of 
leading a normal life were highest, Matthew being unable to live independently from his 
sibling. The parents refused because they did not want to interfere with God s purpose. 
In both cases Fiona s decision favours life.  
                                                 
21 l-
describes 
 
22  
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Then, at 22.30 hrs on the same night, the phone rings. Fiona who is on duty as a 
Family Division judge gets another case, that of a hospital looking for a court order to 
proceed with the transfusion of a leukaemia patient, seventeen-year old Adam Henry, 
against the wishes of his parents who are Jehovah s Witnesses. Even at this time of 
night and under these specific personal circumstances, Fiona immediately instructs her 
clerk what to do, as her husband leaves for his lover. Next day, at the Royal Courts of 
Justice, however, Fiona thinks back on her successful career and how she has held back 
for years to decide about having children; she realises 
belonged to the law as some women had once been brides of Christ  (at 45). For Fiona, 
the law is her religion23. During the hearing later that week, the expert statement of the 
haematologist Carter gives Fiona reason to believe that without transfusion Adam 
Henry will soon die a horrible death. Adam Henry, it is established, is extremely 
intelligent and fully aware of the consequences of his refusal of treatment. His parents 
dote on him, but their faith and his is so strong that they accept he will die. Fiona 
announces that she will go to hospital to hear from Adam Henry himself, or rather, to 
find out ,  of his situation, and of what he confronts should I rule 
against the hospital,  and to tell him, 
decision in his best interests  (at 89). Here Fiona s private persona comes to the surface, 
since it is the social worker rather than the judge who does such visits24. Is the 
pleasurable period she herself spent in hospital when she was thirteen the trigger? Or is 
it her (maternal?) interest in young Adam  (at 69), this young patient  (at 97) a lovely 
boy  who seems to be one confused little puppy  (at 98), beause he is intelligent and 
writes poetry? In hospital Adam immediately tells her that, 
that she would visit him  (at 100). Their conversation goes smoothly and within minutes 
Fiona is telling Adam about a court case of parents prosecuted for satanic abuse of their 
children which proved totally unfounded, and she knows, 
ground. Satan was a lively character in the Witness construction of the world  (102-103). 
She also realises that by asking, Would it please God, to have you blind or stupid and 
on dialysis for the rest of your life? , 
mark (105).  
The intimacy between them develops when Adam asks Fiona whether he can call 
her My Lady , the honorific court term that he obviously uses more in the chivalric and 
private sense. They discuss his poetry, he reads to her and plays the violin to her, 
Benjamin Britten s setting of the Yeats poem Down by the Salley Gardens , one of the 
encores Fiona habitually plays with the barrister Mark Berner when they perform 
                                                 
23 Cfr. the next day in court, moments before the hearing, upon seeing the neat stack of paper on her 
Runcie who tried a murder case four years ago: a mother, Martha Longman, was accused of the death of 
n the Sally 
Clarke case as Ian McEwan explains in an interview in The Guardian, (2014a), in which only by the second 
appeal it became clear that the pathologist had withheld vital evidence of a fatal bacterial infection in one 
of the children. Clarke was released but the vilification by the media and the bullying in jail had broken 
her. 
The second case McEwan uses in the novel (at 183-190) is that of the son of a close acquaintance of 
 and so sen-
tenced for offences committed by others to two-and-a-half year in prison.  
24 
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together at the Inns of Court. This triggers her to sing along with him. Back at the 
court, later that evening, Fiona gives her decision. She sets out the facts, acknowledges 
that Adam Henry, -year-old,  (at 121) 
and then when everything seems to go in to the direction of finding for Adam and 
against the hospital, Fiona suddenly points out that her decision is, 
influenced by whether he has or doesn t have a full comprehension of his situation. I am 
guided instead by the decision  (at 123). In short, Fiona reverts to 
the legal domain by employing the basic principle derived from this precedent that the 
welfare of the minor is the concept guiding the decision. So Adam Henry, 
protected from his religion and from himself  (at 123).  
This oscillation between public role and private feeling will ultimately lead to 
professional transgression. It starts when Fiona gets a letter from Adam. He has had the 
transfusion and his parents are joyful. Why? Because Adam lives. They remained 
faithful, so the blame can be put on the judge and the legal system. It becomes clear 
from what Adam writes that he has developed feelings for Fiona and that the Yeats 
poem is immensely influential in that development. Fiona writes a short and cool letter, 
impersonal to the core, that she then does not send. A second letter from Adam arrives, 
now at her home address. Fiona asks the social worker Marina Greene to go and see 
Adam, who is doing fine at school. A week later, on the Monday morning she was to 
leave for the north-east of England, there occurred a minuscule shift along the marital 
 (at 143) her husband with whom relations had been strained since his 
return, offers Fiona coffee which she accepts. Later that day, in Newcastle, when Fiona 
is having dinner at Leadman Hall, her clerk tells her that Adam Henry is there. Fiona 
goes to see him in the kitchen. He has followed her to thank her for saving his life as 
she saved him from his religion. He s eighteeen now and has left home. It is 
immediately obvious that he is smitten with Fiona, and that the Yeats poem about The 
Salley Gardens  has been instrumental in the development of his feelings for her. 
Baffled when Adam announces that he wants to come and live with her, Fiona knows 
no better than to respond that she will ask her clerk to bring Adam to a hotel. However, 
before he gets into the taxi, 
and drew him towards her. Her intention was to kiss him on the cheek, but as she 
reached up and he stooped a little and their faces came close, he turned his head and 
their lips met. She could have drawn back, she could have stepped right away from him. 
Instead, she lingered, defenceless for the moment  (at 169). She senses that it was 
more than the idea of a kiss, more than a mother might give her grown-up son  (at 169). 
So their brief encounter ends. Fiona probes her state of mind and immediately swings 
back in the legal mode, [S]he was not prone to wild impulses and she didn t understand 
her own behaviour. She realised there was much more to confront in her confused mix 
of feelings, but for now it was the horror of what might have come about, the ludicrous 
and shameful transgression of professional ethics, that occupied her. The ignominy that 
could have been hers  (at 172). Back at her London court, she receives a poem from 
Adam Henry. It s a ballad reminiscent of The Salley Gardens  that ends with Jesus 
saying to the protagonist, Her kiss was the kiss of Judas, her kiss betrayed my name  (at 
180-181). Even though Fiona realises that his infatuation differed from hers, she 
dismisses the idea that she is the Judas of the poem, convinced as she is that he will 
move on, do well at university and forget about her. Again the presumedly rational 
response. In December, however, she breaks down after a concert with Mark Berner, 
with whom as we have read earlier on, she forgets the law when they play together. The 
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trigger is their playing The Salley Gardens  combined with a phone call from the social 
worker Marina Green that Adam is dead, having refused a transfusion after the 
leukaemia came back. Fiona has admit to herself that she was 
creature that led the poet astray and kissed him  (at 203). With Adam too, The Salley 
Gardens  made Fiona forget the law, but this oblivion comes at a high cost. She realises 
that, [H]er transgression lay beyond the reach of any disciplinary panel  (at 212) because 
as a human being she has failed Adam completely. She has kissed him on an impulse 
and left it at that; she has failed to read the message in his poem and now he s dead. 
Fiona then confesses to her husband, s passion for 
life, and her part in his death  (at 213). 
I suggest that the importance of McEwan s novel is that it is literally and 
figuratively a mirror for judges , and one that gives food for thought to legal 
professionals as John Wigmore described one of the reasons why jurists should turn to 
literature, a view adopted in contemporary Law and Literature (Wigmore 1922). Its 
documentary character as far as the choice of legal cases is concerned, based as that 
choice is on McEwan s view on the parallels between the legal and the writing 
profession25, as well as the development of the main character Fiona Maye together 
offer a basis for judicial self-reflection on professional behaviour and judicial regulation 
of emotion, in and out of court, as much as on the demand to balance the private and 
the public persona. This is also to say that the ethics of the story told , or rather the 
reading for the message, should be complemented by the ethics of reception , how the 
narrative influences us, as James Phelan suggests when he writes, Narrative ethics 
explores the intersection between the domain of stories and storytelling and that of 
moral values. Narrative ethics regards moral values as an integral part of stories and 
storytelling because narratives themselves implicitly or explicitly ask the question, How 
should one think, judge, and act  as author, narrator, character, or audience  for the 
greater good?  (Phelan 2014).  
What, then, is it that judges especially can learn from reading The Children Act if 
they read the novel with the necessary narrative empathy?26 Following Terry Maroney, I 
suggest that it is that they should concern themselves more than is done to date with the 
normative issue of the role of emotion in judicial decision making (Cfr. Maroney 2011a: 
1488). The story of Fiona Maye shows how her completely internalised legal 
methodology of distinguishing the relevant facts is predominant. It also shows her 
initially second-order, allocentric empathy for the individuals whose lives she decides 
about, long remains the normative, legal kind as she looks for legal precedents to decide 
the cases, the recognition of relevant precedent being a metaphoric process of dealing 
with similarities and dissimilarities so that one arrives at the imaginative creation of the 
standard person in that specific situation (See Hogan 2011). It changes into first-order 
empathy, however, as a result of triggers in her personal life. From a judicious spectator 
of the kind Martha Nussbaum delineates in Poetic Justice, Fiona Maye changes into a 
                                                 
25 Cfr. Interview with McEwan, (2014a), in which McEwan tells how at a dinner he attended, Alan Ward 
t-
ecise, delicious. Serious, of course, compassion-
ate at points, but lurking within its intelligence was something like humour, or wit, derived perhaps from 
its godly instance, which in turn remineded me  
26 Cfr. Keen 2015 Narrative empathy is the sharing of feeling and perspective-taking induced by reading, 
n-
ables a living reader to catch the emotions and sensations of a representation . 
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judge who loses her phronetic capacity to act and judge correctly under the 
circumstances. Would she have acted the way she did if she had had children of her 
own, and/or if she had not met Adam Henry in the vulnerable emotional state that she 
was in as a result from the problematic relationship with her husband? What is the 
emotional trigger of the song The Salley Gardens ?  
Thus, we as readers are asked whether we can feel with her, i.e. can we develop 
aesthetic empathy for her, and whether we ourselves can develop empathy as a character 
trait. And that is perhaps also to ask whether we can feel for fellow-judges like her in 
real life27.  
Much depends on who we ourselves are and that would include not only our 
professional28, and cultural but also our private values, which for judges are, mildly put, 
usually solidly middle class. And it would include earlier experiences that add to our 
emotional colouring, from youth, for example, just as much as from professional life. 
Our being hermeneutically situated and culturally determined is an inescapable fact of all 
human life. In other words, it is important to be knowledgeable about how narrative 
works to activate our deep frames of (re)cognition, because what affects us in a fictional 
narrative may be indicative of what affects us in other texts as well, and such affect has 
consequences for the way in which judges impose narrative coherence on defendants  
and litigants  acts against the background of the normative system, i.e. the applicable 
rule29.  
4. Narrative Control: Judging and the Cognitive Turn in Narratology 
The topic of how to influence the judge s mind and decision has been with us since 
Aristotle and Cicero s De Inventione already deals with the topic of the plausibility of a 
narrative, i.e. what it is in the narrative that convinces those who judge. Judicial narrative 
imagination and phronetic intelligence therefore need an education in narrative affect 
heuristics, in order to be able to recognise the narrative techniques that are used in any 
text to deliberately guide the judge-reader s perception and cognition, her seeing and 
thinking  as discussed above in paragraph 2, including an empathetic stance (Cfr. Stern 
2014: 116, 129). To this end, the expansion of literary-legal studies into the domain of 
what is called the cognitive turn  in narratology is required. Not only to offer guidance 
in what it is that can trigger judicial emotion  necessary also because judges need to 
fullfil the requirements of impartiality and equal treatment under the rule of law30 , but 
also to help the judge in suspending judgment, i.e. to recognise what anti-suspension 
                                                 
27 In the 2015 course Languag  that I co-designed in collaboration with the 
u-
cation, The Children Act was the set novel. Responses to the character Fiona Maye widely differed; while 
most of my fellow- m-
stances she finds herself in, some found the story of Fiona and Adam utterly implausible since no real 
j . For an earlier overview of the course, see Gaakeer 2013.  
28 Cfr. Cardozo (1921: 178)  
29 Cfr. Desanctis (2012: 159), that stories,  to activate deep frames  cognitive principles that are so 
fundamentally a part of our identity that, once activated, evoke subconscious reactions that can lead us to 
  when its relevance is recognized  
to be effective, it must tap into the cultural narratives and expectations that are meaningful for others . 
30 See also Minow 1988 for numerous suggestions and criteria to diminish the risk of personal judgments.  
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elements (i.e. other than case load and time pressure) are deployed31. Does the text, for 
example, exploit judicial psychological traits, such as anger or vanity32, or does it 
specifically appeal to empathy as a judicial response?33 
The topic of narrative as operative in how we construct the world as we know it  
is important given the risk all humans run because of their psychological make-up in the 
sense of their minds  natural proclivity to structure reality by means of narratives34, and 
that is the risk to fall into the pitfall of narratives becoming set stories and in the judicial 
environment of applying them as set rules. The judge s past experience of specific 
situations (and the people in them) can engender expectations with respect to human 
behaviour that will, in turn, guide her application of such expectations in future cases. It 
can lead to psychological errors such as confirmation bias and belief perseverance (See 
Festinger, 1957; Tversky & Kahneman 1974) when on such basis the judge, for 
example, reasons away  either incriminating or disculpating evidence, and then errors of 
judgment are sure to follow. 
As the findings of neurosciences suggest, emotions have a basis in mirror 
neurons, which fire both when a person performs an action or feels an emotion and when 
that person views someone else having the same experience,  and at the same time they 
are also context- and culture-dependent35. This suggests even more to be alert to 
subconscious activation of the judicial mind as far as the phenomenology of perception 
and judging is concerned36. As Richard Gerrig suggests, human beings are guided in 
their life experiences as much by intuition as by reflection, and their general cultural 
knowledge affects their reading, i.e. the narrative processing of information. As a result, 
resonances of such knowledge in any given text help trigger our memories, tap the 
schemas that are present in us, the organized clusters of information in memory,  and 
these would include genre-expectations in experienced readers (Gerrig 2011: 39, 49).  
                                                 
31 Cfr. Maroney (2011b: 653)  re-
quired dialogue on the contrast between . Cfr. also Maroney (2006: 132) i-
tional legal theory either presumes that judges have no operative emotions about the litigants and issues 
before them or mandates that any such emotions be actively suppressed, reflecting an untested, com-
Belleau et al., (2007: 13) ments of seduction and betrayal . 
32 A good example of a combination of anger and vanity can be found in the reaction of the judges to an 
advocate who called the notes that he saw the judges exchange during his cross-examination ravasakia , 
love letters. They put him in custody to await his trial for contempt because they had been deeply offend-
ed as persons, i.e. not as professional personae. Case of Kyprianou v. Cyprus, EHRC (Application no. 
73797/01) 15 December 2005. For an extended discussion, see Gaakeer 2015b. See also Maroney (2012: 
1225) on the risk of judicial trait anger. 
33 Bar-Cohen (2003: 2) 
thoughts, and to respond to them with an appropriate emotion .  
34 Cfr. Turner (1996: i) Story is the basic principle of mind. Most of our experience, our knowledge, and 
our thinking is organized as stories .  
35 Jurecic (2011: 10, 12) 
by neuroscientists who explain empathic concern as dependent not just on emotion, but also on cogni-
tion, context, and the relationship between the empathizer and the object Cfr. Bruner Mur-
row and Murrow (2013: 298)
neural simulation, of the actual neural affective, neural somatosensory, or neural motor states of others 
. 
36 See already Stein 1989, 3rd revised edition translated by Waltraut Stein, c-
toral dissertation done under Edmund Husserl with a strong foundation in the phenomenology of per-
ception. 
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The latter is of course immensely important in the setting of legal texts that given 
substantive, doctrinal and procedural constraints constitute a highly specific genre of 
text. In contemporary cognitive narratology37, research centres on various questions that 
may fruitfully be used in judicial surroundings. For example, as Fludernik and Olson 
suggest, the question of how narrative functions as a mode of mental access and how 
 how they control the decision-
making processes by which we intuit how stories are most likely to turn out  (Fludernik 
& Olson 2011: 5). This would include attention to [F]rames, and particularly scripts, i.e. 
of plots (Ivi: 10)38. Frames are the expectations on how domains of experience are 
structured, for example, how we recognize a room as a university classroom rather than 
a cell in a penitentiary institution (Herman 2009: 33). If we consider that in 
acknowledging or recognizing some sequence of events as a script, our natural 
inclination is to fill in the blanks of the unfolding story, or rather fill in the blanks (or 
the plot holes) (Cfr. Ryan 2009 on plot holes as deficiencies in the story line) and 
thereby structure the narrative into something we can deal with. In law, this is of great 
importance to acknowledge39. What does the presumption of innocence actually mean if 
the script suggests that a masked man running out of a bank with a satchel of money is 
likely to be the bankrobber who robbed this bank40. The schemata or textual  clues of 
such a narrative may ease judicial doubts too soon! This is dangerous on the view that 
the judge is the one constituting what are to be deemed the relevant facts  from the 
information on events that is presented to her, and she does so always with the legal 
norm and rule in mind. That is to say, the masked man with the satchel is probably 
irrelevant to the coherence of the story if the legal case before her is about a traffic 
incident.  
From a point of view of legal theory, we may also look upon precedent as a form 
of script. For example, the reasonable man , or my neighbour  as found in the 
neighbour principle  in tort, a.k.a. my brother  as in my brother s keeper 41 guide the 
search in a new case put before the judge, and the same of course applies to other fields 
of law. In basing one s decision on precedent too, what does not fit the script (also: as 
deliberately presented by litigants) gets filtered away. Viewed from another angle, that of 
presenting evidence in a court of law in a specific sequence, narrative knowledge is 
important because empirical research shows that people more easily accept evidence as 
true  when it is presented in story order  rather than when presented in witness order , 
                                                 
37 Histories of Narrative Theory (II): From Structuralism to the Present, in: Phelan, J. and P.J. 
Rabinowitz (eds), A Companion to Narrative Theory, Oxford, 2005, pp.38-58, at 48, on the cognitivist turn in 
narratology that concurred with the narrative turn  in the social sciences. Cognitive 
The Living Handbook of Narratology, Hamburg, Hamburg Universi-
ty, http://www.lhn.uni-hamburg.de/article/cognitve-narratology-revised-version <accessed 1 December 
2014>, and eds.), Routledge Encyclope-
dia of Narrative Theory, Milton Par (UK) and New York, 2008, pp. 349-350. 
38 Cfr. Herman (2009: 33) e-
sequence of events  
39 See also Emmot & Alexander 2015 on how texts guide the production of meaning and on the gap-
filling done by readers.  
40 I draw this example of a script from Herman 2014. Cfr. Toolan 2014; also Turner (1996: 16) that we 
n-
 
41 As developed in the case Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562. 
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regardless of the actual veracity of that evidence42. So whether or not the judicial sweet 
spot  is deliberately or unconsciously influenced by means of narrative in order to 
activate judicial empathy43, what matters most is that it may lead the judge to 
confabulate, explain away anything inconsistent with the story, and a posteriori create the 
illusion of there being good reasons for specifically this decision by way of legitimation. 
It is hard to change one s mind once one has literally and figuratively made it up ! That all 
this becomes even more important in hard cases, and that is irrespective of one s 
theoretical standpoint on judicial discretion, nightmarish as many legal theorists think 
that is.  
By way of conclusion, I would therefore suggest that when it comes to law, 
empathy and emotion, the legal professional can greatly benefit from what literature and 
narratology can offer by way of education and caution. And since as human beings we 
are all prone to mistakes  after all, to err is human , in doing so it behooves us to keep 
before our mind s eye Franz Kafka s remark in a letter to his friend Oskar Pollak, Many 
a book is like a key to unknown chambers within the castle of one s own self 44. 
  
                                                 
42 Lempert (1991: 561) r-
ach 
told the jury everything she knew about the events regardless of where that information fit into the un-
folding story of the events that occurred .  
43 Chestek (2010: 34) pot 
where a deep frame is activated (becoming the foundation of persuasion) without it being so obvious that 
 natural defenses are triggered .  
44 
Oskar Pollak, dated Sunday 8 November 1903 (Kafka 1966) 
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Harmony, Emotion & Law: Narcissus at 
COHERENCE s Pool 
Stephen Pethick   
Abstract: The paper attends critically to the current vogue foregrounding COHERENCE in theoretical 
approaches to law. In the paper I argue that existing scholarly exposition of COHERENCE suffers from a 
particular and striking weakness. Using my arguments elsewhere as a starting point I contend that 
COHERENCE at work in current legal scholarship is not the quasi-logical notion supposed (and supposed 
to be so elusive) in the literature, but instead stands as a token, unwittingly reflecting the individual 
theorist s deeper commitments about their primary object of concern. This is because the meaning of 
COHERENCE is routinely - indeed, as it happens, universally - confused with features possessed otherwise 
by the objects taken to instantiate it. I show that essaying COHERENCE has thereby caused legal theorists 
inadvertently to expose their emotions, aspirations and passions about law itself under service to analytic 
conceptual precision. Gazing down without recognition at their own subject in the depths of coherence s 
pool, scholars have been powerless to pull themselves away, imputing to COHERENCE features of justice, 
morality, emotion, wholeness and harmony that, I contend, are merely unexamined projections of 
scholars  deeper notions about law and legal reason. The unguarded conceptual essays that result are 
significant in showing a richer set of conceptual commitments than either we or the theorists themselves 
have supposed. I close by considering the opportunities that this literature offers to extend the range of 
legal theory beyond its traditional boundaries.  
that one could 
ever learn to define in a satisfactory way and thus come to feel 
comfortable with, as it is the name of a neuralgic point of 
contemporary intellectual endeavor, a point of probably incurable 
instability and discomfort, a dilemma . 
[Herbert 2004: 186] 
 
have been unable to reach anything like a consensus on how to 
define their central notion. This book explains why this is so: 
coherence is in a sense not definable . 
[Olsson 2005: viii] 
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 1. Introduction 
Over the last three decades legal theory has become entranced by the notion of 
COHERENCE1, but despite routine claims for its value nobody has been able to say with 
confidence what COHERENCE is2. As successive theorists have attempted to embrace the 
notion each has found COHERENCE complex and elusive, always slipping from sight just 
when its capture seemed near3. These theorists are Narcissus at the pool: coherence  is 
no elusive object of theoretical desire ( devoutly to be sought  as one theorist proclaims 
(BonJour 1985: 94)) but is rather a mirror-image of the old discipline-centered 
predispositions, avidity and inclinations of the theorists staring down onto the surface 
of the water. COHERENCE entrances, but the entrancement is narcissistic. 
If I am correct, my claim (to be substantiated in what follows) is a blow to all 
those who have perceived in COHERENCE a solution to the most intractable and 
awkward questions that beset the disciplines in which its use is urged. However, in this 
paper my aim is not, as it has been in other writing, to sweep away the phenomenon as 
an error, leaving COHERENCE in better shape to be fitted to more purposeful 
application. Instead my ambition is to point to and extol the residue that the 
phenomenon has left in its wake. It turns out that the oversight in question has caused 
theorists to drop their guard and reveal, inadvertently, their deeper and unwitting 
predispositions and understandings about their principal topic or theoretical concern. It 
is in the nature of the mistake and its consequences that this is of more interest in the 
analytic domain, where theorists suppose they are construing COHERENCE in a logical or 
quasi-logical manner, subject to reason and modality alone (see, e.g., Spohn 2009; 
Shimoji 2007; Angare 2010; Thagard 1999, 2000, 2003; Roche 2013; Amaya 2015). At 
least, this is where my attention is focused; i.e., on the scholarship in law and beyond 
that has sought out a crisp, universal, ahistorical and decontextualized concept of 
COHERENCE, but which has happened by turns to unwittingly plot an unruly mass of 
contingent, contextualized and (ironically in light of the supposed target) factious 
features of the primary objects of the theorists  gaze. 
The paper, then, amounts to an essay on reason and emotion emerging from 
theorists  attention to COHERENCE, the concept itself having come to occupy a principal 
place in theoretical approaches to harmony and conflict across diverse disciplines and 
topic fields. Thus we find COHERENCE invoked in the resolution of discord and conflict 
in fields such as politics, IR, management studies, literary criticism, music theory, 
                                                 
1 In the paper I adopt the philosophical practice of using small caps where mention is made of a concept 
as a concept; e.g., COHERENCE. This helps to distinguish occasions where the concept is deployed in an 
e-
come apparent that this distinction is particularly important in the present paper. 
Of the literature referred to here, see, e.g. Alexy and Peczenik 1990; J M Balkin, 1993; Dworkin 1986; 
Gunter, 1989; Hage 2004; Hurley 1990; Jackson 1990; Kress 1996; MacCormick 1978; MacCormick 1984; 
MacCormick 2005; Morgan 2004; Raz 1994; Rodriguez-Blanco 2001; Schiavello 2001; Soriano 2003; 
Weinrib, 1995. 
2 Of the wider literature see, e.g., BonJour (1999: 123) n-
. 
3 Even theorists attempting to be optimistic attest to the difficulties thought inherent in the project: e.g., 
Bertea, (2005) at Legal theorists have become increasingly concerned with coherence over the last 
few decades, emphasising its importance and relevance in law. We owe it to their efforts if we now have a 
better understanding of the nature, scope and limitations of a notion so inherently elusive and slippery as 
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ecology, decision theory and law. COHERENCE is also sought out in solution to 
difficulties in metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy, archeology, paleontology, 
theology, artificial intelligence, argumentation theory and spiritualism, whilst helping to 
articulate core concerns in optics, quantum theory, linguistics, literary studies, history 
and the techniques of good document design. And as more and more is claimed for the 
notion s deployment, so too does the felt need increase for its advocates to deliver 
statements of just what COHERENCE is, and what it is not4. This pressure is felt keenly in 
law, in which COHERENCE is urged in processes of the assessment of fact, in normative 
reasoning, in summing the nature and value of legal systems, and in the techniques of 
hermeneutics and exegesis that supposedly deliver to us the content of the laws 
themselves (e.g., Dworkin 1985). The pressure, particularly among analytic philosophers 
of law, is to deliver an articulation of COHERENCE in which the notion is clear, 
unambiguous and individuated from related concepts, and so is sharp-edged, 
transparent, repeatable and capable of being subject to appellate and other forms of 
judicial, political and social scrutiny. It is important to the jurists and others working 
within this frame that the concept be drawn dispassionately, for it is called upon to 
arbitrate on matters that are otherwise bound to raw emotion and the plays of power 
and force5. The paper unsettles all of these boundaries, perceiving in the literature a 
deeper commitment to conceptual richness than the relevant theorists or their followers 
have hitherto been prepared to concede. 
The paper is structured as follows. Following this introduction, at 2 I quickly set 
out the theoretical oversight on whose commission the paper depends before, at 3, 
showing how the oversight has led to interesting if unwitting capitulations by theorists 
of their deeper commitments and understandings in their subject area. At 4 I comment 
on the phenomenon, finding merit in the residue of the oversight, focusing on law in 
particular. At 5 I conclude. 
2. The Oversight 
Coherence, though pressed in aid in relation to numerous apparently insuperable 
problems (e.g., den Hertog & Stroß, 2013), is subject to the surprising but standard 
lament (on the part of its supporters) and glee (amongst its detractors) that it is an 
elusive, slippery, multi-faceted, complex, contentious and even mystical notion6. Yet 
despite this its use continues to be pressed in high-value contexts, causing attempts to 
render the notion in precise terms to become ever more feverish, programmatic and, 
strikingly, detailed - though without ever reaching modal closure, and without any 
widespread acceptance or conspicuous success. I aim to help explain and expand upon 
                                                 
4 MacCo this elusive notion of 'coherence', 
making se ). 
5 For example, the legal positivist and theorist of COHERENCE Neil MacCormick, in his seminal treatment 
over a quarter of a century, returns frequently trial of 
(Smith was tried and convicted, and then executed for his crime in August of that year). See, e.g. 2005: 
214-236. 
6 See MacCormick (1984)  ; Bertea (2005)   -
(1996)   . 
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the frustratingly asymptotic7 nature of these enquiries into coherence. The explanation 
suggests that theorists, across multiple disciplines, have succumbed to the fate of 
Narcissus at his pool because of a striking and recursive error. This error is universal 
through the relevant literature, in which successive commentators within the analytic 
tradition have failed to attend to the(ir) distinction between the intension of coherence 
and its extension8. In short, my claim is that these theorists, writing both for and against 
coherence, have come routinely to elide the meaning of coherence with various other 
features of the objects taken to instantiate it (as if possessing a motor  was imagined a 
necessary feature of the meaning of COMPLETE when looking at motor cars in illustration, 
because no motor car could be complete without one). Moreover, the commission of 
this first mistake then prompts a series of others raised on the back of it, for the mistake 
naturally results in a profusion of different accounts of any concept (think motor-car 
completeness; jigsaw completeness; sentence completeness, etc.), leading theorists to 
surmise that there are many conceptions of (e.g.) COMPLETE, not just one, and 
concluding that (e.g.) completeness, etc. must be a surprisingly complicated concept  
slippery, multifaceted and frequently contentious. Of course this has never happened 
with COMPLETE, but it has happened everywhere with COHERENCE, despite the 
commitment running throughout the analytic literature to careful conceptual 
disambiguation of the concept, seen in the routine call for its more general and precise 
articulation (e.g. BonJour 1985: 93; Thagard 2000: xii).  
Thus we find that the argument theorists with induction in mind characteristically 
imagine that COHERENCE requires consistency, certainly, but also some additional 
elements that stop just short of entailment, with a great falling out over what the elusive 
additional elements might be9. So these theorists inadvertently produce as an account of 
coherence an account of induction (inference involving consistency and something more, 
stopping short of entailment ). Linguists, meanwhile, imagine grammaticalness   
textual or discourse cohesion and then something more  as COHERENCE; physicists in 
the science of optics in turn take COHERENCE to mean an invariant phase relation 
between waves of light; and so on. In this manner theorists throughout the disciplines 
have procured more or less detailed imaginings of their theoretical objects cast instead 
in the guise of COHERENCE, with the notion accruing attention, confusion and dissent in 
exact proportion to that levelled routinely at the primary object of their theoretical 
concern. The oversight can appear benign in some disciplines (e.g. optics), but can have 
serious consequences indeed where the primary object is some contentious hypothetical 
theorem in a high-value and contended context, such as encountered in law10. 
Naturally enough, the oversight in question ensures that the prospect of finding a 
general account of coherence is frustrated from the outset, as commentators 
unconsciously attach to coherence features of the (many) discipline-specific objects they 
have in mind when bringing coherence into view; and precision is left equally frustrated, 
as commentators seeking accuracy are pushed to peer with ever-closer attention into the 
detail of myriad cohering objects with no idea where this process of cataloguing the 
notion should stop, and with the desired object, coherence itself, retreating bafflingly 
                                                 
7 I borrow this concept from its more familiar home in physics and mathematics. 
8 The distinction is one I hold to as well, and indeed my critique in this paper depends on it. 
9 See treatment and examples in Pethick (2008). 
10 In light of the nature of the error, the oversight appears at its most benign in the typically consensual on-
tology of the natural sciences, and presents as most worrying where coherence is advanced in a method to 
resolve a contested, high-value matter in social practice  for example, in law. 
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into the shadows  just in step, as it happens, with the diligence of the enquiry in 
question.  
The last point above is important, for in it the three characteristic responses to the 
elucidation of coherence are provoked. Thus theorists canvassing the notion within a 
single domain or use often imagine that their (incomplete) account picks out the sole 
real or true meaning of coherence, and that other meanings are thereby mistaken. 
Others who take a more inter-disciplinary approach notice that different meaning is 
offered elsewhere, and so deflate down their claims about coherence to just one of a 
number of possible kinds, types or conceptions of it. And theorists prompted to pursue 
coherence doggedly both across domains and into its fine detail finally conclude the 
impossibility of conceptual definition for coherence, and attest sorrowfully that the best 
we can do is point to multiple coherences , with no ability to state what might join these 
various and perhaps limitless instances together.  
Thus we find, under the mistake, a proliferation of detailed and increasingly 
sophisticated but incomplete accounts of the concept in which all the structures of 
intelligibility on offer within the analytic canon are wheeled out in aid. Coherence is 
thereby understood as a matter of degrees (e.g., Roche 2013), as a matter of kinds (e.g., 
Thagard 2000), sometimes of degrees and kinds (e.g., MacCormick 2005), of supposedly 
necessary modal conditions but never sufficient modal conditions (e.g., Kress 1996), of 
plural conceptions under a unifying but still putative concept (e.g., Haack 2004), and so 
on, and on. And, at every scoring of the notion through these structures, extensional 
content is poured in, in theology, Bayesian probability calculus, document design, moral 
philosophy, literary studies, spiritualism, self-help and law. 
3. The Oversight Evidenced 
As might be supposed, in technical subject areas, or in areas of high-value application, 
the pressure to produce a bright-line articulation of coherence ready for use has led to 
coherence as algorithm (exemplary is the work of Paul Thagard 1999; 2000; 2003)) or 
logical device (e.g., Roche 2013). Spohn, for example, provides us with a relatively simple 
elucidation through a number of principles of coherence . Thus he writes: 
I have just argued for a third principle of coherence: (PCo3) For any j  I* and any 
contingent j-proposition B  B there is a I *- {j}-
stable reason for B 
ultimately stable inductive reason. If there are reasons with stronger than ultimate 
- -
of stability do not seem to be required in PCo3 on coherentistic grounds. [Spohn 
2009: 226] 
Whatever this articulates, it is not a principle of COHERENCE as Spohn maintains (rather 
it is, here, a principle of epistemic and explanatory value, as indicated by the focus on 
induction, truth, reason and measurement within the passage). In fact, the phenomenon 
with which I am concerned has generated a rich and diverse literature that runs in style 
from the algorithms of computational theory and notations of symbolic logic to the 
grandly impressionistic and even mystical. Throughout this scope two features can be 
discerned: (i) increasingly rich, detailed and vivid content; and (ii) the disappearance of 
the concept as the explanatory richness increases. Thus we can imagine, in a furious 
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attempt to trace the meaning of COMPLETE through attention to a Mini on a production 
line, all sense of the core notion disappearing in a welter of information concerning the 
form, composition and relations of the multitude of pieces that comprise the finished 
vehicle. The irony is that this project could never begin in the first place unless the 
concept (COMPLETE) had already been grasped at the outset, before ever leaving with 
research funding for the factory. Again, nobody would consider the method for 
COMPLETE, yet everybody has employed it in elucidating COHERENCE. 
Let s begin by coming at the complex phenomenon in a helpfully pared-down 
manner, by attending to one of the few recent examinations of COHERENCE that aims in 
method and ambition to provide a properly general account of the notion in question. 
Such studies have been offered by Ziff (1984a,b), Haack (2004) and others, but I focus 
here on the examination undertaken by Erik Olsson in his paper Cohering With  
(1999). Olsson s study provides a useful focus because in it he aims, following Bender s 
prompt (1989), to start from scratch and try and arrive at a theory that is simple and 
transparent  (Olsson 1999: 275). 
Olsson promisingly takes as his principal task the systematising [of] our intuitions 
of coherence as a relation , but then proposes an analysis according to which a set of 
beliefs, A, coheres with another set, B, if and only if the set-theoretical union of A and 
B is a coherent set  (all, the Abstract at 273). Yet despite the plainly contingent features 
of his approach (i.e. seeking coherence through attention to sets of beliefs), the 
distinctive feature of Olsson s approach remains his attempt to take seriously in analysis 
the core intuitions on which his proposal rests. To this end he places considerable weight 
on analysis of just what it means to say that A coheres with B  (at 275). The trouble is, 
he never gets near to an answer. 
Having canvassed ordinary situations (e.g., a sofa s aesthetic fit with other 
furniture), Olsson notes: A 
coheres with B  expresses that A somehow fits coherently together with B  (ivi: 275). But 
this claim is nowhere near as illuminating of COHERENCE as Olsson imagines. To see 
this, consider the easy way in which the supposedly core idea of [coherence] can be 
substituted for other notions within the relevant proposition: e.g., A is [consistent] with 
B expresses that A somehow fits [consistently] together with B . The capacity of 
consistency to substitute for COHERENCE in the relevant expression immediately begins to 
unsettle the significance of Olsson s conclusions, in which the central informative claim 
is that cohering with  is a species of fitting with  (ivi: 276). But as it now appears that 
consistency is a species of fitting with  too, we may begin to wonder how far this set 
extends, and whether much is shown about COHERENCE by attention to it. However, 
the problems besetting Olsson s analysis are much greater than this. 
To see the wider problems it is important to notice how easily further, more 
colorful, substitutions can be made. Thus, again following Olsson carefully (he writes of 
a sofa fitting beautifully with a living-room at 276): A is [beautiful] with B expresses that A 
somehow fits [beautifully] together with B . The ready intelligibility of this new 
substitution is a serious worry for Olsson s project, for whilst coherent  and consistent  
can reasonably be individuated as species of fitting with , beautiful cannot. We can now 
perceive that, rather than providing us with the desired analysis of just what it means to 
say that A coheres with B  (my italics), the features elicited by Olsson in fact amount only 
to an extended - though unwitting - articulation of the conjunction -with  and any 
conjunct proposition of which it is a part.  
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Because of his method, Olsson tells us little that is illuminating about 
COHERENCE itself, for everything he imputes to the notion can be ascribed to the 
conjunction. This is bad for Olsson s stated project, but it is illuminating about his 
deeper theoretical values and concerns. Indeed, his attention throughout the paper to 
notions of aesthetic judgment through the idea of relation is interesting and conceptually rich 
(see also Ziff 1984 a&b). 
The remarks above are only preliminary, showing that results about coherence 
that are intended to be simple and transparent can fail to meet their mark. More 
significantly, Olsson s mode of analysis presages the oversight that I claim to be present 
in all of the relevant literature, for though he imagines that his paper elicits helpful detail 
about cohering with , his enquiry elicits information in almost every way except that 
concerning the core concept itself. Thus COHERENCE persists only as a phantom 
presence throughout Olsson s paper, as it does through the rest of the literature too. 
A clear example of the phenomenon is provided in Laurence BonJour s influential 
coherentist monograph The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, in particular where the author 
writes under the sub-heading The Concept of Coherence : 
What, then, is coherence? Intuitively, coherence is a matter of how well a body of 
beliefs hangs together : how well its component beliefs fit together, agree or 
dovetail with each other, so as to produce an organized, tightly structured system 
of beliefs, rather than a helter-skelter collection or a set of conflicting 
such topics as explanation, confirmation, probability, and so on, may be reasonably 
taken to provide some of the ingredients for a general account of coherence. But 
the main work of giving such an account, and in particular one which will provide 
some relatively clear basis for comparative assessments of coherence, has scarcely 
been begun, despite the long history of the project. [1985: 93-94] 
However, the production of the general account sought by BonJour is frustrated 
immediately by his opening intuition  that coherence is a matter of how well a body of 
beliefs hangs together . Significantly, BonJour does not consider whether coherence 
might intuitively be cast wider than a hanging together of beliefs alone: his opening 
intuition simply hangs there, without reflection. This is unfortunate, because under the 
narrowness of this intuition other uses of coherence (- of sentences, narratives, art 
exhibitions, and so on) amount either to misapplications of the concept or suggest that 
there are different kinds or types of coherence  and so many of these, perhaps, that it 
becomes impossible to speak meaningfully about coherence  across the range of its use. 
What is more, by committing the meaning of coherence to features of a body of beliefs 
BonJour consigns his articulation of coherence to the complexity and dispute that has 
attached to that object, particularly as he intuits coherence to be a matter of how well  
the object hangs together. In this manner BonJour makes the pursuit of coherence co-
extensive with the pursuit of epistemic value, and so it is little surprise to discover that 
this project is presently incomplete and a matter of heated division11. Indeed, BonJour 
proceeds, over the next ten pages (and on into his work of the subsequent two decades), 
to attempt to articulate coherence through attention to all of the fractious and most 
beguiling features of his wider topic field, before finally abandoning epistemic 
coherentism because of the elusiveness of its core concept, by 2005. 
                                                 
11 These ideas repeat Pethick (2014: 121). 
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BonJour goes wrong by his own lights in the attempt to analyze coherence 
without any concern about, deliberation of, or even attention to, distinctions between 
this abstract general predicate and features of the object(s) instantiating it. In this way 
BonJour s stated project, of providing a general account of coherence, is meekly 
surrendered from the outset, though its passing appears to have been noticed by no-
one. Perhaps more significantly however, the oversight condemns even the instantiated 
notion to failure, as BonJour is thereby prompted to hunt for his idea of COHERENCE 
through all of the well-worn topic areas of epistemology (i.e., explanation, confirmation, 
probability, and so on) with no idea of how coherence should be dug out of the various 
topics listed, and with little awareness that the coherence  in question is merely a 
mirror-reflection of the standing predispositions, concerns and preoccupations that 
draw the scope of his own topic area. 
BonJour had already presaged his eventual failure in the introduction to his 
treatment of coherence in 1985, writing at p.93 that, A fully adequate explication of 
coherence is unfortunately not possible within the scope of this book (nor, one may 
well suspect, within the scope of any work of manageable length) . Not only is this 
conclusion predictable in view of the oversight I claim exists, but it was in turn already 
presaged in the work of another writer, philosopher Laurence Margolis, in his paper The 
Locus of Coherence one year earlier (Margolis 1984). 
Margolis notices that most writers assume that mere consistency is insufficient to 
furnish an accurate account of coherence, and observes that Nicholas Rescher and 
others presume that another characteristic is required  the feature of being connected 
in some special way  (ivi: 27). Drawing on Rescher s seminal work from 1973 (Rescher 
1973) Margolis comments that the special  connection required links consistency 
pragmatically with our affective (specifically, non-cognitive) life. Margolis then draws a 
conclusion on the basis of his expansive survey of supposedly relevant features: the 
informal survey we have made of a rather wide range of contexts of coherence shows, 
in a strongly convergent respect, that the relevant regard in which consistency is 
connected in some special way cannot be satisfied by any condition less than that of 
fitting a reasonable model of the rationality of human thought and action  (Margolis 
1984: 27). Looking back at the survey itself we find Margolis asserting that context is 
the clue  (ivi: 22), picking through a set of dreams, thoughts, plans, endeavors, theories, 
stories, paintings, statements, u  
(ibidem), before finally concluding that, 
before attempting to appraise such competing models we should first ascertain the 
conceptual locus of ascriptions of coherence themselves. And that we have now 
done. [ivi: 27] 
 As Bonjour s contemporaneous - and later - study suggests, however, in this 
manner no book (or research programme) could ever be long enough to pick out the 
desired conceptual locus  of coherence sufficiently well to enable the notion s 
application in the desired settings. Indeed, Margolis throws the quest for the concept so 
wide that everything he values tumbles in; so it is with BonJour, and so throughout the 
literature. 
BonJour and Margolis are philosophers whose principal interest is in 
epistemology, and though this subject is of direct relevance to law it does not take law 
as its chief concern. However, theorists who do invoke COHERENCE in legal theory 
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display the same qualities of the oversight. Thus we can reflect on Ken Kress s 
compendious treatment of coherence and law in his chapter entry Coherence  (1996), in 
which his attempt to articulate coherence over many pages can be read in the 
alternative, without any alteration, as an extended essay on what Kress thinks law is.  
Kress s treatment is counterpart to that shown in the analytic philosophy, almost 
immediately and inadvertently construing coherence in wide terms that overshoot the 
asserted modal boundaries of his orthodox conceptual analysis to embrace all of the 
many teeming concerns of his primary focus. He begins in unambiguous and disciplined 
manner, setting out his aim on his first page (i.e., 533): Attention is next focused on the 
concept of coherence itself , before observing: 
Three candidates for necessary requirements of coherence  consistency, 
comprehensiveness, the right answer thesis  are acknowledged to enhance 
coherence despite not being, at least generally, required for it. Seven techniques for 
enhancing coherence by eliminating or resolving conflicts among principles and 
counter-principles are described. The core concepts of coherence, monism and 
unity, are then examined. A taxonomy of monisms and unities is developed which 
employs the seven techniques to characterize degrees of coherence in normative 
theories. [1996: 533] 
Here, then, Kress takes us by turns through a modal analysis (compassing necessities 
and requirements of the concept) to an ever-proliferating set of (exemplary?) instances ( a 
taxonomy of monisms and unities ), where this proliferation is still bounded by the 
corners of Kress s central concern, law. Thus the monisms and unities  in question are, 
for Kress, those that bear on political and moral justifications for law and legal force. 
Thus he states that To understand coherence in law, techniques thought to promote 
coherence, or properties or states thought to be aspects of, explanations of, or to be 
necessary or sufficient for coherence, will be examined  (ivi: 539-540). This is the 
precursor for the detail of his method, revealed in the next sentence: 
The discussion will focus on justificatory coherence within normative theory, 
particularly ethics and law, although concepts more appropriate to the theory of 
knowledge will be discussed in passing. The primary aim is to serve as background 
for the later taxonomy of coherence in normative theory, although much of what 
is said here applies more generally. [ivi: 540] 
Kress s attempt to elucidate the concept itself , employing the modal method of 
analytic philosophy, finally results in such a colourful proliferation of topics that Kress 
resolves only to address coherence in normative theory . Yet even here, within this 
prescribed subset, Kress accepts the need for reserve, warning that, 
The remarks that follow are not intended to be a complete and final definition of 
coherence in normative theory. Coherence is much too difficult a concept for that. 
There is a range of conceptions of coherence, not just one. What is offered here is 
the first approximation of a taxonomy of conceptions of coherence. [ivi: 543]  
Such a range of conceptions of coherence is a feature of the literature in law, as 
elsewhere, and has continued to be a core aspect of coherence theorizing in the period 
since Kress s work.  
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Thus we might reflect on Neil MacCormick s early analysis of coherence (1984), 
noting that he flies immediately to kinds of coherence in his treatment - commenting on 
normative and narrative coherence in relation to law. But as it is never made clear by 
MacCormick which features of the subsequent analysis are owed to coherence, and 
which to norms and narratives, disambiguation of the core notion is overthrown by 
contingency. And we might reflect on the proliferation of kinds of coherence relevant to 
law since MacCormick s introductory essay, for under the mistake in question the analysis 
of the notion into kinds naturally proliferates into whole series of distinguishable 
coherence relations, breeding complexity and dissent as they multiply. So where 
MacCormick opens by identifying normative coherence as a discrete kind of coherence, 
another theorist might push this line of analysis further and discover that normative 
coherence in law presents a further discrete kind (e.g., Kress at 537-543) and so on, 
presumably ad infinitum. Significantly then, in 10 Theses on Coherence in Law  (Amaya, 
2013), Amalia Amaya, invoking Paul Thagard s analysis, comes to identify eight kinds of 
coherence relevant to law (i.e. factual, normative, explanatory, analogical, deductive, 
perceptual, conceptual, and deliberative), noting each kind requires different sorts of 
elements and constraints  (at 2). However, right at the start of her treatment Amaya 
accedes to a difficulty: it is also unclear how one may integrate the different kinds of 
coherence in order to give a solution to a legal problem  (4-5). This problem is 
substantial (and not without irony) but under my rubric can be understood simply as the 
problem to be had in integrating aspects of concepts with aspects of perception, facts with 
norms, explanation with deduction, and so on through all logical combinations. Notice, 
however, that my analysis suggests another unintended extension of the core concept, 
even though it goes unnoticed in Amaya s commentary. This is the question, prompted 
by the oversight, of whether there might even be more than the eight kinds of coherence 
that she identifies, relevant to law.  
This problem is well understood by Thagard himself, as he writes in the 
monograph to which Amaya principally refers: Given the above discussions of 
explanatory, deductive, analogical, and perceptual coherence, the reader might now be 
worried about the proliferation of kinds of coherence: just how many are there?  (2000: 
60). Thagard answers his own question in one sentence, writing, I see the need to 
discuss only one additional kind of coherence, conceptual, that seems important for 
understanding human knowledge  (ibidem). It is interesting to notice that the rest of 
Thagard s commentary on the existence of kinds of coherence is limited to (i) 
distinguishing between them (e.g., at 65), and (ii) speculating about their integration 
(e.g., at 169). Under my analysis, however, it is the worry about proliferation, so quickly 
passed over by Thagard himself, where his thesis is most obviously under pressure. 
The spectre that presents itself is nothing less than theoretical collapse, for 
presumably anyone advocating the existence of kinds (or types or concepts) of 
coherence must account for the distinction between such kinds , etc., and particular 
instances of coherence in order to support their contention; after all, the meaning(s) of 
coherence are still reserved to kinds, types or concepts here, rather than a multiplicity of 
individuals. Yet an articulation of this central commitment is absent in Thagard and 
throughout the literature. As a result, the standard analysis of coherence into kinds 
inevitably presents under scrutiny as intuitive and underdetermined, whilst further 
attempts to pin down the required detail have thereby ended in the conclusion recently 
advocated by Olsson (2005), in turn interpreting Ewing (1934) constructively,  
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that defining coherence is logically impossible, that there is no formula or statement, 
however long, which could do the job adequately. Thus understood, [Ewing] is 
maintaining that there is no systematic account of coherence, and the best we can 
do is restrict ourselves to examples. [2005: 137]  
But this conclusion is merely the result of the oversight in question, in which the 
elision of intension with extension inevitably terminates in a beguiling multiplicity of 
coherence-instances, reflected with dazzling clarity in the surface of the pool. 
This is the fate stalking Amaya s analysis too. Because her concern is not human 
knowledge but deliberation in law, she immediately adds to Thagard s kinds of 
coherence, contributing the two kinds of legal coherence  that we find in her paper. 
And in the detailed working of her thesis at this point we can perceive the further 
impulse to instantiate the kinds of coherence  concerned. Thus, in the course of 
summing factual coherence  Amaya writes: 
Explanatory coherence is the most important kind of coherence in a theory of 
evidentiary judgments in law. In addition to the positive and negative constraints 
established by the principles of explanatory coherence, it is necessary to add some 
constraints to account for the fact that the evaluation of explanatory hypotheses in 
law takes place within a highly institutionalized context. More specifically, the 
presumption of innocence may be treated as a constraint that requires that 
hypotheses compatible with innocence be given priority in being accepted and the 
reasonable doubt standard requires that the guilt hypothesis be accepted only if its 
degree of justification is sufficiently high to meet this standard (2013: 245).  
Amaya does not tell us whether these additional constraints constitute additional 
kinds of coherence (consider: institutional coherence , or even, common law adversarial 
criminal-trial coherence ), but certainly they would seem - at least to any lawyer - to 
provide sets of elements and constraints sufficient to warrant the status. And if these, 
then perhaps further kinds  imagine criminal appellate court due-process coherence; 
and so on and on. Of course, Amaya s nuanced analysis deserves much further study 
than this (and indeed, I begin to offer this elsewhere (Pethick 2014)), but it is now useful 
to turn from philosophy and law to another discipline altogether, to show the broad 
scope of the oversight in question. 
I now turn to linguistics, in which it is helpful in opening to present a significant 
passage provided by Wolfgang Bublitz: 
[In] 1976 coherence was regarded or even dismissed as a vague, fuzzy and rather 
mystical notion  (Sinclair 1991: 102) with little practical value for the [linguistic] 
analyst. However, the past two decades have seen a considerable shift in 
orientation and, in particular, a fundamental rethinking of the concept of 
coherence. The amazing number of well over four hundred books and papers 
listed in the general bibliography, which concludes this volume, bears witness to 
this intriguing development and rapidly changing scene in coherence research over 
the last twenty years. Evidently, coherence has found its place as a key concept, 
perhaps even the key concept, in discourse and text analysis. [1999: 1] 
At the beginning of this period, in a 1985 collection, Horanyi analysed a variety of 
visual texts (including paintings, cartoons and photographs) in an attempt to determine 
what made each coherent, and this led him to conclude that coherence is quite [a] 
complex bundle of concepts, and there is no answer to the question: when is a text 
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coherent?, because only the following question can be answered: when is a text coherent 
hic et nunc? And among the answers for these questions, there is no one single desirable 
or proper use of the term coherent . . .  (1985: 575-6). 
But under the now familiar retreat to hic et nunc (pace Ewing, Ollson), there is no 
possibility of finding a general and precise understanding of coherence to satisfy 
supporters and detractors alike. Moreover, it might be expected that the research 
method would result in the proliferation of coherence relations , as investigators attach 
to coherence itself features of the supposedly coherent thing that they currently 
investigate. Indeed, this is exactly what has happened. 
Thus Andrew Kehler notes that, regarding the possible ways in which a set of 
utterances can be connected to form a coherent discourse , 
Several researchers have in fact attempted such a characterization, in which a set of 
connections is enumerated as a list of coherence relations (Halliday and Hasan 1976, 
Hobbs 1979, Longacre 1983, Mann and Thompson 1987, Polanyi 1988, Hobbs 
1990, inter alia; see also Hovy (1990) for a compendium of over 350 relations that 
have been proposed in the literature). [2002: 3]  
Strikingly, Kehler then pursues this list of coherence relations  as part of a theory 
of COHERENCE, contrasting it with his own more economical theory of coherence  (p.4 
and thereafter), itself derived from Hume s analysis of relations. But as Kehler notes (at 
p.3), 350 is not the high-water mark in the project to catalogue relations of coherence, 
for some researchers have suggested that the set of coherence relations is open-ended: 
Mann and Thompson claim that their [coherence] relations are suitable for 
describing a large and varied set of texts, but ultimately suggest that the set is open 
to extension: There are no doubt other relations which might be reasonable 
constructs in a theory of text structure; on our list are those which have proven the 
most useful for the analysis of the data that we have examined . 
So, not only does coherence retreat into a baffling variety of coherence relations 
hic et nunc, but it is also found (at least by Mann and Thompson) to be sufficiently open-
ended to allow the theorist to select the specific coherence relations for their method 
that seem to suit the analysis of data best. This would appear to throw the understanding 
of coherence so wide that there is no prospect of comparing - or speaking meaningfully 
about - coherence relations across the range of their use. Indeed, Kehler recoils at the 
position taken by Mann and Thompson, though only on the ground that they take 
coherence relations to extend to a potentially unbounded set: 
scientific theory of relations, it cannot be up to us to concoct 
them for our own purposes  our job instead is to uncover the pre-existing ground 
truth. On scientific grounds, it is difficult to see how an unconstrained and 
potentially unbounded catalog of relations could give rise to an explanatory 
account of coherence. [ivi: 25] 
But significantly, what Kehler misses, even in the criticism of Mann and 
Thompson, is that no catalogue of relations could provide an explanatory account of 
coherence  where the enquiry only catalogues what is required in order for particular 
objects to possess coherence. This problem in the deep method persists whether a 
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theorist embraces an open set of coherence relations (Mann and Thompson), or 
determines that 350 exist (Hovy), or finds that there are only 3 (Kehler s own view).  
4. Extolling the Oversight 
The oversight I pick out has led to immense frustration on the part of those theorists 
who desire to put COHERENCE to use, in law as elsewhere. The frustration and worry is 
easy to discern, and appears as a motif through the relevant writings and their ambition: 
coherence , of hanging together , 
of making sense . [MacCormick 1984] 
 A better account of coherence is beyond any doubt something devoutly to be 
sought. [BonJour 1985]
The concept of coherence and its practical utility in reference to the legal system 
and legal argumentation are still very far from showing unanimity and precision of 
 
Coherence has had a considerable appeal in legal, moral and political philosophy as 
of coherence is often misunderstood. [Rodriguez-Blanco 2001] 
Legal coherence, one would have thought, must be shared as a universal aspiration 
coherence  requires, 
however, is immensely controversial. [Morgan 2004] 
[I aim to consider] the many roles played by some of the many concepts of the 
coherence family. Concepts  in the plural; for coherence  has a whole raft of 
meanings, distinct though sometimes subtly related, and is applied to a whole 
 
Coherence is a more complex, more ubiquitous, and in many ways less accessible 
phenomenon than our intuitions and scholarship ever led us to believe. [Columb 
and Griffin 2004] 
Coherence is not one thing. That doesn t make it incoherent, although it rules out 
a conceptual definition. [Barry Allen 2004] 
However, despite these and a multitude of other, similar comments, there is value 
to be had in the residue of the oversight. In relation to the analytic-minded legal 
philosophers (such as MacCormick, Kress and Amaya) it has caused the production of a 
rich literature that reflects deeper commitments and understandings concerning the 
theorist s primary object, be that the legal system, or the determination of a legal rule, or 
making a finding of fact on a disputed point at trial. Perhaps most striking is these 
theorists  impulse not to be constrained in their summing of coherence within their 
domains and topic fields, despite the strictures of the analytic method with which they 
associate. So despite their own calls for a general, precise and clear account of the 
concept itself , and despite their attempts to impose the order of necessary and 
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sufficient modal conditions on coherence, the supposedly core notion is constantly lost 
amongst the swirl of features that are contingent, contextual and appealing. 
I am not suggesting for a moment that the literature provides evidence of the 
failure of the post-Fregean analytic project (with which I associate), though of course 
the evidence could be treated that way - certainly theorists have found it difficult to 
constrain their analyses of COHERENCE, at least, within the precise modal form that so-
called Anglo-American philosophy typically demands. But regardless of the wider point, 
the writings themselves provide a valuable resource within their relevant topic fields, 
offering up a liberation from the orthodox topics on the prescribed subject list. Thus we 
have, through the prism of Herbert s unsettled point of neuralgia , attention to morality, 
memory, love, narrative, utterance, monisms and unities, and so on. We also find a 
celebration of connections, each of which, having been stated, deserves to be explored. 
So if Kress imagines that one kind of coherence  has to do with power and law, then 
this should be a prompt to further investigation, perhaps exploring the relation between 
power and knowledge, or power, knowledge and law, and so on. In fact, having 
articulated coherence in such an accidental manner, the theorists concerned would, 
presumably, have to raise a special argument why, once said, the richness they describe 
should be excluded from consideration of law, or evidence, or reason. This insight 
works in another way too, for the corners of their elucidation of coherence would seem 
to map the subject with which they are really concerned  and though this may look like 
law, or legal reason etc., at the outset, careful consideration of their analysis might begin 
to show other interests emerging, subtly different from their stated concerns. 
My suggestion is that the present foregrounding of COHERENCE in legal theory 
will have promoted, as a lasting if invisible legacy, an interest in and attention to matters 
hitherto considered contingent and extraneous within orthodox legal thought. So Paul 
Thagard s attempts to provide computational algorithms for kinds of coherence  over 
the last two decades may have as their success not a sharper concept of coherence, but 
an acceptance of excluded topics within the traditional legal domain. Thus the success 
of his paper Why wasn t OJ convicted? Emotional coherence in legal inference  
(appearing in the journal Cognition and Emotion, 2003), might lie just in the attention to 
emotion in legal inference, and not to COHERENCE at all. A similar prospect presents 
itself through the more recent work of Amalia Amaya (who uses Thagard s ideas as a 
starting point). Her monograph The Tapestry of Reason: an enquiry into the nature of coherence 
and its role in legal argument (2015) contains, on my account, almost nothing dedicated to 
the nature of coherence, but every page presents a rich resource in the connections, 
contingencies and accidents that colour her primary focus. 
The prospects are heralded from Amaya s first page onwards, writing of her topic 
(in now familiar fashion) on page 1 of her Introduction: 
First, coherence is an elusive notion, and there is a need to further clarify how 
coherence should be understood for the purposes of legal justification.  
We might ask, in similar fashion, how complete  should be understood for the 
purposes of jigsaws (etc.), but it would be better to ask what is required of a jigsaw in 
order to satisfy the predicate. Be that as it may, Amaya s instantiated and contingent 
sense of coherence then runs through 500 pages, leading from her idea (for example, on 
page 12) that hers is an idea of the concept of legal coherence  (my italics). Indeed, each 
of her chapter headings provides an indication of the corners of her idea of law, 
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knowledge, moral truth and finally rationality itself  reflecting at greater length aspects 
of the rest of the literature in doing so. 
In the first line of her conclusion, at page 551, Amaya writes, This book has 
scrutinized the concept of coherence from a variety of perspectives . In fact, under my 
analysis, the concept of coherence is never scrutinized by Amaya at all, but really acts as 
a silent cypher in the celebration of the perspectives themselves. For Amaya, these 
perspectives include the traditional topics in epistemology and jurisprudence, but go 
further too, to embrace psychoanalysis, virtue ethics, and more. This celebration of 
connection stands, even if the prompt to its creation is abandoned. 
5. Conclusion 
If one thing can be discerned amongst the many treatments of coherence across 
domains and within them, it is discord, confusion and dissent. But perhaps a first step 
towards resolving these frustrations is to acknowledge that the commitments at stake 
are contingencies, bound to context and not to the nature of the concept itself. So it may 
be with harmony too, though perhaps that concept has benefitted from its less 
prominent treatment within technical literature. The paper has compassed reason and 
emotion, law, conflict and harmony, with this last engaged through its analogue of 
coherence. Memory and oblivion have, however, been conspicuous by their absence, 
and this calls for a return to Narcissus. 
In his Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis Freud asserts that the oblivion of sleep is 
a narcissistic state: In the sleeper the primal state of distribution of the libido is restored 
 total narcissism, in which libido and ego-interest, still united and indistinguishable, 
dwell in the self-sufficing ego . Regardless of whether Freud is right about sleep, the 
ponderous longing of Narcissus at his pool warns us to be on our guard: if we remain 
entranced by the notion of coherence, in which each perceives aspects of their own 
theoretical desire, our enterprise will succumb to Narcissus s fate. Our gaze, in short, 
will remain upon the asymptote of our own predispositions and attitudes, always 
beguiling, yet always out of reach, channeling our intellectual resources into an 
engagement that can never be realized. If, however, we recall what is really essayed in 
our enterprise we can move forward, with a better grasp of the contingencies of our 
own theoretical assumptions and interests. This is the hope, at least, in extolling the 
literature that remains once the oversight I pick out has been cleared away. 
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The contribution of literature to the quest for 
the right answer  
Fernando Armando Ribeiro   
Abstract: In this paper we intend to investigate how literature can effectively contribute to overcome 
problems and contradictions brought about by Law, mostly by legal positivism. Through this, we try to 
show firstly, how literature can diminish the abstractionism and conceptualism that permeates Law. 
Developing the capacity to identify and more deeply understand the complexity and diversity of human 
being, literature contributes to the materialization of our relations with the world, allowing for a better 
acceptance of pluralism. Moreover, we will verify whether it is possible to extract normative concepts 
from literary narratives, that ends up permeating public rationality and judicial decisions. We also try to 
demonstrate the convergence between hermeneutics and literature, and to prove how literature can 
contribute in the strengthening of our interpretive skills with considerable gain for the enforcement of the 
law. Thus, the concept of judicial impartiality should be explored from the perspective of the judicious 
spectator  (Nussbaum 1995), this rich, real and democratic hermeneutic vector that literature allow us to 
develop. Literary contribution becomes of fundamental importance so that the judicial decision can be 
based upon concrete historical parameters. At the same time it can be delimited by normative guidelines 
that are in fact re-signified and deeply understood in light of the concrete cases taken seriously. The quest 
for the right answer  (Dworkin 2006) therefore becomes widely strengthened by contributions brought 
by literature. 
 
Key-words: Literature; Judicial decision; Hermeneutics; Right answer 
1. What can Law learn from literature? 
The analysis of Law from a literary point of view can contribute to a closer approach to 
the contemporary project of legal Science, thus overcoming a dogmatic and norma-
tivistic vision of the legal phenomena. The purpose of this paper is to show it inserted 
into the dynamics of life, the only one capable to present the correct meaning of the 
norms, according to the contemporary legal philosophers. It also opens space for a 
permanent criticism of the legal institutes, through the open dialog with other social 
phenomena and sciences.  
We should never forget that literature also possess a normative sense to be under-
stood. It might lead the readers to act in different ways, adopting certain attitudes, 
choosing with the mind and emotions.  
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One of the main consequences of the literary thought is the ability to develop a 
better understanding and acceptance of alterity. In this case, however, the acceptance of 
the other will not be approached as a mere postulate or an abstract and imperative vec-
tor, but as a consequence of the acute and thriving development of our capacity to rec-
ognize the diversity and richness inherent to human life. There is, therefore, from the 
very beginning, some sort of commitment to concretitude and facticity, since, by means 
of the literature, we are led to identify ourselves with the various characters enacting in 
its plots.  
By reading literature we think and intelligere (intus + legere = read from the inside to 
the outside), and are endowed with a more acute capacity to reflect and analyze than the 
capacity we develop as spectators. The richness of the literary narratives is something 
that demands from the person interpreting them the constructive effort of the sensitive 
understanding, of the construction of horizons in which worlds are really delineated, but 
not simply as the spectrum of its own self. In this sense, Nussbaum states, based on Ar-
istotle, that literature is more philosophical than history, because the latter limits itself to 
showing what occurred, while the former shows things as they could or should occur: 
Unlike most historical works, literary works typically invite their readers to put 
themselves in the place of people of many different kinds and to take on their ex-
periences. In their very mode of address to their imagined reader, they convey the 
sense that there are links of possibility, at least on a very general level, between the 
characters and the reader. The reader s emotions and imagination are highly active 
as a result, and it is the nature of the activity, and its relevance for public thinking, 
that interests me. [Nussbaum 1995: 5] 
2. The convergence of hermeneutics and the literary thought  
Literature has the power to make us wonder how men and women used to and still lead 
lives that are so different to mine, leading us to see that things could always be different. 
This means that literature provides a catalyzing potential for us to reach what Hans 
Gadamer called as historically effective consciousness . 
The analyses conducted for the work Truth and Method brought to surface that un-
derstanding occurs as a result of a hermeneutic dialogue, which entails the fusion be-
tween the horizon of the interpreter and the horizon of the interpreted. According to 
Gadamer, it is in the fusion of horizons that the plenitude of conversation, in which 
something that is not only of my own interest or of the interest of the author but of a 
general interest gains expression  (Gadamer 2006: 484).  
Gadamer comes up with a hermeneutic twist by which it is no longer possible to 
describe the interpretation as the product of a solipsist subject (solus ipsis). In this sense, 
rather than imposing his or her previous understanding of things upon the text, the in-
terpreter should turn a critical eye on it and compare it with the reasonable possibilities 
offered by the context. According to Gadamer:  
it is important to avoid the error of thinking that the horizon of the present con-
sists of a fixed set of opinions and valuations, and that the otherness of the past 
can be foregrounded from it as from a fixed ground. In fact the horizon of the 
present is continually in the process of being formed because we continually have 
to test all our prejudices. [Gadamer, 2006: 305] 
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The truth of a passage does not lie just in its unconditional submission to the au-
thor s opinion, neither in the preconceived ideas of the interpreter, but in the fusion of 
these two horizons. The task of discovery of the truth in the object is of little avail, be-
cause as the man shifts his focus to the object, he is not, truthfully, coming across the 
object alone but the inter-subjective human action reflected in it. In this way, the inter-
pretation rather than being a reproductive process, becomes a necessarily inter-
subjective productive process, once the interpreter does not just reproduces the text, he 
updates it. A historically effective consciousness comes when the subject turns a new 
look onto his/her historical condition. Certain of his/her finite nature, and aware of the 
limitations brought about by the current pre-understandings, the interpreter is led to be 
open to perceive possible contradictions, hesitations and weak points present in the his-
torical consensus shared by the interpreter.  
Gadamer defends the point that we must seek to expand our awareness of the 
pre-understandings generated in the present, which become inherent to our understand-
ing of other temporal and historical dimensions. If such acceptance occurs, the paving 
on the way to our self-understanding will be more solid. When the hermeneutist puts his 
sense of history into action and sees his own preconceptions, which are the result of 
consolidation of die-hard traditions, the desired interpretation is attained. Historical 
consciousness no longer listens with good ears to the voice that comes to him from the 
past, but when he reflects on it, he places it back in the context from which it came, in 
order to see its relative meaning and value. This reflexive behavior in view of tradition 
has been termed as interpretation (Gadamer 2006: 18). 
We think that literature can really add an invaluable look capable of perceiving the 
world in a richer and more real way, allowing us to stand up against our pre-conceived 
ideas and freeing us from our pre-undertsndings. A very important excerpt from Grande 
Sertão: veredas, by Guimarães Rosa seems to translate this lesson from Riobaldo s mouth, 
when he says that: 
Jagunço (a hired gun man) is a man who has given up on himself. [Rosa 2006: 51]1 
A jagunço is this, a jagunço does not crack before loss or defeat  for him almost 
everything is the same. There s nothing like it. For him life is set. Eat, drink, look 
at women, fight and that s it. And doesn t everyone think the same? Even the 
farmers? What they want is thunder in October, the granary full of rice. Everything 
that even me, deprived of it all, had forgotten. [Rosa 2006: 56]2  
Here we see, in the literary construction of this ingenious Brazilian writer, the 
presence of several of the elements built up on hermeneutics. After all, here, Riobaldo s 
wisdom consists in seeking to bypass the pre-understand plot, in which most of the in-
dividuals are entangled. With his acute sense of understanding, he manages to win over 
his fragmentary side, generator of stereotypes. The author is totally aware of the limita-
tions inherent to the jagunço s understanding of himself. In him, the human being as a 
whole, has already withdrawn, leaving behind a traditional conceptualist shared vision: 
                                                 
1 Jagunço é homem já meio desistido por si  51). 
2 Jagunço é isso, jagunço não se escabrêia com perda nem derrota  quase tudo para ele é o igual. Nunca 
vi. Para ele a vida já está assentada. Comer, beber, apreciar mulher, brigar, e o fim final. E todo mundo 
não presume assim? Fazendeiro, também? Querem é trovão em outubro, e a tulha cheia de arroz. Tudo o 
que eu mesmo, do que mal houve, me  (Rosa 2006: 56). 
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man lives to eat, get involved with women, fight and accept death. However, it can be 
noted that this segmentary vision, encaged in stratified pre-understandings is no privi-
lege of the jagunços. Everyone, even the farmers, run the risk of expressing it. Riobaldo s 
deeply human eye, however, manages to set him free from this condition; making it 
possible for him to forget  it, which means to set himself free from it.  
Here we have some sort of approach to daily life and history that is marked by 
particularization and concreteness, which makes it confront directly with the basically 
abstractionist and descriptivist vision, on which the legal science of a positivist bias was 
built. The literary narrative allows us to have a closer and more reflexive contact with 
what is common to us. On the other hand, the particularistic discourse which marks it is 
not independent from rationality, it being just a possible and necessary alternative to 
logical thinking, typical of the sciences of nature  (Naturwissenshaften). All this shows us, 
in a very emphatic way, that rationality should not be made hostage to logic, and that 
the universality of the concept will always be faced with an argumentative context ready 
to re-signify it. What is really sought is to build legal science on a deeply human ground, 
so that its fundaments become more complex and philosophically coherent.  
3. Literature and the expansion of the horizons of our senses 
In this item I would like to depart from quoting two literary excerpts that point to more 
fertile grounds upon which literature can contribute concretely to the application of 
Law. 
You think I dare say, that our chief job is inventing new words. But not a bit of 
it We re destroying words scores of them hundreds of them every day. We re 
cutting the language down to the bone. The eleventh edition of newspeak won t 
contain a single word that will become obsolete before the year of 2050.  
It s a beautiful thing the destruction of words. Of course the great wastage is 
in the verbs and adjectives but there are hundreds of nouns that can be got rid of 
as well. It isn t only the synonyms there are also the antonyms. After all, what good 
is a word that is simply the opposite of some other word? A word contains its op-
posite in itself. Take good for instance. If you have a word for good, what need is 
there for a word like bad? Ungood will do just as well  better because it s an exact 
opposite, which the other is not.  
You don t grasp the beauty of the destruction of words. Do you know that 
newspeak is the only language in the world whose vocabulary gets smaller every 
year? Don t you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of 
thought? In the end, we shall make thought crime literally impossible, because 
there will be no words in which to express it. The revolution will be complete 
when the language is perfect. [Orwell 2013] 
I will also make use of the quote from Dylan Thomas, for whom A good poem is 
a contribution to reality. The world is never the same once a good poem has been added 
to it. A good poem helps to change the shape of the universe, helps to extend every-
one s knowledge of himself and of the world around him  (Thomas 2014). 
This extract of George Orwell s 1984, and the quote from Dylan Thomas are 
deeply connected with some lessons came from philosophical hermeneutics. After all, 
one of the most poignant lessons by Hans Gadamer is that the limits of our world are 
the limits of our language. He states that language is the universal medium in which 
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happens the understanding . Only through the language can we understand. And lan-
guage cannot be understood merely as the description of objects. It is through language 
that we can create and act in the world (Gadamer 2006: 390).  
Not only tradition, but the very nature of linguistic understanding has a funda-
mental relationship with linguistics. As Gadamer points, the world itself is the common 
ground, not trodden by anyone and acknowledged by all, that unites all who speak to 
each other. All forms of community life are forms of linguistic community, and moreo-
ver, are forms of language (Gadamer 2006: 443). The linguistic worldliness of the world 
in which we have been always living is the condition for all of our concepts and 
thoughts. 
Also noteworthy and deserving of reflection is Gadamer s assertion that there is a 
hermeneutic phenomenon, according to which there is no possible enunciation that 
cannot be understood as an answer to a question, and that is the best way it can be really 
understood (Gadamer 2006: 269-271). It is important to mention that the interpretation 
we make of a text is always the result of the dialogue we strike with it, whose conducting 
wire will be the questions we ask to this text, and those we allow it to ask us. In fact, as 
demonstrated by hermeneutics, the questions we ask will only become possible if they 
are based on the pre-understandings that language provides us with. These, in turn, will 
be determined by (and will determine at the same time) the horizons of our world. It is 
important to mention that the way we look at a passage is always the result of a complex 
process by which, crisscrossed by the language that pervades us  with its larger or 
smaller amplitude of senses and significations -, we ask it the questions that the horizon 
of our senses allows us to ask. This is an ontological question. 
In this way, just as what occurs with the aims of Orwellian newspeak, it would be 
exactly the impossibility to formulate any alternative thought, because of the reduction of the hori-
zon of the senses imposed on its speakers, it becomes imperative to recognize that the 
same effect, albeit in the opposite direction, can be offered by literature to the interpret-
ers of Law. Well, if our cognitive filters are determined by our linguistic horizons, it be-
comes evident that a reader who reads only books on management and economics will 
have a totally different outlook on the world and Law from the reader who cultivates a 
wider range of literary works, especially the great literature .  
As demonstrated by Martha Nussbaum, literature will lead the reader to value the 
particularity inherent to each historical context, providing moral development that takes 
into consideration the emotions as an indispensable part of the reader s perception of 
life. In the novel Hard Times, the author narrates a passage in which someone says to 
Sissy that in a huge city of one million inhabitants, only 25 starved in the streets. Instead 
of an answer expressing contentment at such a small number Sissy says: it must be just 
as hard upon those who were starved, whether the others were a million, or a million 
million  (Nussbaum 1995: 68).  
4. Literature and the quest for the right answer  
The reading process is something complex and intricate, and its results are easily identi-
fiable. From the very initial effort to identify with the characters and their points of 
view, moving on to the mental construction of the pictures formed by this whole world 
of words and the dispelling of stereotypes whether they are good or evil, beauty or ugli-
ness, inserted in the narratives. All this conspires to prevent our conception of world 
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from being guided by less centralizing sense vectors. And the apprehension of this 
knowledge does not occur by means of abstract concepts and ideas, but by means of the 
perception of the concreteness and particularity one can only receive from the experi-
ence of reading. This is most probably what led the author Orhan Pamuk, literature 
Nobel Prize, to state that when we read, we understand that it is not only the world, but 
also our minds have more than one centre.  According to the Turkish author: 
The fact that there is no single center became apparent to me when I read literary 
novels and when I saw the world through the eyes of characters who clashed with 
one another. The Cartesian world in which mind and matter, human figures and 
landscapes, logic and imagination are separate and distinct cannot be the world of 
the novel. It can only be the world of a power, an authority who wants to control 
everything  for example, the single-centered world of the modern nation-state. 
More than the passing of an overall judgement on an entire landscape, the task of 
reading a novel is the joy of experiencing every obscure corner, every person, each 
color and shape of the landscape. When we read novel, we devote our primary en-
ergy not to judging the entire text or to logically comprehending it, but to trans-
forming it into pictures, clear and detailed in our imagination, and taking our place 
within this gallery of images, opening our senses to all its many stimuli. [Pamuk 
2011: 1572-1576) 
Here we have one of the most powerful foundations for the construction of this 
new parameter of impartiality, possible to be developed by means of literature; that is, 
the judicious spectator  (Nussbaum 1995). This spectator does not participate, in person, in 
the actions that he witnesses, but takes interest in the participants. He sees the situation 
from a distance that prevents him from having thoughts of his own happiness and safe-
ty. Among his most important moral faculties is the power of imagining vividly what it 
is like to be each of the persons whose situation he imagines  (Nussbaum 1995: 73). 
However, only this compassionate identification with the other is not enough for 
the rationality of the spectator to conform. Evaluation from the outside is also crucial in 
determining the degree of compassion considered rational in a person: 
The compassion of the spectator must arise altogether from the consideration of 
what he himself would feel if he was reduced to the same unhappy situation, and, 
what is perhaps impossible, was at the same time regard it with his present reason 
and judgment. [Nussbaum 1995: 73-74] 
Quoting Adam Smith, Martha Nussbaum sustains that emotions such as fear, 
compassion, anger or happiness are based on reason and judgement . Therefore, the 
point of view of the spectator would be rich in emotions. These emotions are implicit in 
some thoughts considered appropriate to have before what happens to the people 
around us. 
Then, this is the reason why great importance should be placed on literature as a 
source of moral guidance. This is so because reading can be considered a mock substi-
tute for the situation of the judicious spectator, taking us, in a natural way, to assume an 
attitude that characterizes the good judge and the good citizen. On portraying this point 
of view, especially when related to the novel A Hora da Estrela (The hour of the star), by 
observing the narrative of Macabéa and Olímpico, we realize how remarkable the de-
struction of stratified conceptual models is. It allows the reader to broaden their hori-
zons leading them to a better understanding of the world. In this novel, besides having 
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identical backgrounds, since both characters came from the poor Brazilian northeastern 
area, they have completely different personalities. Fragile, humble and innocent, Maca-
béa is a woman who has acquiesced to her insignificance, and has no expectations to be 
recognized for anything in special. Her strongest desires are simple things like having a 
meal at the end of the day, and having someone to love. Olímpico, on the other hand, 
who boasts to be forging in the embers of the strong and to have teeth of iron, took 
great interest in public affairs and dreamt of conquering the world , and one day be-
come a congressman (Lispector 1998). As suggested by Nussbaum, reading the novel 
we can feel in a more balanced way than can either of them, precisely because we are at 
the same time both of them and neither  (Nussbaum 1995: 75). 
This is the reason why Walt Whitman demanded that poets rule the public life of 
the nation. In his work By the blue Ontario s shore he says that only poets are really quali-
fied to enforce codes of practice capable of keeping the states united as a nation, de-
scribing the poet as some sort of judge:  
 
Of these states the poet is the equable man, 
Not in him but off from him things are grotesque, eccentric, fail of their full re-
turn... 
He bestows in every object or quality its fit proportion, neither more, nor less 
He is the arbiter of the diverse, he is the key, 
He is the equalizer of his age and land, ... 
The years straying toward infidelity he withholds by his steady Faith, 
He is no arguer, he is judgement (Nature accepts him absolutely) 
He judges not as the judge judges but as the sun falling round a helpless thing 
He sees eternity in men and women, he does not see men and women as dreams 
and dots. [Nussbaum 1995: 80] 
 
In fact, literature makes judges of us. Our experience as interested readers allows 
the search for the human asset we are looking for in and for the human community. 
What is sought is not just some vision that lends meaning to our personal experience, 
but one that can be defended and reinforced before those with whom we intend to live 
in community. This prevents literature from becoming the ground for extreme freedom 
of interpretative faculties. The reader applies the global meaning of a principle and tradi-
tion to a concrete context. 
The literary judge is committed to what is termed as well understood neutrality. 
This means that he does not accommodate his convictions to pressure groups or does 
special favors to nurture his relationships with them. The judicious spectator will not fall 
prey to irrelevant or unfounded feelings. The fact that he remains neutral does not mean 
that he wants to keep a distance from social realities. He should regard these realities 
with the emotional answers typical of a judicious spectator. 
Literature allows the reader to take part in a variety of lives. These lives that un-
fold consciously in different social stands, and the way the circumstantial arrangements 
shape the events in these lives are fodder that feeds the experience of the reader. Note-
worthy here are Whitman s words as he refers to the poet-judge, saying that a judge 
should not judge someone as mere dreams and dots . And it would be interesting to 
remember that for some theorists of the juridical positivism, people only have a juridical 
sense when conceived as imputation dots , to use the expression coined by Kelsen 
(2015).  
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Distancing is not incompatible with the literary imagination of the judicious read-
er, but this doesn t mean that one should ignore or refuse to recognize the sufferings 
and inequalities that write our history: Literary neutrality, like Whitman s sunlight, like 
the reading of a novel, gets close to people and their actual experience. That is how it is 
able to be fair and to perform its own detached evaluation correctly  (Nussbaum 1995: 
90). 
Literature can contribute to facilitate and rationalize the introjection of moral vec-
tors in Law. This is because the reading experience allows us to have a better under-
standing of the values that pervade history from the perspective of a particularity, lead-
ing us to understand the singular nature of every human life. With this we will improve 
our chances to escape traditional forms of expression of hatred and collective oppres-
sion, usually disguised under the veil of impersonality.  
Moreover, in this way, the quest for recognition, which pervades the Grammar of 
the social actions, becomes faster and more effective. What occurs is that now the stag-
es for the introjections of the values brought about by such efforts can be abridged by 
means of the valorative constructions offered by the literary narrative. The literary expe-
rience, therefore, expands intersubjectivity and as a result the fundaments of the social 
assumptions. Literary reading will, then, allow the axiological vectors to interpenetrate 
the juridical arguments, without them being marked by a mere subjectivism.  
The judge who has developed in a satisfactory way the predicate of the judicious 
spectator  will be more closely protected against the always imminent danger of deci-
sionism. What happens is that the very maintenance of his values will be hit by the con-
crete intersubjectivity found in the literary narratives. They, therefore, play an intrinsical-
ly critical and constructive role, submitting the individual values to the scrutiny of a sub-
tle, autonomous and vigorous self-reflection, by departing from the place and point of 
view of the other.  
Therefore, we start to experience a richer and more truthful understanding, since 
it takes into account, in a very concrete way, the experience of negativity. The fact is 
that real experience rather than confirming our expectations, frustrates them. The nega-
tivity of an experience is something extremely productive, as it contributes to expand 
our knowledge. This reveals itself as essentially dialectic, since it enfeebles previous 
knowledge (without, however, erasing it) and more expanded knowledge is acquired. In 
the Hegelian dialectic analysis, shattered expectations make the consciousness turn to 
itself, making the experience of self-consciousness possible. This is the reason why con-
sciousness inversion could be considered, according to Hegel, as the real essence of ex-
perience (Gadamer 2006: 348). 
 We know that Dworkin s project seems to have undergone a shift since his work 
Justice in robes. This is because it is there that the author starts to recognize that the dif-
ference between rules and principles established since then did not get away with the 
semantic sting  in which so many positivists got entangled. In this sense, in his work Jus-
tice in robes, Dworkin recognised that the idea that Law would be formed by distinct 
normative species, that is, norms and principles, would be nothing more than reasona-
ble elaboration  (Dworkin 2010: 8). Quoting him: 
I may have contributed to the e mistake. In an early essay, I suggested that the 
Law  contains not just rules but certain principles as well. See Taking rights seriously 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1978, Chapter 2.) I quickly corrected 
myself, however. (See ibid, Chapter 3, 76. See also Chapter 8 of this book). 
[Dworkin 2006: 264] 
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My point was not that the Law  contains a fixed number of standards some of which are 
rules and other principles. Indeed I want to oppose the idea that the law  is a fixed set of stand-
ards of any sort. My point was rather that an accurate summary of considerations 
lawyers must take into account, in deciding a particular issue of legal rights and du-
ties would include propositions having the form and force of principles, and that 
judges and lawyers themselves, when justifying their conclusions, often use propo-
sitions which must be understood in that way.  
My target, in other words, was doctrinal, not taxonomic, positivism. I made 
the doctrinal argument that we cannot understand legal argument and controversy 
except on the assumption that the truth conditions of propositions of law include 
moral considerations. I did not mean to make, I said, the fallacious taxonomic ar-
gument that everything that figures among those truth conditions should be 
counted as belonging to a distinct set of rules or principles called legal. [Dworkin 
2006: 234] 
So, if the difference between the types of norms is only effective when we apply 
the definition of community of principles , so essential to the interpretation of Law, 
then a concrete delineation of the normative elements of its historical taxonomy should 
be included. Otherwise we may run the risk of falling back on a real decisionism since 
there will be no axiological or normative linguistic parameters capable of representing 
the historical self-understanding of some society. It means that the literary narrative 
plays a vital role in the maintenance of the Dworkian idea of community of principles  
without the need to resort to some ethos of a communitarist nature, neither to get caught 
in the moralist dimension of subjectivity. After all, literary narrative offers the sophisti-
cated subsidy we need for understanding the world and to lend meaning to the world 
that we can perceive. Therefore, literature presents itself as indispensable to the con-
struction of a real community of principles , in line with Ronald Dworkin s proposal, 
which proves to be of great importance for the attainment of the right answer. 
5. Case study 
On May 5th 2011, the Supreme Federal Court, (STF) the highest court in the Brazilian 
legal system, made the unanimous decision to consider as stable union the relationships 
between people of the same sex. With this, homoaffective unions were no longer con-
sidered a mere de facto union to be treated as a family entity. Based on this decision, ho-
mosexual couples started to have the same rights as heterosexual couples, such as pen-
sion and inheritance in the event of death of one of the partners, sharing of assets and 
alimony in the event of separation. 
 The STF judged the case based on two actions: Direct Action of Unconstitution-
ality (ADI 4277) and a Petition for Certiorari (ADPF 132). 
The result was that the decision of the Supreme Court, the way it was, was only 
possible because of the vital role played by literature and hermeneutic, such as interpre-
tation dimensions that place the interpreter within the world of life, in the arena of his-
tory, and do not treat him as a mere descriptivist spectator.  
 Starting from the cause received from Luis Roberto Barroso - at that time an at-
torney and today Justice of the Supreme Court, representing the Rio de Janeiro gov-
ernment, who took as a basis the fertile literary soil to build the arguments he used in 
the trial. 
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Honorable Justices, what matters in life are the people and things we have affection for. Love 
and search for happiness are at the core of the main philosophical systems and of 
the main religions. A good life is made of our beloved ones, a good life is made of legitimate 
pleasures, a good life is made of our right to seek our own happiness. In 1876 Oscar Wilde 
wrote a very beautiful poem called The Love that dare not speak its name, in which he 
reveals his homosexual passion: Oscar Wilde was sentenced to two year s impris-
onment because of this poem and his sexual preference. In the decade of the 
1970s, an American soldier who had been decorated for fighting in Vietnam, said 
the following when he was expelled from the Armed Forces: for killing two men I re-
 [Brasil, Su-
premo Tribunal Federal 2011] 
Most of the Supreme Federal Court (STF) Justices made use of quotations col-
lected from literature in order to make a decision. By doing this, the Supreme Court Jus-
tices do not disguise their intention to bring to the session the emotions and feelings lit-
erature is capable of evoking. The main point made in this trial, however, is the search 
for the development of a shared feeling of what is fair, one which reflects the commu-
nity of principles  we are. Since the aim of the legal action was to update the legal nor-
mative concepts, the exploitation of the potential injustice in the application of such 
concepts yielded very important results. The singularity inherent to the literary argu-
ments, proved capable of showing the way to the development of a more unbiased jus-
tice, more in line with the life of various (and different) individuals who form the plural-
ist contemporary societies.  
We can live in a passable house, / In a passable street,/ In a passable city, / And 
may even have a passable government./ 
What we cannot, / By any means, / Never, never, / Is love moderately, / Dream 
moderately, / Be a so-so friend,/ [...] Or we will run the risk of becoming a so-so 
person. [Brasil, Supremo Tribunal Federal 2011] 3 
By quoting the poem written by the Brazilian medium Chico Xavier, Justice Car-
los Ayres Britto referred specifically to the need for the equality of rights between het-
erosexual and homosexual couples, which, according to his vote, will only gain a com-
prehensive meaning if it results in the equality of rights subjected to the formation of an 
autonomous family. This being understood as being within the scope of the two typolo-
gies of juridical subjects, independent from any other nucleus and formed, as a rule, by 
the same factual visibility, continuity and durability. Pitiful to consecrate a homoaffec-
tive friendship by half or condemn it to occasional clandestine and underground en-
counters . 
 Justice Cármen Lúcia, another author of a vote stuffed with literary quotes, 
leaned on the words by Guimarães Rosa. In a moment of critical importance, she 
quotes a passage from Grande Sertão: veredas in which Riobaldo joins Diadorim, whose 
identity he still didn t know.  
When something like that happens, we will feel much more what the body is: heart 
h-
                                                 
3 
nenhum,/ É amar mais ou menos,/ É sonhar mai
Supremo Tribunal Federal 2011). 
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ers, of all time, are the hours of the others ... love like that grows first; then it 
sprouts ... life is not too easy to understand. [Brasil, Supremo Tribunal Federal 
2011]4 
Reflecting on this passage that for her was the best synthesis of everything that 
was happening in that session, the Justice added:  
We have to concede that life is not always easy to understand. You can touch life 
without understanding it; you may not make the same choice as the other person; 
you just cannot refuse to accept this choice, especially because that life belongs to 
the other person and his choice does not break the limits of law. Especially as it is 
Law that exists for life, and not life that exists for the Law.  [Brasil, Supremo Tri-
bunal Federal 2011] 
 Finally, in their votes, Justices Cármen Lúcia and Ayres Britto made use of a 
normative concept that is very close to a literary discourse, that is, pluralism. In the per-
ception of the magistrates, political pluralism (normatively inserted in the Brazilian Con-
stitution of 1988) cannot be dissociated from social pluralism. And pluralism, as empha-
sized by Marcelo Galuppo, is a key issue for the democratic configuration of contempo-
rary societies (2001) This will demand openness and acceptance of the different life-
styles people choose to lead, in line with their tendencies and vocations.   
                                                 
4 Enquanto coisa assim se ata, a gente sente mais é o que o corpo a próprio é: coração bem batendo... o 
real roda e põe diante. Essas são as horas da gente. As outras, de todo o tempo, são as horas de todos... 
amor desse, cresce primeiro; brota é de  (Brasil, Supremo Tribunal Federal 
2011). 
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Law and Politics in Plato s Gorgias 
Paulo Roberto Tellechea Sanchotene   
Abstract: Law and legislation are quite relevant to fully grasp the unfolding of the story in Plato s Gorgias. 
They remain in its background up to the end. The juridical aspects of Plato s philosophy emerge to the 
surface from the discussions on politics, ethics and philosophy; and, ultimately, such relations are 
responsible for illuminating the question on the meaning of law. The present work begins presenting a 
kind of display brought up by Socrates in the early stages of the dialogue. There, he makes important 
distinctions between body and soul, the arts and flatteries related to each of them, and the goods they 
aim. He also presents why there are a parallel between all of them, both in form and in substance. Such 
display, although not straightforwardly clear, can be relevant for understanding the dialogue as a whole. 
Regarding to Law itself, according to the display, piety and moderation are the political goods directly 
associated with the art of legislation. Moreover, as the dialogue continues, the differences between 
Callicles and Socrates illuminates lawfulness as the embracive political virtue  a merger between 
moderation, piety and justice. The paper ends addressing the question on what is Law, and how this 
answer is related with Socrates  allegation of him being the only politician of Athens. 
 
Key-words: Plato; Gorgias; Law; Politics; Legislation; Justice; Ethics; Philosophy. 
1. Introduction 
In the Gorgias1, Plato shows lawfulness as being the political virtue, responsible for the 
emergence and preservation of the rule of law. Moreover, he also demonstrates that the 
political role of the philosopher is both to teach such a virtue to the ruling class, i.e., to 
those who make and apply the laws, and to keep them aware of the necessity to nurture 
and practice such virtue. 
The Gorgias was probably written when Plato was in his late thirties. After it, Plato 
went away from Athens for a long period, in a journey to Italy and Sicily. It is only in his 
return to Athens that Plato founded the Academy. The dialogue, thus, marks Plato s 
transition into maturity, his grasp of the fundamental issues that were ravaging his city, 
and the foundation for his main dialogues on political philosophy (Voegelin 2000: 56) 
 that also includes Plato s approach to Law. For instance, Huntington Cairns says that, 
Law was a subject which [Plato] kept constantly before him, and there is scarcely a 
dialogue in which some aspect of it is not treated explicitly. His theory of law is a 
                                                 
 Master in Laws by the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and a Ph.D. Candidate in 
the Political Science Department at the Catholic University of America (CUA). 
97sanchotene@cardinalmail.cua.edu 
1 All quotations come from the English translation made by James H. Nicholson, Jr. Plato. Gorgias. transl. 
James H. Nicholson, Jr. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
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fundamental part of his general philosophy, and it illumines and is illumined by the 
entire Platonic corpus. [Cairns 1942: 359] 
As it is shown below, already in the Gorgias, Plato kept Law constantly before 
him . As murky as the presences of Law and legislation in the dialogue might be, they 
are still there. Moreover, such dimness makes them even more important than one 
would suspect. Although Law and legislation are definetely not everything one can take 
out of the Gorgias, and besides the fact that they are not even the main point of the 
dialogue, they are still inseparable from, and relevant to, it. There is a juridical aspect 
related to the unfolding of the story, with both Law and legislation remaining in its 
background up to the end. By looking the dialogue through such juridical lenses, Plato s 
theory of law within it becomes clearer; which gives another dimension to dialogue 
itself. 
Furthermore, there is a practical lesson to be learned from the obscure presence 
of Law and legislation, since it means that their relevance and meaning can be extracted 
even when they seem to have disappeared from the horizon. The juridical aspects of 
Plato s philosophy present in the dialogue emerge to the surface from the discussions 
on politics, ethics and philosophy. Ultimately, the relationships between them are 
responsible for illuminating the question on the meaning of Law as a whole. 
The present work is divided in four parts. First, there is a presentation of the 
distinctions between body and soul, arts and flatteries, brought up by Socrates in a kind 
of display at the beginning of the dialogue. Such display is taken as key to understand 
the dialogue as a whole. Then, the point becomes showing that the display has piety and 
moderation as political goods directly related to the art of legislation. After that, the focus 
shifts to the differences between Callicles and Socrates and how their clash illuminates 
lawfulness as the embracive political virtue. Finally, the question on what is Law is 
addressed through its relation with Socrates  claim of being the only politician of 
Athens. 
2. The Display: the arts and flatteries of body and soul 
Amidst a debate with Gorgias and Polus, Socrates is asked to clarify his position on 
Rhetoric as a sort of flattery, a false art, unintelligible (Gorgias, 465a). His position is 
strong on the subject; at least, on that part of the dialogue. Later on, he admits the 
possibility of a good Rhetoric (Ibid., 503a), but not in a way to contradict his older posi-
tion. It would remain being flattery, however conduct toward a good. 
In order to explain what he meant by such distinction between arts and flatteries, 
he presents a kind of display, where he establishes comparisons between rhetoric and 
other kinds of flatteries, in opposition to related arts. 
2.1 The Dichotomic Structure of the Display 
Socrates begins by pointing out the arts. For him, there is an art related to the body, and 
other, to the soul. Both, in turn, can be divided in two subordinated arts. The art of the 
soul, he calls it politics, and it is divided in legislation and justice; the art of the body, un-
named, is divided in gymnastics and medicine. He, then, states that legislation is to gymnas-
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tics what justice is to medicine. Of those, legislation and gymnastic are ordering arts, 
while justice and medicine are corrective arts. Those are arts because they aim toward 
what is good. 
Socrates follows by presenting a similar display of flatteries. Those flatteries are 
not arts, but experiences. The flattery of the soul, also without a name, is divided in two 
subordinated kinds, sophistry and rhetoric; the one of the body, nameless as well, is into 
cosmetics and cookery. As on the arts, they also related to one another: sophistry to cos-
metics; and rhetoric to cookery. 
Using the classification of the subordinated arts in ordering and correctives, it is 
possible to call the subordinated flatteries as deranging and perverting, respectively. 
They are not arts because their goal is pleasure, not any good. Therefore, the display as a 
whole is related in a series of opposites: legislation and sophistry; justice and rhetoric; 
gymnastic and cosmetics; medicine and cookery. The whole display seems to be 
perfectly balanced this way. 
2.2 Problems within the Display 
However, after a closer inspection, this balance should be questioned. There is a se-
ries of oddnesses that demand analysis before concluding the display is fully dichotom-
ic. The first oddity that emerges from the display is actually not in it. The figure of the 
politician, as the artist, craftsman of the soul is there, but the philosopher is not. Philos-
ophy is nowhere to be seen, at least, apparently. What this could mean? 
Does philosophy has nothing to do with it, and that is why it is not mentioned? 
O r , maybe it has everything to do with it, so there is no necessity to bring it up? 
Or would philosophy be disguised under the name of politics? In order to answer those 
questions, it is necessary to go beyond the display itself, but without losing the sight of 
it. 
The second oddity is the fact that there is no counterpart to the politician. The 
balance of the display is only achieved after the presentation of the subordinated arts 
and flatteries. According to Socrates exposition, only the arts of the soul have a real 
embracive art. The others do not seem to be subordinated to anything at all. But why 
is that? What does politics have differently from the others to be a special case? If 
politics has no counterpart, how does it relate with the flatteries of the soul? Here, as 
well, the display alone does not permit any answer to those questions. 
The third problem is the fact that, while the political arts point toward a collec-
tive or social dimension of the human being, the corporeal arts  and all the flatteries  
focus on a individual or personal dimension. Since the flatteries are experiences, according 
to Socrates, this should not be a surprise; all experiences are personal. 
However, the corporeal arts are not experiences. Still, they seem to point to a dif-
ferent dimension as the political ones. While gymnastics refer to the physical exercise of 
one body, and medicine to the healing of one diseased body, legislation is always general2, 
and justice is always relational3. 
                                                 
2 If it were particular, it would be an order, not a rule. That is, for instance, the problem in the core of 
command theories of law, since they would necessarily negate the rule of law. For more on this problem 
of generality of law, see Voegelin (1991: 55-59) 
3 There is nothing just per se. The debate on the Gorgias serves as an example, since it is centered not in 
something abstract as , but on the difference of perpetrating injustice or suffering 
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These problems seem to point to the question on how the parallel between the 
arts of the body and the arts of the soul would work in accordance with the display. It 
could be said that there are more than one possibility, but they do not seem to contra-
dict one another. 
3. Ordering Political Virtues: equivalence in the arts of body and soul 
As it was said above, there is one art of the soul, politics, but no art of the body. Alt-
hough Socrates says there is one, he is incapable of naming it. That seems to imply that 
he hypothetically believes it is possible, but he does not know it. Therefore, their 
equivalence is only established after their respective division on subordinated arts. 
However, even then, the political arts are social while the corporeal ones are personal. 
These features did not stop Socrates to state their parallelism, though.  
The answer to why he did not can be given twofold, with both parts complement-
ing each other and bringing forth that the good intended by the arts of the soul is virtue; 
more precisely, the virtues of piety and moderation. 
3.1 Piety: the different dimensions of Body and Soul 
The first part of this twofold answer addresses the difference between body and soul. 
One way of presenting such distinction is by advocating in favor of the collectiveness 
of the soul in the Platonic thought, as presented  for instance  in the Timaeus (Timeaus, 
35a-b), in opposition to the individuality of the body. There is something into that, but 
it would need some clarification. As Eric Voegelin puts it, some of the symbolizations 
used by Plato are considered outdated. This does not mean that they are false, but that, 
in some regard, they are not the best description of the reality they claim to represent. 
The collectiveness of the soul is one of such cases. Plato s soul was more com-
pact than the one differentiated by the Judeo-Christian tradition, since it does not 
imply transcendence (Voegelin 2000: 116). The soul is still a thing for Plato, but its col-
lective assumption in the Timaeus shows a grasp on the oneness of being. Plato was 
aware of the issue. For instance, such oneness is not presented as an unit in the Gorgias, 
but as community between heaven, earth, gods, and the human beings 4 (Gorgias, 508a). 
Still, those are taken to be parts of a whole. 
Socrates  distinction between body and soul in his display points to the fact 
that the soul and the body relate to distinct dimensions of the human being. The body 
relates to the realm of the many, of things, of concreteness, of changeability, of time, of 
difference, etc. If such is the case, it not only allows, but it demands specialization. 
An art of all bodily things would be rather hard, if not impossible, to be estab-
lished5. It is probable that it does not have a name because it does not exist and it never 
will. The parallel between corporeal and psychic arts is true, but relatively unbalanced 
due the different proprieties of the body and the soul. 
                                                 
4 Voegelin formulated this consubstantial community differently, as , but still with a 
quaternarian structure:  (Voegelin 1956: 1). 
5 Although, in the Symposium, Eryximachus advocates medicine would be such art. For an account of his 
arguments in this sense, see Rhodes 2003. 
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The soul, on contrary of the body, relates to realm of the gods, of the One, of the 
Whole, of the Ideas, of the Everlasting, of the Timeless, of the Common, etc. There 
cannot be specialization on the study of such dimension. That is the reason why legisla-
tion and justice are arts under one embracive art; there is no way to split the soul nor to 
decouple the reality that it relates. 
The oneness of this reality and its relation to the art of politics show that there are 
something divine connected to the political practice. Politics has something to do with 
piety as a political virtue. The politician must be a pious man. 
If the soul is indivisible, the same must be true to the experience of flattery. That 
is why Socrates must add to his display on the flatteries. Therefore, he states that soph-
istry and rhetoric are indistinguishable from one another (Ibid., 465c). 
There is someone who opposes and, hence, balances the politician out, after all: 
the politicker6. Such man, in the dialogue, is represented by Callicles. He is engaged in 
politics, but he does not do actual politics in the Socratic sense. 
3.2 Moderation: the different perspectives of ruler and ruled 
Second, another way to establish a parallel is through the recognition that the arts were 
presented in different perspectives. The reason why legislation is collective is because it 
is a set of general rules for people to conform; justice is always relational because it de-
pends on the relation between two or more people to become an issue7. On the contra-
ry, gymnastic is individual because it refers to the one who exercises; medicine refers to 
the sick body that needs to heal. 
However, gymnastics can also relate to the rules that set which exercise in to be 
done and how it must be done when the goal is to develop the body; medicine, to the 
precepts of its practice. Each case can be unique, but they are connected to general 
rules of the art it relates. The same apply to legislation and justice. There is the necessity 
to a person to abide to the action prescribed in the legislation; therefore, legislation re-
fers to both the lawmaker and the law-abiding person. The same happens with justice, 
which refers both to the situation in which a just or unjust relation occurs and the just 
or unjust action perpetrated and/or suffered by the people involved. 
Hence, the main difference between the arts in Socrates  display is that while the 
arts of the body were defined considering the point-of-view of the subject, the arts of 
the soul were considering the point-of-view of the craftsman. However, they are still 
equivalent because both perspectives are possible in both arts. There is something per-
sonal on the soul - each individual has his own, after all; and there are common fea-
tures of the human body  which allow the existence of arts regarding it in the first 
place. 
The arts of the soul and the arts of the body partake the same perspectives, from 
the point-of-view of the ruler, as well as of the ruled. The corollary from these shared 
perspectives is the emergence of the ruler as also a ruled; something completely differ-
ent from the position defended by Socrates  interlocutors in the dialogue. There is an 
                                                 
6 This term fits well as someone different from the politician. According to the Merriam-Webster 
someone engaged in often partisan pol . 
7 To be precise, Justice ultimately referes to the relation between members of the community of being 
(see note 3 above), but it is relational nevertheless. 
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element of self-regulation on politics. The political man regulates himself; therefore, he 
is a moderate man. The display also shows moderation as a political virtue and Law ha-
ving something to do with it. 
4. Love: good and virtue 
Roughly in the middle of the dialogue, Callicles interrupt the discussion between Socra-
tes and Polus, and take over the debate. When he does, the opposition between his 
views and Socrates  becomes the main ingredient of the plot. Callicles is the first 
character to speak in the dialogue, and his also the owner of the house where the 
dialogue happens. 
Although the dialogue has the title Gorgias, Callicles is, among the interlocutors 
of Socrates, the most engaged and the one that most endure. As he says at the begin-
ning of the dialogue, for him, this is a matter of war and battle ( Ibid., 447a). That is 
his spirit, although he is the one that accuses Socrates of being a lover of victory ( Ibid., 
515b); a feature Socrates does not deny, but qualifies it: win matters, but not for its own 
sake (Ibid., 505e). Their struggle is a struggle of interests, since they love different 
things. 
4.1 A Tale of Two Loves 
The display can pass completely unnoticed throughout the dialogue. After all, no char-
acter of the story questions it, and there is no direct reference to it after its presentation. 
It is never mentioned again. However, without it, some features of the dialogue can 
pass unnoticed. For instance, right after the display is described, the focus of the con-
versation shifts to the question if it is better to do or to suffer injustice8. 
This question has everything to do with the Socratic display. First, justice is 
one of the political arts, and it has justice  as its virtue, the good aimed by the art. Sec-
ond, there is the relationship between the body and the soul. After all, to do injustice 
damages the soul, but not necessarily the body; while suffering injustice can hurt the 
body, but not the soul. Any damage to the soul, according to Socrates, is much more 
vicious than one to the body. 
The greatest evil would be injustice (Ibid., 480d), and it affects much more who 
commits it than who suffers it. That is why Socrates defends that the best use for rheto-
ric is for the wrongdoer to advocate for his own punishments and of those who he 
loves the most, if they are also wrongdoers9. Because of its absurdity, that is when 
Callicles interrupts and takes the dialogue over. As soon as he stormed into the conver-
sation, Socrates marks the difference between them; and he does that by going back 
to the display, although not straightforwardly. 
As Socrates says, Callicles and he love different things. Socrates loves philosophy 
and Alcibiades son of Cleinias; Callicles, the Athenian demos  the people of Athens  
                                                 
8 There is a reason why the interlocutor of Socrates is Polus for such question. Polus needs Justice in his 
soul, badly. He shows himself uncapable to understand what it actually means. 
9 There is a contrast between this statement and the position Socrates takes in the Euthyphro. There, Eu-
thyphro is willing to prosecute his own father, but Socrates argues against such action. 
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and Demos, son of Pyrilampes (Gorgias, 481d.). Such statement is not gratuitous, how-
ever. It is close related to the question Socrates instructed Chaerephon asking to Gorgi-
as: who he is  (Ibid., 447d). He wants to point out their distinct characters by distin-
guishing what they love, that is, what they aim. As with the arts and flatteries in the dis-
play, their loves are also divided in two; and as in the display, they aim different things10. 
Socrates explains. 
There is a contradictory aspect of Callicles  love. Although he does not love any-
thing but himself, he must follow the positions of their beloveds. He longs for their 
recognition, and so he tries to do what they please. Hence, he is able to change his opin-
ions back and forth, if necessary to be attuned to both the demos and Demos. He wants 
power, but, at the same time, he is a slave of his beloveds. Socrates, on the contrary, 
does not need to agree with Alcibiades, who is like Callicles. Also, philosophy allows 
Socrates to remain the same person in every situation. Hence, he is never in contradic-
tion, and he is never on the dependence of the circumstances. Socrates  love does not 
grant him power, but makes him free.  
If the thesis here is correct, what Socrates wants to make clear through this differ-
entiation is that he is a lover of the truth (good) and of the soul11, while Callicles loves 
the appearances (pleasant) and the bodies. This difference between them, between the 
good of the soul and the pleasures of the body will remain true until the end. Callicles is 
never persuaded, although all the love that Socrates has for him. Callicles is like Alcibia-
des, after all (for instance, see Gorgias, 516d), and Alcibiades was not persuaded either 
(Symposium, 216a-b). 
4.2 Lawfulness, the Political Virtue: moderation, piety and justice 
Callicles does not want to concede any point, but Socrates manages making him to ac-
cept the distinction between the good and the pleasant (Gorgias, 499b). Once this 
agreement is established, Socrates changes the route of the conversation, going back to 
the display, now trying to explain why rhetoric is a sort of flattery. He points to the fact 
that there is a difference of finality between arts and flatteries. Pleasure cannot be, but 
the goal of experiences; never, of an art. According to Socrates, such flatteries cannot be 
an art because their goal is a random phenomenon. Every time, the pleasure-giver must 
find what pleases his targets, and give it to them in exchange of something he 
wants (Ibid., 502e); just as Callicles was doing with his beloveds. 
The craftsman, the artist, on the other hand, does not act randomly, but follows 
an order, in the sense of a specific sequence of acts and events; like Socrates. He ar-
ranges the object-matter in a certain way in view of the desired goal - to achieve a cer-
tain form, which is the good of that art. Hence, good, as Law, has something to do with 
order. So the good of the soul must relate to its order. Socrates compares it to an or-
dered body: an ordered body is called healthy , thus, health is a bodily virtue (Ibid., 
504c). 
                                                 
10 It is interesting to compare this part of the dialogue with the thesis of different types of eros developed 
by James M. Rhodes in his Eros, Wisdom and Silence. op. cit. 
11 The issue on Socrates loving Alcibiades for his soul is controversial. James M. Rhodes, for instance, 
adoptes such position; with which I agree. 
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It is possible to affirm that, according to Socrates, an ordered body, being 
healthy, does not need the art of medicine (Ibid., 505a). Now, the equivalent term for 
an ordered soul is called lawful  (or Law . Ibid., 504d). One could imagine that, consid-
ering what Socrates presented in his display that, if what is said of the body is true, an 
ordered soul would not need the art of justice. That could not be what he actually 
meant. 
As it was seen above, there is only one virtue of the body, health; but there 
are two of the soul, moderation and justice (Ibid., 504d). They were presented earlier as 
moderation and piety, but, then, the question was on the ordering political virtues. The 
key here is to note that Socrates introduces piety right after stating moderation and jus-
tice as the virtues of the soul. Piety, actually, is taken to be a specific sort of modera-
tion, in relation to the divine (Ibid., 507c). So, when Socrates says that the virtues of 
the soul are moderation (the ordering virtue) and justice (the corrective virtue), he is 
stating that is moderation, as moderation and piety, and justice. 
Still, there is one bodily virtue but two of the soul. How is it so? First, the dif-
ferences between the body and the soul, as seen above, do not allow a direct correlation 
between the two. It exists, but it needs to be worked upon to become clear. There are 
two arts of the body, but only one virtue that holds them together: health. There can be 
health without medicine. The nature of the body allows specialization, and gymnastics 
can achieve its good without medicine. The same does not apply to the soul. 
A healthy soul, a lawful soul, needs both moderation and justice. The arts of the 
soul, legislation and justice, have both of the virtues as their goal (Ibid., 478b). However, 
such arts are subordinated arts of politics. Such virtues are also subordinated virtues. 
Now, the correlation between body and soul is possible. If the healthy body has health 
as its virtue, a lawful soul has lawfulness as its virtue. Lawfulness is the virtue of the 
political art, which is the combination of both moderation and justice. 
5. Law, Politics and Philosophy 
Socrates says at the display that legislation and justice were arts subordinated to politics. 
If his scheme were misunderstood, it would be possible to use it in favor of the argu-
ment on the prevalence of the political over the juridical. However, if that was simply 
the case, Polus and Callicles would be right, not Socrates. They seem to have no regard 
to legislation and justice, after all. 
If politics is supreme over legislate on and justice, the path is clear for the argu-
ment that might makes right (Ibid., 484b)12; which seems to be the prevalent notion among 
the leaders of Athens, against which Socrates struggles. His position is that Law makes 
right. In such a battle between Law and Power, to prove his position, Socrates  weapon 
is philosophy. 
Plato presents a series of issues in the dialogue between Socrates and Callicles, 
which goes from the middle up to the end of the book. If politics seem no longer able 
to establish and preserve the right order of the community, how its members, especially 
those of the ruling class, will be able to restore the order in their own souls? In other 
words, how a politicker can become a politician? Another way to formulate the question 
is to wonder whether a political community could be able to form its ruling class appro-
                                                 
12 Callicles makes exactly this argument. 
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priately when its traditions are no longer up to such a task. The development of the ex-
change between Socrates and Callicles seems to be a long effort to respond this pro-
blem. As it was said, Socrates answer is philosophy. 
5.1 The philosopher as professor of politicians 
Recapitulating, philosophy is nowhere to be seen at the display. Also, it is never 
mentioned in the conversations Socrates has with Gorgias and Polus. Philosophy ap-
pears for the first time only when Callicles takes a spot on the center stage. The first 
mention happens when Socrates distinguishes himself from Callicles through their 
loves: Socrates loves philosophy; Callicles, politics. 
Socrates goes on and repeats philosophy  three other times in the same speech, 
by stating that if Callicles disagrees with what he said, he needs to contest it, not him13; 
that what he says is always from philosophy; and that philosophy never changes its dis-
course. Comparing himself to Callicles, Socrates points out that his relationship with 
philosophy is not different from the one Callicles has with his beloveds. However, phi-
losophy is completely different from all others beloveds. 
Callicles accepts Socrates premises and reacts. If he needs to challenge philoso-
phy, so be it. He mentions philosophy, in any of its forms, nine times in his reply. He 
lets clear that philosophy is a rival of politics, and he explains his view on what politics 
are. He actually agrees with Socrates that politics is about the laws of the city, its cus-
toms and its people. However, any similarity stops there. 
Callicles adds that politics is about speeches, pleasures and desires. Such addition 
gives the clue that the aforementioned agreement is only apparent. The full meaning of 
Callicles  account is that politics are about rhetoric  speeches  and sophistry (Gorgias, 
484d), confirming the dichotomy presented by Socrates in the display. 
Also according to Callicles, philosophy would good for the youngsters, since it 
makes them free and prepares them to become future politicians. For the older men, 
however, it is bad. He argues that it forbids them to be good at politics. That is why he 
advocates punishment for old philosophers. They need to be corrected in order to fit in 
the society they live in. If not, they could be prosecuted, and, once unable to defend 
themselves, condemned to death (Ibid., 485c-d). 
One does not need to read this account ironically, as a threat linked to the fate of 
Socrates (Ibid., 487d). Callicles affirms they are friends and that he is speaking in good-
will (Ibid., 486a). If this is taken seriously, then, Callicles is approaching Socrates with a 
soteriological goal. He is not a completely deranged human being, as some of his argu-
ments apparently imply, but a mistaken noble man. He wants to convince Socrates to 
follow him and become a good man, a politician  as Callicles understands it to be, at 
least. Socrates seems to be aware of this. He affirms his belief in Callicles  seriousness, 
but disagrees on what a political man, a politician, actually is.  
Socrates ends up referring to himself as the only politician of Athens, even though 
he refers to his way of life as a life of philosophy (Ibid., 500c). Socrates, at the same time 
that he identifies himself as a politician, he also recognizes Callicles as one. However, 
Socrates differentiates himself from Callicles and those alike. Socrates, to explain his po-
                                                 
13 Such request is similar to a comment Socrates made in the Symposium, stating that Agathon could easi-
ly refute him, but not the truth. Symposium, 201d. 
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sition, states that he is a politician because he engages with people, talks with them, and 
makes speeches with a view to the best (Ibid., 521d) . He wants to make people better. 
Such practices notwithstanding, Socrates is not a politician because he does not legislate, 
he has anything to say at the law courts  (Ibid., 521e) and he becomes ridiculous  while 
dealing with political affairs (Ibid., 484d-e). Once this is aknowledged, it is possible to 
understand which kind of politician Socrates believes himself to be, and how such a pol-
itician is somewhat similar to a philosopher. 
As it was said, there is no philosopher at the display. However, the philosopher is 
the one presenting it. So, it was actually unnecessary to mention him, in the first place. 
Also, if the display remains at the background during the entire dialogue, this is because 
Socrates, the philosopher, kept it there. He is the representative of the display; he is the 
one responsible to defend the truth in it throughout the display. Still, to actually be suc-
cessful in such a task, he would need to demonstrate it. He finally achieves it when 
proving Callicles to be the exactly opposite of a true politician; and he does it by show-
ing what Callicles lacked, and therefore needed in his soul - moderation, piety and justi-
ce, i.e., the virtues necessary for legislating in accordance with the Law. Socrates, thus, as 
a politician, he is a professor of virtues; of those virtues he had developed in his own 
soul through philosophy. 
It was said above that the counterpart of the politician was the politicker. In the 
context of the dialogue, Callicles is the paradigmatic politicker. So, one can identify him 
- alongside with Polus - as representative of the opposition to politics  in the display, 
engaged in state affairs, and seeking power for power s sake. However, this is not actual 
politics, but politicking. There is no virtue in power whatsoever for it to become a real 
good intended. Nevertheless, Polus and Callicles exercise such political flattery fero-
ciously, because they are unable to recognize what is actually good. Such incapacity is 
consequence of a bad formation, and that should be understood as a failure of their ma-
sters; in the story, represented by Gorgias. It turns out that the philosopher and the pol-
itician are close related, although, they mean the exercise of different roles in society. 
Socrates is the only politician of Athens because the so-called politicians of the 
city are actually politickers. Socrates exercises politics indirectly by philosophizing with 
people, always seeking for moderation, piety and justice in their souls; making them citi-
zens, politicians, philosophers, etc. Hence, in certain extent, it is through such an ex-
change that the philosopher proves himself to be a politician. On the other hand by ac-
knowledging that their task is making people better, the politicians also become like phi-
losophers (Republic, 473c-d). 
If one considers Socrates as the professor of politicians, Gorgias is the professor 
of politickers and the opposite of the philosopher in the dichotomic structure of the 
display. Gorgias opposes Socrates as the paradigmatic example of a philodoxer (Voegelin 
2000: 120-121)  the lover of opinion. Gorgias exercises his profession by teaching his 
students, who are always seeking for some advantage. There is no virtue to be gained, 
no order to be achieved. Instead of getting better, the students of Gorgias get worse, as 
Polus and Callicles demonstrate (Gorgias, 519c-d).  
Now, it is possible to realize part of the reason why the title of the dialogue is 
Gorgias. Gorgias appears as the real opposition of Socrates in the story and symbolizes 
the rivals of Socrates in Athens. Still, in such war and battle , victory is not necessarily 
obtained by destroying or subjugating the opponent. As it was said above, Socrates, dif-
ferently from Callicles, understands that victory should not be pursued for its own sake. 
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Socrates wants to win over Gorgias and his students, Polus and Callicles, but by making 
them partners on the quest for truth and the good life. 
5.2 What is Law? 
The kind of victory Socrates intends to obtain and the role of the good rhetoric is di-
rectly related to the problem of Law. The main discussions of the dialogue are on rheto-
ric and its relation to justice, giving the impression that legislation and Law are put aside 
after the display for good. As it was seen above, legislation only emerges in relation to 
moderation as a virtue. This seems to imply, although Socrates does not say it expressly, 
that moderation is a kind of self-legislation. Still, legislation is never discussed as an art. 
Law, on the other hand, is not even in the display. However, it appears later in the 
dialogue as the good of the art of politics. Law, it seems, would have only an indirect re-
lation to legislation. Legislation, alone, would not make law. If this is true, one might 
wonder how they would relate, then.  
Law as such is introduced by Callicles, not Socrates, when he intervenes in the 
middle of the dialogue. Callicles first accuses Socrates of defending the world to be up-
side down (Ibid., 481c). Socrates confirms it by affirming that he is indeed trying to turn 
the world downside up. Callicles, then, makes a long speech, one that Socrates never inter-
rupts (Ibid., 461e)14. In this speech, Callicles criticizes philosophy, introduces law to the 
debate (Ibid., 474e)15, and threats Socrates both physically and legally. Callicles believes 
law to be a kind of coup of the weaker against the stronger, violating the nature of the 
stronger to impose his will by force. Callicles is the one who makes the distinction be-
tween physis (nature) and nomos (law), and brings a definition of natural law  or the law 
of nature  (Ibid., 483a). For him, such law is the one that justifies the stronger to do 
whatever he wants; it is the survival of the stronger. As Polus also believed (Ibid., 466b-
c), tyranny is the natural inclination of man (Ibid., 483b)16, true freedom, the fully ex-
pression of the law of nature. Socrates, however, fully disagrees. 
Socrates argues, on the contrary, that law is not a limitation, but the very source of 
liberty, because it brings moderation and justice to the soul of those who complies with 
it. Still, he does not refer to any kind of law. Athens is upside down, and so it is its laws. 
When Callicles says that law limits him, he is actually beating a dead horse. There is 
nothing in the laws of Athens that can hold him, or Alcibiades, or any other back. He 
just needs the votes necessary to get the realm. Rule of law, properly understood, is al-
ways a rule of moderate and just men. If there is none of those among the rulers within 
a society, its laws can mean anything.  
This point is so hard to understand because there is actually no rule of law that op-
poses a rule of man17. The option is always between two different kinds of rule of men 
who makes and applies laws. Formally, the distinction between them is inexistent or not 
relevant at all. Nevertheless, they are substantially contrary to each other. The text or the 
customs, alone, are unable to defend themselves (Pheadrus, 275d), and that is why legisla-
                                                 
14 He does not allow the same liberty to Polus. 
15 Socrates mentions it once, before, but on a list of examples, without much consequences. 
16 Those unable to be a tyrant were not even men, but life-worthless slaves. 
17 Still, the temptation to separate them sometimes is too great to resist. According to Voegelin, that is the 
 process itself into two components, the valid rules and 
the acts of their creation, and to make each of the components independently the basis of theoretical con-
 (Voegelin 1991: 27-28). 
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tion is less important than the people who live it. If there are good people legislating 
and applying them, the laws take care of themselves. Hence, a society will live under a 
proper rule of law, or not, depending on the quality of those who rule it18. The kind of 
laws Socrates defends aims at moderation, piety and justice, the kind that is described as 
rule of law.  
However, those laws ordering Athens at that time were not, because there was no 
person among the leaders of Athens able to carry the rule of law. Callicles symbolizes the 
typical Athenian politician of his time. Callicles is a politician in the common sense of 
the word; a politicker, as said above. He is seeking power. He does not believe in the rule 
of law, because he wants the rule of Callicles, instead. However, it was already seen 
above that Callicles is a slave of his own appetites. The telos, the finality of his action is 
pleasure. That is his love, which leads to insatiateness and an everlasting pain (Ibid., 494a-
b). His opposition to law, or to the rule of law, is nothing but the recognition that law is 
an obstacle to his attempt to ease his suffering. 
Under that cloth of a power-thirsting relentless political warrior, a miserable man 
is hidden. Socrates knows it. His effort in going into a heated argument with Callicles is 
revealed to have a soteriological goal. This is the same soteriological goal that it was said 
Callicles has toward Socrates. Both want to save the other. Their clash, thus, reveals it-
self as a struggle of persuasions. They are both using rhetorical tools to convince the 
other to live the good life, or, in orther words, the political life. The problem is that they 
cannot agree on the meaning of politician . 
Socrates asks for an example of politician that made the Athenian better. Callicles 
can only name those that made Athens, the city, better by building walls, dockyards, 
ships, etc. The people, however, only got worse (Gorgias, 515e.). It is the evidence that 
the good aimed by the city is not a real political good, and this reflects in its laws. Being 
a law-abiding citizen in such environment does not make anyone good, since there is no 
virtue linked to legislation at all. 
In the dialogue, Socrates points that Athenian legislation could not be law because 
it lacked moderation. It was unable to moderate its people because those who legislated 
were not moderate themselves. In the Gorgias, Callicles symbolizes this complete de-
tachment of the Athenian elite to lawfulness, the virtue of politics; the right order of the 
soul. Law, as Callicles understands it, does not mean anything, letting the political order 
void of substance.  
Whenever the truth of legislation is lost, and it becomes the result of wills clashing 
to each other, the task of regaining the lost order becomes harder. The laws and social 
customs become suspicious as their interpreters, who attempt to persuade others that 
their goal is noble and good. Rhetoric becomes as empty as those who practice it. That 
was the ill of Athens diagnosed in the dialogue. In Gorgias, Plato shows a way to recon-
quer the reality lost. In order to reestablish the order in the city, the politicians need to 
order their soul rightly, that is, to arrange it through love toward the actual and true 
Good.  
However, this is achieved, first, politically through persuasion. Hence, rhetoric 
and dialectic are proven to be inseparable, making fully clear why the title of the dia-
logue is Gorgias, and what kind of victory Socrates was pursuing. Socrates wanted to 
win over Gorgias and his disciples for their sake. He wanted them to be virtuous, to use 
their talent to educate others toward virtue, and to rule lawfully. The only way to save 
                                                 
18 This could mean everybody, in a complete democracy. The political system is irrelevant here. 
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Athens from itself is to create a ruling class capable of legislating well, enabling the rest 
of the citizens to become better by abiding to the law. In the end, the right political or-
der or, equally saying, the Law is nothing more than the social manifestation of the right 
order of the souls of the members of the political community. 
6. Conclusion 
The Socratic display of arts and flatteries of body and soul was presented as the key to 
understand the unfolding of the dialogue and its meaning. The analysis revealed what is 
the art of legislation and how it relates to its good: the lawmaker aims, or must aim, at se-
curing a moderate and pious social environment. This would be the first step toward a 
just society, and it would enable the necessary margin of freedom for its citizen to flour-
ish; i.e., to become more virtuous. In Chapter III, the question became how the law-
maker would be able to know what piety and moderation actually are. The answer ap-
pears in the debate between Socrates and Callicles from the necessity to love the sub-
stantial good, not the empty pleasure. 
Lawfulness, as the right order of one s soul, establishes itself as the answer to the 
question of what is the political good intended. In its turn, lawfulness has brought Law 
into prominence. Thus, the question on what is Law is addressed. The answer of such 
question illuminated the meaning of Socrates as the only politician of Athens. The right 
political order, the Law, is the good of the art of politics. Law is also the social manifes-
tation of the right order of the soul of the members of the political community; of 
which Socrates became the only representative. The social ascent of people like Gorgias, 
which would teach rhetoric without concern for what is good and just, resulted in the 
loss of substantial Law in Athens. People lost contact with the common good.  
The title of the dialogue is Gorgias because he is the anti-Socrates in the drama, the 
paradigm, and main enabler, of philodoxers, the lovers of opinion. They are those 
against whom the philosopher reacts. They are also those Socrates knows he ultimately 
needs to change in order to save Athens.    
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